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ARTICLES 
PROCEDURE, POLITICS AND POWER: 
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 
Stephen B. Burbank* 
INTRODUCTION 
I t  is a privilege and a source of great personal satisfaction to par­
ticipate in a festschrift honoring David Shapiro , whose influence on 
the fields of federal courts and civil procedure-through his scholar­
ship, teaching, and colleagueship-has been pronounced, enduring, 
and thoroughly constructive . Equipped with a penetrating intelli­
gence and a wry sense of humor, David is a brilliant scholar, a 
thoughtful and subtle critic,  a generous colleague , and a loyal friend. 
David seems always to bring out the best in those around him, 
encouraging the search for truth , gently deflating pretension, and , by 
force of luminous example, demonstrating that the path to progress 
lies neither in raw power, intellectual or political, nor in situational 
expedience, but rather in hard work, in good faith ,  for the common 
weal . His is the voice of sweet  reason. David's  quiet and courageous 
example in confronting and mastering health problems has inspired 
those who regard him as a mentor, as I do, reminding us how fortu­
nate we are to hear that voice and how important it is to listen. 
© Stephen B. Burbank 2004 
'� DaYid Berger Professor for the Admi n istration of J ustice ,  U niversity of 
Pennsylvania Law School. This Article elaborates presentations made at a June 2003 
Conference on Civil Procedure sponsored by the Association of American Law 
Schools and at an Ad Hoc Faculty Workshop of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
School .  I particularly appreciate the comments and suggestions of Morris Arnold,  
Lawrence Bamn, Edward Becker,  Charles Geyh ,  Nathaniel Persily, Louis Pollak, 
.Judi th Resnik,  Kim Scheppele,  Anthony Scirica,  Catherine Struve , and Stephen 
Subrin.  Peter McCabe, John Rabiej and James Ish ida of the Admi n istrative Office of 
the Uni ted States Courts patien tly responded to numerous questions .  Andrew Bradt, 
Harvard Law School class of 2005, provided excellent research assistance. 
N O T R E D A M E L A W  R E VIEW 
It may seem odd to dedicate an article about procedure, politics 
and power to a scholar so prominently associated with great traditions 
of legal scholarship-and in that sense, so old-fashioned-as David 
Shapiro . Yet, the opportunity to write on this subject in  h is honor 
seemed to me a fine way to emphasize what is wrong with the picture 
of procedural lawmaking for the federal courts that emerges from this 
work. To be sure , my approach is not, or at least not exclusively, old­
fashioned in the above sense, since I attempt to deploy the insights of 
disciplines in addition to law. At the end of the day, however ,  my 
conclusions resonate with the lessons of David 's  l ife in the academy: 
neither unvarnished power nor unvarnished reason is the answer to 
our current dilemmas, and if we sincerely desire progress in the p ub­
lic interest, rather than personal, partisan , or insti tutional advantage , 
we must proceed with respect for others and for our traditions, and 
with humility. 
If one is to reckon with power, it is necessary to know where it lies 
and to take i ts measure . For that reason, in Part I of this Article,  I seek 
to identify the seats of power with respect to federal procedural law 
and to do so without romance. A clear-eyed view that is informed by 
precedent and history leaves little doubt that Congress holds the cards 
and that the questions of moment are , therefore, whether, when, and 
after what process of consultation, i t  should play them. 
I turn in Part I I  to a brief history of the congressional role in 
fashioning procedural law for the federal courts , hoping thereby to 
tap its power in helping us to understand the past and to navigate the 
future . A broad historical view-one that does not proceed as if his­
tory began in 1 934 and ended in 1 973-confirms the analysis in Part I 
and, by revealing the changes that have taken place over the long run, 
lays the groundwork for a better understanding of the causal influ­
ences and normative implications of those changes. 
With these preludes to the main event, I devote most of my effort, 
in Part III ,  to trying to tease out what has changed, and why, in the 
relationship between Congress, the federal courts , and the federal j u­
diciary in the regulation of procedure . I perceive importan t  changes 
in ( 1 )  the ways in which procedure is viewed by the bar, the academy 
and the public, affecting the jurisprudential and political landscapes 
of ·which Congress and the federal j udiciary (and also the Executive 
Branch ) are a part and to which they respond; (2) the rulemakers,  
their identity and interests ,  and the rulemaking process; and ( 3 )  Con­
gress's abili ty and incentives to monitor procedural lawmaking by the 
judiciary and to make such law itself. Intersecting with , and at critical 
points contributing to , all of these changes are others that I also dis-
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cuss, including changes in the bar and in the federal judiciary as an 
insti tution. 
Much as I admire David and have benefited from his scholarship 
and counsel, there is no mistaking our personalities or our scholarly 
voices. We have forged different paths, and in different  ways, to our 
respective visions of the truth .  I am mindful, therefore, that he will 
not agree with some of what is set clown here. Particularly because 
this is a work in progress, part of an ongoing project on procedure 
and power, I can only hope to be worthy of his continuing counsel, as 
I know I will be blessed with his continuing friendship. 
I. THE SEATS OF PowER 
Careful consideration ofjudicial independence from an interdis­
ciplinary perspective has prompted recognition of the \Veakness of the 
federal judiciary's defenses against congressional determination to 
control or influence i ts decisions. Life tenure subject only to removal 
from office through the impeachment process , protection against 
diminution of compensation while in office, and the other protections 
of Article III, such as they are , 1 leave Congress free , were it so in­
c lined, to use a host  of other methods to work its will: from court 
s tripping, to court packing, to j urisdiction stripping or otber jurisdic­
tional regulation, to refusal to authorize (or fil l )  judgeships required 
to keep pace with a growing workload, to slow budgetary starvation.� 
Fortunately, over the years since the Founding, Congress has 
rarely used the blunt instruments that are available, and when it h<ts 
clone so, there has usually been wide-spread agreement that such use 
"The Judges. both of the s upreme and inferior Couns, shal l hold their Office., 
during good Behaviour, and shall. at stated Time�, receive for their Senice:;, �t Com­
pensation, \vhich shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office . .. U.S. 
CoNsT. art. Til,§ l. As to the "other pmtections.·· see Ste ph en B. Burbank. Tit!' ,\;r/ii-
{1 I. . l I I · · I · �') S ( ' L R.. "·1 - � 0- ')(.. ( I t)CJC). lerture o ur.u:w nrPjJI'IIr nuF, /_ . , .. \!... . i·.\'. ·' :'l, ·''-J-- J . • •  ) . 
Apart from habeas corpus and thejurisdiction of the S upreme C:ottrt, ,,·hich 
have special status under the Constitution, if we �{ccept the imiolabilit\' ,,fa 
final federal_judgment in a particular case, on the one hand. and Congress· 
power to change substanti\·e federal law prospectivclv, on the other, the 
scope of debate regarding changes in the jurisdiction or powers of the fed­
eral courts that would implicate core federal judicia ! independence should 
be confined to ( 1 )  the judicial power to interpret and i m plem en t tile Cml-;ti­
Lution, and ( 2 )  the irreducible powers or federal courts to act as such. 
!d. (footnotes omitted). For a recent decision f:liling hct\\·een the LW\J kmd·, �mel 
upholding congressional po\\'er to impose an automatic stay of prospectin· i;: :nt( t1-.·e 
relief in prison condiLions litigation, see Mil/r; 1'. F-m11h, :)30 U.S. 3:27 z:ZOOO 
2 See Burbank, SHjHa n ote 1. at 3 J 8-26; Stephen B. Ru ;-bank, H 7w! Oo \,\ i' .\f,w; /Jy 
''} f . . ll I I I . "? r::4 0 � . .  -i J CJ<) •l ·O<)- ')I\ (9')'l'3' U( !rta n�e1wnr t'llrr . , n HIO :::,1. . .. . �'-�' • ·'- 1--�· _\ t . •  1. 
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was a mistake. Indeed, it seems plausible that, as Professor Geyh has 
argued, there have developed constitutional customs or norms against 
the use of most of these instruments of pow·er-customs or norms 
that, on a realistic view, may be more important to the actual health of 
federal judicial independence than the formal protections the Consti­
tution affords.3 I t  also seems plausible that the practical unavailability 
of blunt instruments to control or influence the federal j udiciary is 
one reason for the greater perceived importance of the appointment 
process for federal court j udges , as to 1vhich a custom or norm of sen­
atorial acquiescence m presidential nominations has never 
developed."' 
The same careful consideration of the seats of power is important 
when the subject is not federal j udicial independence but the regula­
tion of procedure in the federal courts . Indeed, the two subjects may 
be related .''; Moreover, j ust as understanding judicial independence 
requires careful unpacking, so,  in considering the status and relation­
ship of the respective powers of Congress, the federal courts , and the 
federal judiciary in the regulation of procedure, precise analysis re­
quires numerous distinctions. The inability to perceive (or  acknowl­
edge the importance of) such distinctions is one reason why some 
discussions of the question,  and in particular of the role of the inher-
3 Set Charles Gardner Geyh , Cvslrmzmy lnriPjJPnrltnrP, in JL'DICI.\L INDEPENDENcE 
.\T THE CRossRO.-\DS: AN lNTERDISCIPUN\RY APPROACH 160, 162 (Stephen B .  Burbank & 
Barry Friedman eds . ,  2002) [hereinafter JuDICL\L !!'!DEPENDENCE]; SPP also Stephen B. 
Burbank & Barry Friedman, [ntrorf'Urtion, in JL'DICI.\L INDEPENDENCE, sujJm, at  5-6; 
Charles G. Ceyh,  Judici(/l lndwpendenrr, Judirial Accounlability, and thP Role of CongrPs­
sionrd ,\.0/ms in Congrr>ssional RPgulation of the Courts, 78 IND. l.J. 153 (2003) [hereinai� 
ter Gevh, Cnrt,L,DPssional Xonns]. 
[T] he formal protections of j udicial independence in the Constitu tion are 
c!waded by those formal powers that could be usee! to control or i nt1uence 
decisiuns, and informal arrangements and understandings reached in  their 
shadow may be far more significant to the quantum and qual i ty of federal 
_judicia! independence (and accoun tabil i ty) . 
Bmbank, suj)ltl note 2, at 336. 
4 See Geyh, CongrPssional Nonns, sujJm note 3, at 211-20; Stephen B. Burbank, 
Politlrs. PriviiPge and Powr>r: The Senatp \ Role in tht ApjJOint mmt of f·f>deml Judges, 86 .JUDI­
( \iL'RE 2-± (2002). Professor Gevh is developing h is work further  in a book. 
5 Set Stephen C. Breyer, .fndirial !nrlf!jmzrfpnu' in the Uni!Pd Sta/Ps, 40 ST. Louis U. 
LJ ��;:�ll. 991 ( l996) ("The power over the procedural environmen t  i n  which cases are 
he<i•-cl .mel decisions are rendered is probably the power that is nearest the core of 
in�timtional_juclic ial  independence. "); Linda S. Mullenix ,  judicial Powa and 1/zr: Ru!Ps 
Fnubii ng Act, 46 !'VIF.R<TR L. Rn. 733, 734 ( 1995 ) ("A j udiciary that can not create i ts 
(W:n procedural rules is not an inclependent j udic iary." ) .  
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ent powers of federal courts, are s o  thoroughly unsatisfactory. 6 An­
other reason may be the incentive of any institution ( and of those who 
champion that institution) to prefer ambiguity when clarity might di­
minish its power or prestige . 7  
The critically important distinctions for these purposes are those 
( 1) between procedure fashioned (or  applied as precedent) in deci­
sional law and that provided prospectively in court rules, (2) between 
local court rules (for the regulation of proceedings in the promulgat­
ing court) and supervisory court rules (for the regulation of proce­
dure in inferior courts ) , and (3) between inherent power in the weak 
sense ( the power to act in the absence of congressional authorization)  
and inherent power in  the strong sense ( the power to  act in  contra­
vention of congressional prescription) . 
The lawmaking powers of Congress under Article I, including its 
powers under the Necessary and Proper Clause in aid of its own pow­
ers and of the Article III judicial power, enable Congress to make pro­
spective law throughout the broad field of procedure .H This has been 
the consis tently held and oft-articulated view of the Supreme Court 
since at least 1825,9 which means that, even if the Court's statements 
6 SPe, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform 
Art and Sejmration of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REv. 1 283, 1 3 1 9-22 ( 1 993) . In  my view, the 
best articles remain Felix Fran kfurter, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Con­
tempts in "Inferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Sepa-ration of Powers, 37 Hr\RV. L. REv. 1 0 1 0  
( 1 924) ; Tyrrell Will iams, The Sourre ojA11thority for RulPs of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 
W.-\SH. U. L.Q. 459 ( 1 937) ; and A. Leo Levin & Anthony G.  Amsterdam , Legislative 
Control overjudicial Rulnnaking: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, l 07 U .  PA. L. REv. 1 
( 1 958) . For an admirably careful recent effort, see Robert]. Pushaw, Jr. , :nu lnhe1Pnl 
Powers of Fednal Courts and the Structural Constitution, 86 lmvA L. REv. 735 ( 200 1 ) .  
7 See joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with lvlultiple Pnsonality Disor­
riPis: ThP ��'!hlP of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and fnterjJTetation, 54 STAN. L. RE\'. 627 
(2002 ) .  
8 "To make all Laws which shall b e  necessary and proper for carrying into Execu­
tion the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this  Constitution in the 
Co\·ern ment of the United States, or  in any Department or  Officer thereof." U.S .  
CoNsT. art. I ,  § 8. The "foregoing Powers" include, in  turn, the powers both to enact 
rules of substantive law in  areas of federal competence and to "constitute tribunals 
inferior to the supreme Court . ' '  !d. N ote, moreover. that some statutory procedural 
provisions can be j ustified without reference to the Necessary and P roper Clause. For 
a recent decision upholding a statutory ban on the discovery or  admissibil ity of cer­
tain  information as a proper exercise of Congress 's Com merce Clause power, see 
Pierce Courztv v. Guillen, 537 U.S .  1 29 (2003). The Court found that it was not neces­
sary to reach the question whether the provisions in question "could also be a proper 
exercise of Congress' authoritv under the Spending Clause or the Necessary and 
Proper Clause . "  !d. at 1 47 n .9 .  
9 Ser, P.g., Hanna v .  Plumer, 3HO U.S .  460,  473-74 ( 1 965 ) ;  Sibbach v .  Wilson,  31 2 
U.S.  1 ,  9- 1 0  (1941 ) ;  Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S .  (10 Wheat. ) l, 42-43 ( 1 825) . 
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are, as a scholar has claimed, dicta, 10 they are very old and tenacious 
dicta. They are also surely correct as a matter of consti tutional law. 
Indeed, the puzzle is not where Congress gets i ts power, but rather, 
particularly in the case of supervisory court rules, how the exercise of 
a power to promulgate prospective , legislation-like rules can be 
squared with the grant of judicial power in Article III.11 
This probably helps to explain why, although ( as of 1 982)  the 
Supreme Court had "never satisfactorily explained . . .  the place of 
court rulemaking in our consti tutional framework," 12 i t  had consist­
ently espoused the view that Congress may delegate i ts legislative 
power over procedure , and that Congress did so in the vanous ena­
bling acts granting rulemaking power to federal courts .  
[The theory o f  delegated legislative power J has n o t  easily won ac­
ceptance i n  the l i terature. During the campaign for the u n i form 
federal procedure bi l l  and the national movement for court 
rulemaking, arguments were i ncreasingly made that c o urts pos­
sessed the inheren t  power to regulate procedure by court rules and 
to do so even i n  the teeth of c o n trary legislative direction. To be 
sure, such arguments often reflec ted the passion of the reformer 
more than the detachme n t  of the scholar, ignoring distin ctions be­
tween local and supervisory rules of court and betwee n  rules of 
court promulgated i n  a legislative vacuum and rules of court c o n tra­
ven i ng statutes; but they were, an d are, persiste n t. 1� 
l 0 See Mullenix, sujJra note 6, at 1327-28. 
11 See j.-\CK B. vVE!f'!STEIN, REFOR!\1 OF COURT Rl!LE-MAKINC PROCEDURES 44-55 
( 1977). Note that this discussion concerns prospective procedural lawmaking, not 
procedure fashioned (or applied as precedent) in the context of deciding a case. 
12 Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules F.nabling Act of 1 934, 130 U. P.\. L. RE\'. 1015, 
1115 (1982). 
The Supreme Court has never satisfactorily explained-indeed it has hardly 
discussed-the place of court rulemaking in our constitutional framework. 
The early cases, starting with Wayman v. Southard, in which the sources and 
limits of the rulemaking power were treated, set a pattern of ambiguity that 
has not been departed from. Not even the power of federal courts to regu­
late procedure by court rules in the absence of legislative authorization, 
power assumed to exist in the 1926 Senate Report [on the bill that became 
the Rules Enabling Act of 1934], is made clear in those cases, and it has not 
been made clear since. 
!d. (footnotes omitted). 
13 !d. at 1116 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 1021 n.19. Perhaps this is not surpris-
ing, given the controversy surrounding legislative delegation more generally. 
The reader should recall that those who framed our system of government 
adopted no explicit limitations on the scope and manner of legislative dele­
gation. Madison and his contemporaries foresaw little danger from con­
gressmen giving up too much of their pO\ver .... Dangers arising from the 
natural inclinations of legislatures understandably received attention, 
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The intervening twenty years since these words were ·written have wit­
nessed a major decision exploring (and, one would have thought, 
clarifying) the constitutional landscape of rulemaking, but that has 
not weakened the resistance of some to the evident implications of the 
dominant theory of court rulemaking when the existence of power 
has been more than a theoretical question. Alas, the passage of time 
also has not improved the quality or detachment of the arguments 
against the traditional theOl)'· 
vVhatever else one may think about the Court's decision in Mis­
tretta v. United States, 14 it would appear to make legally untenable the 
notion that court rulemaking is an inherent judicial power. To the 
contrary, the Court was at pains to justify court rulemaking as not "in­
herently nonjudicial ," 1 "  and thus as capable of being delegated to the 
judiciary. " [RJ ulemaking  power, the Court acknowledged, 
"originates in the Legislative Branch and becomes an executive func­
tion only ·when delegated by the Legislature to the Executive 
Branch . " 1" By parity of reasoning, it becomes a judicial function only 
when delegated by the legislature to the judicial branch. 1 7  
whereas those aris ing from iegislatures acting contrary to their supposed nat­
ural i n cl i n ations were ignored. 
Morris P. Fiori na, Ltgislator Unr:ntainty, regislative Control, mui the Delegation of Legisla­
tive Power, 2J.L IcoN. & ORe. 33, 3:"1 nA (1986). 
14 488 U.S. 361 (19R9). For criticai commentary, see, for example, Martin H .  
Redish, Separation of Powers. Judicial Authority, anrllhe ScojJe of Article II!: The Twubling 
Cases of Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DrP,\UL L. REv. 299 ( 1989). 
15 Mislrelta, 4S8 U.S. at 386. 
l6 !d. at 386 n . l4 ; 1j Supreme Court ofVa. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 
731 ( 1980) (holding that "in promulgating disciplin<iry rules the Vi rgin ia Supreme 
Court acted in a legislative capacity·' and thus was entitled to absolute legislative 
i mmunity) .  
17 See Alislretta, 488 U.S. at 392. 
To be sure, all mlem aking is nonjudicial i n  the sense that rules impose stan­
dards of general application divorced from the fact situation which ordina­
rily forms the predicate for judicial action. Also, this Court's rulemaki n g  
under the enabling acts has been substantive and political i n  the sense that 
the rules of procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of 
litigants. 
!d. (emphasis added). For scholarly cummentary that misses the Court's point, and 
thus its reference to ''all rulernaking, " see infm note 19. 
It appears that the Supreme Court, acting as rulemaker, gave an advisot�; opinion 
to the original advisory committee on the constitutionality of e n te ring judgmen t  not­
withstanding the verdict without the consent of the parties nr the jury. See Edson R. 
Suncledancl, The Xew Federal Rul.os, 45 W. V.-\. L RE\·. 5, 29 ( 1938). 
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Undeterred, in a series of articles in the 1 990s Professor Mullenix 
argued that the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1 990 ( CJRA) lt' both au­
thorized unconsti tutional rulemaking and was itself an unconsti tu­
tional abridgment of separation of powersYJ These articles give scant 
attention to history, or at least history before 1 934. 20 Thus , Senator 
Thomas vValsh ,  ·who for twen ty years successfully opposed the bill that 
ultimately became the Rules Enabling Act of 1 934,21 would not be the 
only person astonished to learn that the bill he opposed ( and that was 
ultimately enacted) "governs and limits congressional rulemaking"22 
or that it contains a "central prohibitive feature . . .  : that Congress 
may enact substantive laws, but that the judicial branch promulgates 
procedural rules . "23 The supporters of the bill would also be aston­
ishecl. 24  The heart of the difficulty with these articles ,  however, is 
1 8  Civil justice Reform Act (C<JRA) of 1 990, Pub. L. No. 1 01 -650, 1 04 Stat. 5089. 
Virtually all of this legislation h as n ow expired. See Carl Tobias, The Expiration of the 
Civil justice Rrfonn Act of !990, 59 WASH. & LEE L. RE\'. 541 (2002 ) . 
19 See Linda S. Mullenix,  The Counter-Reformation in Procedural justice, 77 MINN. L. 
REx. 375, 427 (1992) ; Mullenix,  supra n ote 6; Mullenix, supra note 5 .  The last of these 
articles is a response to Martin H. Redish ,  Federal judicial ndependena: Constitutional 
and Politiral PPnjJectives, 46 MERCER L. REv. 6SJ7 ( 1 995 ) .  
20 SPe, e.g., !Vlullenix, sujJra note 5, at 745-46. 
21 Senator Walsh's "expressed doubts about the validity of supervisory rules of 
court even v.rhen authorized by Congress remained a threat to the e n tire enterprise 
throughout." Burbank, supra note 1 2 ,  at 111 7. 
22 Mullenix, suj))a note 1 9 , at 427. 
23 Mullenix, supra note 6, at 1 31 2 . See id. at 1 330 ( arguing that the Enabling Act 
codifies a constitutional l imitation " that  p revents Congress from compromising the 
constitutional independence of the j udiciary by i nvading the inheren t  power of the 
j udiciarv to create rules of practice and p rocedure for the courts" ) .  But see Lauren 
Robel, Fmrtured hort'dure: The CiviljustirP Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. RE\'. 1447, 
1472-83 ( l9SJ4) (arguing that the CJRA does not violate separation of powers or statu­
tory l imits on congressional rulemaking) . For an account  of the legislative process 
yielding the CJR.� that is radically d ifferent  from that offered by P rofessor Mullenix 
(and in  my vie\v much more accurate) ,  see joh n  B urritt McArthur, Inter-Bmnrh Politics 
and thP judicial Resistance to Federal Civil justice Reform, 33 U .S.F. L. REv. 5 5 1 ( 1 999) ; id. 
at 555 ("Yet one of the C<JRA's most striking features is how often Congress deferred 
to the courts."); and see also CHRISTOPHER E. Stv!ITH, J UDICI.-\L SELF-INTEREST: FEDERAL 
Junn:s AND CcJLiRT An\IINISTRATION 23-39 ( 1 995) .  
24 Srr S. REP. No. 69-11 74, at 7 ( 1 926) . 
But the bili proposed wil l  not deprive Congress of the power, if an occasion 
should arise. to regulate court practice, for i t  is not predicated upon the 
theor-v that the courts have inheren t  power to make rules of practice beyond 
the power of Congress to amend or repeal. On the contrary, Congress may 
revise the rules made by the Supreme Court, or by legislation may modify or 
rutirely wilhdmw thr delegation of jJower to that body. I n  that sense the bi l l  is 
experimental. It gives to the court the power to initiate a reformed Federal 
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their failure to draw the distinctions referred to earlier, and to do so 
in the light of history. 
Congress ' s  power to prescribe procedure for the federal courts is 
shared with the federal courts to the extent that it covers matters sub­
ject to the power of the latter to make law when deciding cases , which 
is the only power that can without difficulty be deemed inherently 
j udicial for these purposes under Article III. Moreover, Congress not 
only may choose to delegate i ts power to make prospective procedural 
law to the j udiciary; it may choose to eschew both statutory procedural 
law and delegations to fash ion court rules in favor of, and to displace 
federal common law Uudge-made) procedure with , state law, bor­
rowed as federal law. Congress has done both at various times since 
the Founding. Perhaps most important for present purposes, ( l )  I am 
not aware that the federal courts have ever promulgated either local 
or supervisory court rules for civil cases without legislative authoriza­
tion;25 (2) the Supreme Court never exercised its delegated power to 
promulgate supervisory court rules for actions at law, first conferred 
in 1 792 , prior to the Rules Enabling Act of 1 934;26 and (3 )  for more 
than sixty years, federal courts hearing actions at law were required to 
apply state procedural law, "any rule of court to the contrary notwith­
standing, "n unless a federal statute provided a pertinent rule . 2x 
procedure without the surren der of the le gislative power to correct an u n sat­
i sfac tory exercise of that power. 
!d. (emphasis added) ;  St!P B ur bank, sujna note 1 2 , at 1 1 1 7; Stephen B. B urban k, !gn u­
ra nee and Procerluml Law &furm: A. Call for a i\tfmalorium, 59 B RooK. L. RE\ . 84 1 ,  3:) I 
n . 79 ( 1 993) . For a strange interpretation of this passage (which the author selec ti\·e ly 
q uotes),  see M ullenix, sujJra note 1 9 , at 427-28. 
Of course,  if supervisory c ourt rulemaking were an inhe re n t  j udicial pmver, con­
gressional oversight m ight be un constitutional. See Miller v. Fre nch, 530 U.S. :127,  343 
( 2000 ) .  
2 5  See B urbank, supra note 1 2 ,  at l 036-40. This is not to say that court rules ha\ e 
never exceede d  the authority conferred. 
26 See id. at 1 039-40. 
27 Act of j un e  l, 1 872 ,  ch. 255, � 5, 1 7  Stat. 1 96, 1 97 .  This provision co-existed, 
however, with continuing s tatutory authority to fashion local ru les ·'in anv man n er not 
inc onsiste nt with anv law of the U n ited States . ... " Rev. Stat. . ch. 1 H , � 9 1 8  ( 1 878) . 
See Shepard v. Adams, 1 68 U .S. 6 1 8 , 625 ( 1 898) . Accordin g  to Profe ssor Dobie,  
the broad rule to be deduced from the c ases . .. seems to be that the District 
Courts c an n ot by rules set at naught the Conformity Act as to th e i mportan t 
substan ce and broad general methods of state practice,  but that, as to what 
are deemed minor details and comp aratively unimportant phases of p roce­
dure, the D istrict Courts m ay make valid rules, when this seems necessary for 
the prevention of delay or the substantial administration of justice. 
ARMISTEAD M .  DOBIE ,  HANDBOOK OF FEDER.-\L j l'RISDIC :TION AND PROCE D U RE S87 
( 1 928) ' 
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to carry an argument that either local or supervisory c o urt rulemaking 
represents an exercise of inherent pmver in the strong sense and rhus 
trumps a contrary legislative direction . To conclude o therwise is to 
ignore not only almost two centuries of Supreme Court precedent but 
also more than sixty years of experience under the Conformity Act of 
1 872.  It is, moreover ,  to suggest that those who struggled so long and 
hard for the Rules Enabling Act of 1934 were wasting their time be­
cause the Court could have proceeded without congressional authori­
zation and in the teeth of the Conformity Act. ?>n 
If Congress chooses to exercise i ts power, it has the las t  word on 
matters of procedure , subj ect  only to the specific l imitations of the 
Consti tution ( i . e . ,  in the Bill of Rights ) and to a l imitation that, al­
though difficult to phrase precisely, prevents Congress, as a matter of 
separation of powers, from depriving the federal courts of powers that 
are necessary for them to act as such-to function as courts exercising 
judicial power under Article I II-when deciding cases. ::�7 
The fact that an actor has power does not mean that i t  should be 
exercised. Yet progress is not well served by accounts of either legal or 
s tance of adjudication that fits withi n  the j urisdiction of the Supre me Court . "  ld. at 
1 602-03. "But," he conti n ues, "we have long grown accustomed to the  idea that the 
Court's judicial power embraces authority to fashion such rules, part icularly pursuant 
to congressional delegation . '' !d. at 1 603. There are two problems with the latter for­
mulation .  First ,  the Court i tself has been at pains, consisten tly since at ! east 1 825,  to 
d isc laim any such theory of court ru lemaking, including supervisory court rulemak­
ing.  See supra text accompanying n otes 1 2- 1 7. Second, as Professor Pfander e lse­
where acknowledges, the Court has had statutory aut hority for i ts rulemaking from 
th e beginn ing, see Pfander, supra, at 1 60 1  n . 365 ,  which  renders pecul iar h is use of the 
word, "particularly." That usage would also be peculiar if the on ly poin t  were that 
supervisory court rulemaking is not  so "nonj udicial" as to render Congress ' s  delega­
t ions unconstitutional ,  the point  that the Court was anxious to establ ish  i n  Mistretta. 
SeP supm text accompanying note 1 5 . Note,  however, that this (very smal l )  part of 
Professor Pfander's artic le is  avowedly speculative , and disagreement  on this point  
does not  detract from my adm iration for the whole ,  which rescues Niarbwy from many 
of i ts cri tics by ciose attention to text and h is tory. 
:)6 Professor Wigmore, who suggested as much,  should have stuck to evidence .  
See John H. Wigmore , All J,egislative Rulesjorjudicial)' Procedure are Void Constitutionally, 
23 I LL. L. RE\' .  276 ( 1 928) .  
37 See sup1rt text accompanyi ng note 30. A b i l l  i n troduced i n  the House in Febru­
ary 2003 that would directly amend Appel late Rule 49 to require wri tten opin ions in  
certai n cases. H . R. 700, l ORth Cong. ( 2003) , would presen t  an  in teresting test of this 
l imi tation .  q: Mi l ler v. French,  530 U .S .  327 ,  350 ( 2000) ( " ["W] e have n o  occasion to 
consider whether there could be a time constrai n t  [on j udicial decision making] that 
was so severe that i t  implicated these stru c tural separation of powers concerns." ) .  
Like most bi l ls that would directly affect the j udiciary's  powers and prerogatives, how­
ever, i t  is unl ikely to go anywhere ( there has been no reponed action s ince i t  was 
referred to a subcommittee in March 2003) . See inji·a text accompanying nOLe 95 .  
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pol itical arrangements that obscure reali ty in wishful thinking or that 
confuse wha t  is deemed normatively appropriate wi th that which the 
law or other instruments of social ordering provide or permit. 38 Such 
accounts are not only analytically unsatisfying; they may encourage re­
liance by those whose power is in question and hence lead to confron­
tation, wi th potentially serious consequences for the polity. "'�1 
A.mbiguity can be useful in connection with the ordering of insti tu­
tional power as it can in the construction ( in both sense of that word) 
of statutes . -'1 1  I t  i s  not a scholar 's  job,  however, to create ambiguity 
where none exists. If realism about procedure and povver suggests 
inadequate defenses against improvident lawmaking, the answer l ies 
in custom, dialogue,  compromise, and statesmanship; it lies, in a 
word , in politics . -' 1 
:18 Cj. Burban k,  sujHa n o te 2. at 333 ( " [ I ] t  s i mply wil l  not  do to read i n to consti tu­
tions protecti ons that are n o t  there or to p rete n d  that i n formal norms wi l l  last 
forever . '' ) .  
39 See Ste p h e n  B .  B u rbank, !mjJlnnm l ing Procedural Change: H·7w, How, \.'\,'7zy, a11d 
l,t'iten ?, 49 ALA L .  Rn . 22 1 , 2 3 1 -32 ( 1 997) . 
!d. 
Far worse,  however,  is to tell Con gress what i t  may hear as an assertion that i t  
has n o  constitut ional busi ness conce rn i n g  i tself  with matters that,  n o twi th­
s tan ding the labels we affix to t h e m ,  have attracted s usta i n e d  p o l i tical i n te r­
est.  I n  any eve n t ,  the s t rategy [of the federal j u d i ci ary i n  opposing the 
CJRA .. ] backfi red, e l i c i t i n g  e q uallv fatuous claims of exc l us ive legislati\'e 
power in the Senate Report on the CJ R.A.. 
40 See Grundfe s t  & P ri tchard, supra n o te 7. The ambigu i ty t h a t  c haracterizes m ost 
i nvocations and discus�ions of " i n  her en t j ucl i ci a l  power" i s  also c haracteristic of e<<ses 
and com m e n tary i n\'( J lvi ng the so-cal l e d  "supervisory power."  See Sara Sun Beal e ,  RP­
cunsidering SujJt•miSOI)' Power in Cri min al Cases: Constitu tional and ,)'taluiOI)' Li111its rm t!ze 
A utlw1·it_v oj thP Fedeml Cou rts, 84 Cm.L' � I .  L Rrx. 1 433 , 1 434 ( 1 984) ( " B u t  the Court has 
n ever ful ly explored the so urce of' �md the i n h erent  l i m i tat ions on e i th e r  i ts own su­
pervisory powers or  those of the l ower federal courts . " ) ; supra n ote 35; see ulso U n i ted 
States \'. Payner, 447 U . S .  727 ( 1 980) . 
4 l  Si'i-' Ste p h e n  B .  Burbank, lvfaking Progress the Old-Fashionfd Way, 1 49 U .  P.-\. L. 
Rn . 1 23 1 , 1 234-35 (20{1 1 ) .  
ld. 
Fifteen vears ago, " law is n o t h i n g  more than p o l it ics" was a c o m m o n  refrai n  
i n  law schools,  a n d  t h a t  view remains a s tapl e of  p o l itical sc ience studies of  
human behavior.  For U udge Edward] Becker,  the refrai n  i s  not  a counsel  of 
despair because for h i m ,  law is  equally nothin g  less than p o l it ics :  the art of  
seeking to improve the h u man conditi o n  th rough intel l igence,  patie n c e ,  
persuas i o n ,  and compromise .  
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It  is possible to tell the story of congressional regulation of fed­
eral procedure in many different ways. Acknowledging that any at­
tempt to divide that history into discrete periods will inevitably be 
freighted with premises or assumptions that are disputable ,  i t  is proba­
bly not seriously misleading, at least for descriptive purposes, to work 
with three periods. Those periods are 1 789 to 1934, 1934 to 1 9 73,  and 
1 973 to the present.4� 
A .  1 789 to 1 934 
The period from 1 789 to 1 934 was characterized by s tatutory di­
rections to the federal courts to apply state procedural law,4'� e i ther as 
of a certain date44 or ,  after the Conformity Act of 1 872 ,4:o dynamically, 
in civil actions at law, with delegations to the federal courts of the 
power to vary state procedure by local or supervisory rules . 40 The 
gran ts of local rulemaking power were c ircumscribed from time to 
time in areas of demonstrated friction, such as final remedies,4 7 and 
4� Professor Geyh i d e n tifi ed the same periods i n  d iscuss ing the fudiciar/5 role in  
p rocedural ru le reform . See Charles G.  Geyh , Pamrfise f_osl, Paradigm Found: R.edrfining 
thr'fudiriruy 's lmfJnii!'d Role in Congress, 7 1  N.Y. U .  L. RE\ . 1 1 65 , 1 1 84-9 1 (1996) . 
4 1  Sl'e, e.g. , Act of Sept :?9, 1 789,  c h .  2 1 ,  ;:i 2, 1 Stat 9 :), 9�-94:  Act o f  May 8 ,  1 792 ,  
c h .  � 6 ,  � 2 ,  J Stat . 275, 27n. 
-t..J s·tl' 'Nayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. ( 10 Wheat. ) 1 ,  32 ( 1 8�5)  ( i n terpreting the 
Process Act of 1 792 to requ i re static co nformi ty ro state procedure as of 1789 ) ;  Bur­
ban k ,  sujno note 1 2 , at 1 037.  In 1 828, subject  to the exceptions discussed i-nfr([ note 
4 7 .  the basic ob l igation of sta tic conform i ty cts of 178'::! was continued for the original 
slelte� , with static c o n fo r m i ty req u i red as o f  1 828 fo r states ad rn i tted between 1 789 and 
1 8:28.  s·tr Act of May 1 9 ,  1 828,  c h .  68, § 1 ,  4 Stat. 278.  For sta tes a d m i tted after 1 828,  
s e e  Ch arles \Varre n ,  Fednal Pmrrss and Stale J_egislation. 16 VA. L. l<..£v.  42 1 ,  445 ( 1 930 ) .  
"-1:1 .-\ct ofj une 1 ,  1 8 7'2,  ch .  255. § 5 ,  1 7  S tat. 1 96, 1 97;  set Burba n k ,  :·;up·ra note 1 2 , 
at 10:)9 .  
46 Sre A c t  of Aug. 23 ,  1 842 .  ch .  1 88, � 6,  5 Stat. 5 J 6. 5 18 ;  Ac t o f  1\ilay 19,  1828,  c h .  
68,  8 l .  c[ Stat. 278 ,  278; A c t  of Mar. 2 ,  1793,  ch. 22 ,  � 7 ,  ! Sta t .  333 ,  335;  Act of M a y  8,  
1 792 ,  ch . 36, s 2 , 1 S tat.  '.2.75, 276; Act of Sept. 24,  1 789 ,  ch.  20 . § l 7 (b ) , l Stat . 73,  83;  
1 .Juut rs GoEr>EL,  Hts r<>RY oF THE SL1PRF!'.rE Cot 'RT oF THE  UN ITED STATES: A TECED­
ENTS AND BEC! N "J I NCS TO 1 80 1 ,  at 550--5 ] (1971) ( documenting the debate l eading to 
the Ac t of M ar.  2, 1 793) ; Burbank, svjJra n ote 1 2 , at 1 037 n.90 .  
47 See Act of.J une 1 ,  1 872,  ch .  25:'l,  § 6,  1 7  Stat .  i 96, 1 97: Act of May 1 9 ,  1 828, ch .  
fi8, 8 3, 4 Stat. 278 ,  28 1 .  The 1 828 s tatute, wh ich responded tn the con trove rsy caused 
by the Court's dec is ion in \Vaymo n avoi ding the application of Ken tu cky debtor-relief 
legis lati o n ,  required conformi ty to state law on "writs of execution and other fin a l  
process issued o n  judgments" as of 1 828 ( rather than 1 789 o r  t h e  elate o f  admission ) ,  
with povver to conform to (bu t  n ot to vary) changes made i n  state l aw thereafter by 
court  rul e .  The Conformity Ac t of 1 872 contained a s imi lar  provision , ap p l i cable to 
both provisional and fi nal remt:dies,  requiring stati c confo r m i ty as of 1 872,  but  with 
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the Supreme Court never exercised its power to promulgate super-vi­
sory court rules for actions at law.4H The Conformity Act effectively 
withdrew most local court rulemaking power for actions at law and 
"enj oined continued inactivity" by the Supreme Court.40 
During this first period, Congress authorized the federal courts to 
fashion procedural law for suits in equity and admiralty, including by 
local and supervisory court rules. Congress presumably eschewed con­
formity in equity because, even if it would have been desirable, " in 
1 789 equity was either non-existent or undeveloped in the courts of 
many of the states . "50 Thus, the Temporary Process Act of 1 789 pro­
vided that "the forms and modes of proceedings in causes of eq­
uity . . . shal l  be according to the course of the civil law . . . .  "5 1 Under 
the Process Act of 1 792 ,  process and proceedings in equity were to be 
"according to the principles, rules and usages which belong to courts 
of equity . . .  as contradistinguished from courts of common law," and 
they were made subj ect to alteration by both local and supervisory 
rules .>� Procedure in federal suits in equity was governed by super-vi­
sory court rules promulgated by the Supreme Court from 1 822 . '-' '1 
the federal couns empowered to adopt subsequent state laws i n  general rules.  Act of 
June 1 ,  1 872,  c h .  255, § 6, 1 7  Stat. 1 96,  1 97.  For the h istorical c i rcumstances and 
contem porary sign ificance of the eve n ts p rompting th i s  legislati o n ,  see Stephen B. 
B u rbank,  17ze Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, anrl Limita tions o n  Federal Judiriol 
Power-A. Case Study, 75 NoTRE D.-\ iv!E L. RE\'. 1 29 1 ,  1 322-33 (2000 ) . For related con­
u oversies i n  Kentucky, see Theodore W. Ruger, "A Question Which Cmwufses rt Nation. "; 
T he Dzr!y Republic :s Greatest Debate About the]udicial Review Power, 1 1 7  HARV. L. RE\·. 826, 
835-55 ( 2004) . 
4S See supm. text accompanying no te 26. 
49 Burban k ,  sujJut n ote 1 2 . at 1 040; see supra n ote 27 an d acco mpanyi ng text. The 
lowe r federal court s  we re, h owever, perm i tted to adopt post- 1 872 state laws on p rovi­
sional and final  remedies by court rule . . See supra n ote 47. M o reove r,  the "Court ' s  
auth ority t o  promulgate court rules i n  equ i ty and admiral ty was n o t  affected b y  the 
Confo rm i ty Act of 1 872 a n d  was specifi cally continued by section 9 1 7  uf the Revised 
Statues of 1 878."  Burban k ,  sujmt note 1 2 , at 1 040 n . l 05 ;  see infra text accompanyi n g 
notes 50-53. 
50 RJcH,\RD H. F,·\LLON, JR. ET AL , HART & WECHSLE R's Ti lE fEDERA.L Col'RTS .·'. N D  
THE fEDER.\L SYSTE !Vl 602 (5th eel. 2003) [ hereinafter H\RT & vVECI iSL.ER] . .)'(l(/ THE 
FEDERAL. IST No. 83,  at 470-7 1 (Alexander Hamilton) (Cli nton Rossi te r  e d . ,  1 96 1 ) .  
5 1  Act of Sept. 29, 1 78 9 ,  c h .  2 1 ,  s 2 , 1 Stat. 93, 93-94. 
5 2  Act o f  May 8 ,  1 79 2 ,  c h .  36, § 2 .  1 Stat. 275, 276. 
53 See 20 U.S. ( 7  Wheat. ) xvii  ( 1 82 2) . The Court brought out revised E q u i ty Rules 
in 1 842,  see 44 U .S .  ( 3  H ow.)  xli  ( 1 842 ) ,  and again in 1 9 1 2 . See 2 2 6  U . S .  627 ( 1 9 1 2 ) .  
For th e h istory o f  admiralty p rocedure, see HART & WEcHsLER,  sufJm n o te 50, at 
603-04. For supervisory Admiralty Rules,  see 254 U . S .  67 1 ( 1 92 1 ) ;  44 U . S .  (3 H ow.)  ix 
( 1 844) . "The 1 9 2 1  rules ,  in turn, were frequen tly amended u n ti l  in 1 966 adm ira l ty 
p ro cedure was merged with c ivil procedure . "  HART & WEcHSLER, svpm n ote 50,  at 
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Finally, the extent of s tatutory procedural law for the federal 
courts during the first period is a matter of perspective ( as well as 
definition) . Any generalization is hazardous without an independent 
review of the statute books .  Failing that, l ists of federal procedural 
rules trumping or not subj ect to the obligation of conformity that 
were compiled before the Rules Enabling Act of 1 93454 or before the 
Supreme Court acted thereunder5'  provide one basis for j udgment.  
Yet, those compiling some such lists had an incentive to paint with a 
broad brush , whether to persuade others of the failure of the Con­
formity Act56 or of the need for a comprehensive response to the Ena­
bling Act's delegation .57 Writing in 1 928,  Professor Dobie, who had 
no such incentive, observed that the Conformity Act "is easi ly the most 
important single statute in the field of procedure at law . . .  and most 
of the law in that field turns on the applicability of its provisions. This 
604 ( c i ting A. mmdments t o  Rules of Civil Procedwe, 3 8 3  U.S .  1 0 29 ( 1 966) ) .  On bank­
ruptcy procedure , see id. at 604-05.  
54 The Committee of the American Bar Association that led the campaign for 
Supreme Court rulemaking in  act ions at law for twenty years compiled a l ist  of "fifty­
odd notable exceptions to confo rm i ty . "  Repmt of the Committee on Unifonn .fudicial Proce­
dure, 6 A.B.A. J .  509, 5 1 4  ( 1 920 ) .  Many of these exceptions were j udge-made, how­
ever,  and not required by federal  statute . See id. at 5 25-27 app. E; seP also Burbank,  
supra note 1 2 , at 1 04 1  n . 1 09 ( noting that the l ist  became "standard fare i n  [ the Com­
mittee 's  annual] reports") ; id. at 1 067-68 ( "From 1 920 through 1 929, the core of the 
ABA Committee's  annual report remained the same from year to year. " ) . 
:::>� See Charles E .  Clark & James Wm. Moore, A. Nnu Ferlf'ral Civil Procedure: I. The 
Barhground, 44 YALE LJ. 387, 409- 1 4  ( 1 935) . 
Since Congress has legislated upon a large number of matters , such as the 
d isregarding of defects of form and allowan ce of amendment, consol idation  
of cases of  a l ike nature ,  when  the  right to  l itigate i n  forma pa ujmis exists, 
when  and h ow service by publ ication may be had, the time when the defen­
dant in  a removed case must p lead , and so on in  a wide variety of situations, 
this last exception is a large one .  
Charles E .  Clark, T h e  Challenge of a New Federal Civil Procedure, 2 0  CORI':ELL L .Q.  443 , 
45 1 -52 ( 1 93 5 ) . 
56 The existence of "statutory provisions regulating particular aspects of  federal 
court procedure . . .  rendering complete confo rm i ty to state law impossibl e ,  furn ished 
an arrow in the quiver of those who sought to replace the Conformity Act of 1 872 with 
rulemaking by the Supreme Court." Stephen B .  Burbank, The Relurtanl Partner: Mak­
ing Procedural Law for International Civil Litigation, L\v\' & CoNTH,IP. PRoss . ,  Summer 
1 994, at 1 03,  1 06 ( footnote omitted) . 
57 "The power thus granted to the Court affords an u n usual opportun i ty for i n­
troducing effective measures of reform i n  law administration i n to our m ost extended 
court system and of developing a p rocedure which may properly be a model to al l  the 
states . "  Clark & Moore, supm note 55,  at 387. 
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i s  true , though numerous federal statutes control various details of 
that procedure . ":>s 
B. 1 934 to 1 9 73 
The second period,  from 1 934 to 1 973,  brought the long-sought 
delegated power to the Supreme Court to promulgate supervisory 
court rules for actions at law,59 with authority ( that was exercised )  to 
combine them with the pre-existing supervisory rules for suits in eq­
uity60 ( the last revision of which , in 1 9 1 2 , both spurred the movement 
for the Enabling Act61 and served as the primary model for the Fed­
eral Rules ultimately authorized thereby) . 62 Congress did not block 
the originally proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure63 or any sub-
58 DoBIE, supra note 27, at 584. A review of the chapter of his handbook analyz­
ing procedure at law in the district courts reveals statutory regulation of the fol lowing 
subjects (or in the fol lowin g  areas) , among others :  p rocess (form , service ,  and amend­
ment) ; amendment of p leadings and remedies for defects of form; qualifications, se­
lection,  and waiver of j ury; formal requirements of bills of exceptions; m ode of proof; 
motions for new trial ,  and contempt. See id. at 59 1 -658. 
59 Act of June 1 9 , 1 934, Pub. L. No. 73-4 1 5 , 48 Stat. 1 064; see generally Burbank, 
supm note 1 2 . 
60 For the provenance of section 2 of the Rules Enabling Act of 1 934, which Chief 
Justice Taft drafted in 1 923, see Burbank, supra note 1 2 , at 1 07 1 -76. 
6 1  See Thomas Wal l  Shelton,  Uniform judicial Procedure Will Follow Simplification of 
Federal Procedure, 76 CENT. LJ. 207, 208 ( 1 9 1 3) ;  supm note 53. 
62 See Stephen N. Subrin ,  How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 1 35 U .  PA. L. REv. 909 ( 1 987) . I n  1 935 , before i t  
was clear whether the Supreme Court would choose to  uni te new supervisory court 
rules for actions at law with rules for suits in equity under section 2 of the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1 934, Clark and Moore had noted that "there is at hand a substantial 
model for the new rules. The Federal Equity Rules of 1 9 1 2  successfully accomplished 
their purpose in essential features and, in  fact, embody for the equity practice the best 
of modern procedure, both English and i\merican ." Clark & Moore, supra note 55,  at 
394.  
63 See Burban k ,  supra note 1 2 , at 1 1 78 .  
Since the Court [ in Sibbach v .  Wilson] acknowledged the attacks on Rule  35 
in the 1 938 H ouse and Senate Hearings on the proposed Rules, i ts statement 
that "no effort vvas m ade to el iminate it" must be taken to characterize the 
results of the congressional review process. So viewed, the statement is, at 
best, misleading. The H ouse Judiciary Committee recommended that the 
p roposed c ivil rules be permitted to go into effect. In the Senate ,  on the 
other hand, a determined effort was made, supported by the Senate Judici­
ary Committee, not to e l iminate one or more of the proposed Rules deemed 
substantive ,  but to postpone the effective date of the entire package so that 
Congress m ight give it "thorough study and exami nation ."  The effort fai led 
in the Senate ,  in part ,  i t  m ay be assumed, because it  came up i n  a " late hour 
of the session , "  and in part because the attitude toward the proposed Rules 
in the House made it unl ikely that both bodies would agree.  
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sequent amendments to such Rules during this period,  and the Su­
preme Court did not declare invalid any Federal Rule ,  having come 
close to doing so in the first case in which i t  considered the Enabling 
Act ' s  limitations. 64 
After the Federal Rules were effective , most previously enacted 
statutory procedural law was either superseded ( through the Rules En­
abling Act ' s  supersession clause) 65 or repealed in the 1 948 revision of 
the Judicial Code,66 or both, and Congress largely abstained from 
making new statutory procedural law.67 
The honeymoon lasted for more than thirty years and produced 
subsequent grants of rulemaking authority for both criminalf>H and 
civil ( e .g . ,  appellate rules ) 69 cases, as well as attendant supersession of 
!d. ( footnotes omitted) . 
64 See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co. ,  3 1 2  U .S .  1 ( 1 94 1 ) ;  Burban k, supra n ote 1 2 , at 
1 028-32, 1 1 76-84. 
65 Section 1 of the 1 934 Enabl ing Act p rovided that the rules "shall take effect  six 
months after their promulgation ,  and thereafter all laws in confl ict  therewith shall  be 
of no further force or effect ."  Act of June 1 9 ,  1 934, Pub. L. No. 73-4 1 5 , § 1 ,  48 Stat. 
1 064 ( codified at 28 U .S.C. § 2072 (b)  ( 2000) ) .  See Clinton v. New York, 524 U .S .  4 1 7, 
446 n .40 ( 1 998) . For the origins of and reasons for this provision ,  sec B urbank,  supra 
note 1 2 , at 1 052-54; see also Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul 
Caning/on 's ''Substance " and "Procedun/' in lhP Rules };nabling Act, 1 989 DuKE LJ. 1 0 1 2 , 
1 036-46; infra text accompanying note 82 .  
66 See JAMES Wrv1 . Moo RE , MooRE's JuDICIAL CooE � 0 .03 ( 1 0 ) ,  at  7 1-72 ( 1 949) .  In  
a 1 985 letter to  the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee ' s  Subcomm ittee on 
Courts and Admi nistrative Practice ,  the Chair  of the J udicial Con ference 's  Committee 
on Rules of Practice and Procedure stated ,  "The Conference defers to your view that 
the supersession clause is probably unnecessary since the Judicial Code of  1 948 elimi­
n ated the numerous federal procedural statutes which were the princ ipal reason for 
the clause . "  Letter from Edward T. Gignoux,  Chairman, Comm. o n  Rules of Practice 
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States , to Robert W. Kas­
renmeier, Chairman, Subcomm. on Court.<;, Civil Liberties and the Adm in istration of 
Jw;r ice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 24, 1 985 ) , re;m:nterl in H . R. REP. 
No.  l19-422,  at 44 ( 1 985) [hereinafter 1 985 HousE REPORT] . 
117 "Since the advent  of the rules the result  has been quite phenomenal . Notwith­
standing many p roposals, Congress has withstood all attempts to obtain passage of 
procedural statutes of any consequence. A search has turned up in the rules area on ly 
a single statute, one of no far-reaching import . "  Charles E. Clark, Two Derades of the 
Fedrral Civil Rules, 58 CoLuM. L. REv. 435, 443 ( 1 958)  ( footnote omi tted) .  
68 See Act of June 29, 1 940, Pub. L. No.  76-675, 54 Stat. 688. This rulemaking 
grant enlarged a previous grant ,  which had i ncluded only crim inal proceedings after 
verdict. SP.e Act of Feb. 24,  1 933.  Pub. L. No. 72-371 , 47 Stat. 904. 
69 See Act of Nov. 6,  1 966, Pub. L. No. 89-773, § l ,  80 Stat. 1 323 ,  1 323 ( extending 
ruiemaking power under 28 U.S.C.  § 2072 to admiral ty and mari time  cases, appeals in 
c i\·il actions, proceedin gs for review of Tax Court decisions, and for j udicial review or 
enforcement of orders of admi nistrative agencies,  boards, commissions ,  or officers ) . 
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statutory law. 70 lVIoreover, i n  1 958, two years after the Court dis­
charged the advisory committee on c ivil rules,  Congress gave to the 
Judicial Conference responsibility to "carry on a c o n tinuous s tudy of 
the operatio n  and effect  of the general rules of practice and proce­
dure now or  hereafter i n  use as prescribed by the Supreme Court" 7 1  
and to recommend changes i n  and additi ons to those rules t o  the 
Court. 72 
C. 1 973 to the Present 
In the third period,  starting with the proposed Evidence Rules in 
1 973 ,  Congress for the first time exercised i ts power to block and/ or  
revise proposed Federal Rules p romulgated by the Court  under th e 
E nabling Act,73 doing so on a number of occasions rhereafter ,  albeit 
usually proposed Criminal Rtdes.74 O n  o ther occasions ( as in 1 983 
and 1 993)  Congress seriously e ntertained o�jections to the val idity,  
wisdom or fairness of proposed Rules but did not,  for various reasons,  
block th e proposed amendments .  7' Con gress has also directly abro-
For other ruiemaking gra n ts ,  see CHARLES A • .L..\N WRICHT, THE LAw O F  FFDER.\L 
Col' RTS § 6 3 ,  at 433-35 ( 5 t h  eel. 1 994 ) .  
70 See B urban k ,  sufJra note b!'i, at l 044. 
7 1  Act of .July l l , 1 95 8 ,  Pub. L No.  85-5 1 3 , 7 '2  Sta L 356 ( codi fied at 2 8  U . S .C. 
8 3 3 1  ( 2000) ) .  The Conference has perform ed this  respo ns i bility through a standing 
comm irree and a vari ety of advisory commi ttees. SPe WRICHT . . l ujJra no re 69 . � 62, a t  
429 . F o r  the order discharging the advisory committee '·wi th thanks" a n d  rf'voking a 
previous ( 1 942) o rde r wh ich had made that com m i ttee a conti nuing bodv , see 3:)2 
U.S .  8();) ( 1 9S6) . For the immediate backgro u n d ,  see Comm . on Rules of Pra c tice 
and Procedure of the J u dicial  Conference of the U n i ted States , A SPlj<\tudv of FNiem! 
.Judicial Rvletnaking, Hi8 F . R . D .  679. 686 ( 1 995) [ h ere i n after SP!fStudy] . 
�') c A f.J 1 1 1  1 9 " 0  P b 1 l\ l  8 "  " 1 '  �q s C) .- (·· ( , - , - 1 ') O ·L' � c ··  / _  .JI'f !'\.C t 0 ll }' , :J u , ll •  . • . l , O . :J-:J .'1 , / .:.. ta t .  :':-> l . COCtlfl t" C at -" • . .::> . • . 
� 3 3 1 ( 2000) ) .  
73 SeP Act of Mar. 30,  1 973,  Pub.  L. N o .  93- 1 2 .  87 S tat 9 .  ·'Wi thin six years, post­
po n i ng the effective date of proposed amenclrnen ts to Federal Rules had become ' n ot 
a n ovel procedure . ' " B urban k, sujJia n ote 1 2 , at 1 0 1 8  n.4 ( q uot ing Rep .  R(>be rt 
D ri mm ) .  
74 See 1 985 H o usE REPORT, supra note 66, at 8 n . 2 0  ( l ist ing twe n ty-four statmes 
rnodit�·i ng or suspending Fede ral Rules between 1 973 and 1 98 + ) :  Geyh . suji i rl note 4:!, 
at 1 1 88 ;  Linda S. Mullenix,  Hope Over Expe1ienre: i\Ja n dru'rny fr�j!mnal Disrmwry (/ ilfi ihe 
Pulitirs of Rulemaking, 69 N . C. L. RE\·.  795, 843-55 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
75 The 1 983 amendme nts "hecarne effective , it is true , but o n ly j ust b<trclv.  the 
House h aving passed legislation to p reve n t  them tak i n g  effe c t  o n  Augllst 1 . and [ht' 
Sen ate b i l l  n o t  com ing to the floor i n  tim e . "  Burban k  . .  1 / ipm n u te 39,  at '2 :: S .  " I t  is a 
wonde r that the 1 993 a m e n d m e n ts becam e  effenive-a n o th e r  n�n· clo�e call . . ·· fd_ 
at 2�3.  
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gated, amended or added discrete Federal Rules apart from proposals 
promulgated under the Enabling Act. 7(' 
The years after the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective as 
a statute in 1 97577 brought increasing concern in Congress about 
overreaching by the rulemakers , and more generally about the break­
down of the Enabling Act system ( 1 )  of allocating lawmaking responsi­
bility and (2 )  because of the proliferation of local rules, of uniform 
federal procedure . Such concerns prompted an effort, led by the 
House of Representatives,7H to revise that system,  yielding the 1 988 
amendments to the Enabling Acts . 70 
Most of the formal changes in 1 988 related to procedures for de­
veloping proposals for supervisory rules within the j udiciaryHo and to 
76 E. g. , Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of  1 994,  Pub. L. No. 
1 03-322,  § 320,935,  1 08 Stat. 1 796, 2 1 35 (adding Federal Rules of Evidence 4 1 3-4 1 5 ) ; 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1 988, Pub.  L. No.  1 00-690 , § 7047, 1 02 S tat.  4 1 8 1 ,  440 1 
(amending FED. R .  Cr\·. P .  35 to enable psychologists to conduct m e n tal examinations 
under the Rule) ,  discussed in Mullenix, supra note 74, at 846-48; Act of Oct.  2 1 , 1 980,  
Pub.  L. No. 96-48 1 ,  § 205 (a) , 94 Stat. 232 1 ,  2330 ( repealing Fm. R.  Cr\.  P .  3 7 ( f) ) .  As 
to the 1 994 Act, Professor Geyh observed: "Even more remarkabl e  is that Congress 
suspended the etlective elate of the rules it enacted for 1 50 clays i n  order to permit 
.J udicial Conference review, thereby etlectively turning the Rules Enabl ing  Act . . .  on 
its head . "  Geyh, sujJra note 42 ,  at  1 1 90 n . l 28 .  
77 Act of Jan . 2 ,  1 975,  Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat .  1 926 ( 1 9 75 ) .  
78 See 1 985 HousE REPORT, supra note 66; H . R. REP. No. 1 00-889,  at 26  ( 1 988) : 
Hearing on Ru les Enabling Art of 1 985 (H R. 2633 and H R. 3550) Before the Subromm. on 
Courts, Civil Lilmties, and the Administration oj]u.1/ia of the HmtSP Comm. on tiu ' .fudicirny, 
99th Con g. ( 1 985)  [hereinafter 1 985 Ho use Hraring] ; Hearings on Rules Enabling Art 
(Ovnsight and H R. 4 1 44) Befme the Subcomm. on Cmuts, Civil Liberties, and the Administra­
tion of .fustice of the House Comm. on the juriicirny, 98th Con g. ( 1 983- 1 984)  [ hereinafter 
1 983- 1 984 House Hmrings] ; Burbank, supm note 65, at 1 030. 
79 See Judicial Improvements and Access to J ustice Act, Pub. L. No. l 00-702, 1 02 
Stat. 4642 , 4648-:)2 ( 1 988) . 
80 Thus, section 40 1 (a)  of the Act both amended 28 U .S . C. � 2072 and added 
§� 2073 and 2074. Section 2073 requires the Judicial Conferen ce to p rescribe and 
publish procedures, requires the appointment o f  "a standing committee on rules of 
practice ,  procedure, and evidence,"  authorizes the Conference to appoint other  com­
mittees to assist i t, and requires that all committees appointed "consist of members of 
the bench and th e professional bar, and trial and appellate j uclges . "  28 U .S . C. § 2073 
( 2000 ) . Section 2073 also requires that,  except as specifically permitted otherwise ,  
committee meetings be ope n ,  and that minutes be maint ai n ed and made available to 
the public,  to whom sufficien t prior notice is also required. See id. Most of these 
requiremen ts reflected practices the rulemakers alreaclv followe d .  Sre infra text ac­
com panying note 206. Section 2074 c hanged the procedure for reporti ng proposed 
Feciet-al Rules to Congress , previously contained in  § 2072,  requir ing that any such 
proposal be transmitted "not later than Mav 1 of the vear in  which [ it] is to become 
effective'' and that i t  take effect "no earlier than Decem ber l . " 28 U . S . C.  § 2074. For 
the previous system, see Act of M av 1 0 , 1 950,  ch. 1 74 ,  § 2 ,  64 S tat.  1 58 ( 1 950) ( al-
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local rules.8 1 The Senate defeated the Ho use 's  attempt to repeal the 
supersession c lause . tl2 Yet, the h e arings and legislative h is tory c ast  a 
broad shadow,8:) eliciting an assurance of careful atte n ti o n  to the Ena­
bling Act's  l imitations,  which were formally unchanged, fro m  the 
Chief Justice ,84 and increasing evidence of the sinceri ty of those assur­
ances in the work of th e rulemakers when considering proposalsi:i:> 
lowing reporting of proposed Federal Rules to Congress not later than May 1 of each 
year, to become effective n inety days after they were reported) (amending 28 U .S .C.  
§ 2072 ) . 
8 1  Thus, section 40 1 (b )  of the Act extended the requirement that advisory com­
m ittees be appointed to assist in the review and development of local rules,  previously 
applicable on ly to courts of appeals, to all courts (other  than the Supreme Court) that 
are authorized to prescribe local rules .  See 28 U .S.C. § 2077 (b ) . Section 40� required 
courts ( other  than the Supreme Court) to give "appropriate publ ic notice and an 
oppo rtunity for comment" before prescribi ng local rules. See 28 U.S. C. s 207 1 (b ) . In  
addit ion,  provisions in  sections 402 and 403  amended the Judicial Code to  provide for 
the review and possible modification or abrogation of local  rules-district court rules 
bv the judicial councils of the circuits ,  see 28 U .S .C. § 332 (cl ) (4 ) , ancl court of appeals 
rules bv the .Judic ial Conference. Sre 28 U .S.C. § 33 1 .  Again .  most of these requi re­
m e n ts ret1ected practices that the j udiciary bact ah·ead;· put in place before 1 988.  See 
f ED .  R. CJ\'. P .  83;  infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
82 See Burbank,  supm note 6S, at 1 036-46. Under § 2072 (b)  as amendecl in 1 988, 
·' [ s ] uch rules shal l  not abridge , enlarge or  modify any substantive right. Al l  l aws in 
confl ict  with such rules shal l  be of no further force or effect after such rules  have 
taken effect." 28 U .S .C. � 2072 (b) . 
83 See Stephen B.  Burbank, Proposal\ to A menrl Rule 68-Time to A.brmdon Shi.jJ, 1 9  
LJ . M ICH.  J. L.  REFORM 425 ( 1 986) .  
84 Sa Letter from Hon . \Vil l iam H .  Rehnquist, to Rep .  Peter W. Rodino,  Jr. ( Oct. 
l '::l ,  1 98 8 ) , rejnin ted in 1 34 CoNe. REc. :'1 1 ,874 ( 1 988) . 
The Judicial Conference and its committees on rules have p articipated in 
the rules promulgation process for over a half centu ry. During this t ime 
they have always been keenly aware of the special responsibil i ty they have i n  
t h e  rules process and the duty incumbent upon them not  to overreach their 
charter. The advisory committees should be circumspect in  supersedi ng 
procedura l  statutes. 
!d. : sPe Burbank ,  supra note 65, at 1 038 n . l 63 .  
85 .'ier, P.g. , Burbank, sujna note 56,  at  1 46 n . 347 ( discussing a "Special Note" to 
the 1 993 proposed amenclment, adding Rule 4 (k )  (2 ) , that a lerted Congress to ques­
tions of authority under the Rules Enabling Act) . More recently, responding to the 
problems created by overlapping and duplicative c lass actions,  the rulemakers consid­
e red and abandoned proposals to precl ude the certi fication of a c lass or the approval 
of a settlement in a certified c lass action after negative decisions on those questions by 
a federal  court. SPe Letter from Anthony .J . Sci rica, Chair, Comm.  on Rules of P ractice 
and Procedure of the .Judicial Conference of the Un ited States, to Members of the 
Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the J udicial Conference of the United 
States ( May 30, 2002) (on file with author) ; Stephen B. B urbank,  Prel iminary Re­
marks at the C lass Action Conference ( Oct. 23 ,  200 1 )  (on fil e  wi th author) . for a 
··' thoughtful and comprehe nsi\·e analysis of the s tate of contemporary federal  supervi-
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and of the Court when interpreting Federal Rules .s6 
Contemporaneously with the 1 988 amendments to the Enabling 
Act, with Senate rather than House initiative , Congress considered 
and ultimately enacted the Civil J ustice Reform Act of 1 990 ( CJRA .. ) ,s7 
which was in  unbearable tension with some of the goals of the 1988 
amendments .Rs Congress thereby signaled not, as previo usly, political 
interest in controversial proposals with arguable substantive impact89 
or in isolated goodies for interest groups,90 but the capacity for politi­
cal interest in the core of procedural regulation (or, as it has been 
called, " the heartland of Civil Procedure") .9 1  The CJRA provided a 
"wake-up call"92 to the federal judiciary (which, on one view of the 
1 993 amendments to the Federal Rules, had difficulty responding) Y�  
The politics of the mid- 1990s , including the agenda captured in 
the "Contract with America" and the '"''ar on crime ( an d  criminals) ,  
brought forth legislation in which Congress prescribed substance- ( or 
litigant-)  spec ific procedure at variance with the Federal Rules, nota-
sory court rulemaking," Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of Utigatirm, 80 WAsH. U. L.Q. 
705, 72 1 (2002 ) , see Richard L. Marcus, Reform Through Rulemnking ?, 80 WASH .  U .  
L.Q. 90 1 (2002 ) .  
I t  should also be noted that i n  1 99 1 ,  the Court returned certain proposed 
amendments LO the Civil Rules for further consideration following p rotest by the Brit­
ish Government,  see Burbank ,  s·11jJ-ra note 56,  at 1 1 4 ,  1 24 ,  and that in 2002, the Court 
decl ined to promulgate proposed amendments to Rule 26(b)  of the Cri m inal  Rules 
because of consti tutional doubL'i .  See Wil l iam H .  Rehnquist, Letter of Transmittal (Apr. 
29,  2002 ) ,  rejJrinted in 535 U .S.  ] 1 58 ( 2002 ) ; sr.e also id. at 1 1 59 (statement  of Scalia,  J . ) ;  
id. at l J 62 ( statement of Breyer, J ,  dissenting) . 
86 See, e.g. , Semtek I n t ' l  Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp . ,  5 3 1  U .S .  497,  503-04 
( �00 1 ) ;  O rtiz v. Fibreboard Corp . ,  527 U.S .  8 1 5 , 842 , 84!'>-46 ( 1 999 ) ;  Grupo Mexicano 
de Desarrollo,  S .A. v. All iance Bond Fund, Inc . ,  527 U.S. 308, 322-24 ( 1 999 ) ;  
Amchem Products, Inc.  v. Windsor, !'>2 1 U.S .  59 1 ,  6 1 3 , 620, 628-29 ( 1 997) ; Business 
Guides . !nc .  v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises, Inc . ,  498 U.S .  533,  :15 1 -54 
( 1 90 1 ) 0 
S7 Pub. L. No. l 0 1 -650, l 04 Stat.  50H9, 5089-98 ( 1 990) ( codified in scattered sec­
tions of 28 U S. C. ) .  
88 "Coming so closely on the heels of legislation that culminated a fou r  year ef­
fort, l ed by the House of Represematives ,  to reform and disc ipl ine the Enabling Act 
process, the CJRA, driven by a power·ful Senator, could be viewed as repudiation of 
the new treaty." Burbank, supra note 39, at 23:1 .  
89 SeP, e. g. ,  Burbank, supra note 83 ( proposals to amend Rule 68) . 
90 See, e.g. , Mullenix, supra note 74, at 846-48 ( revised Rule 35) .  
9 1  RICHARD H .  FI ELD ET A L. ,  Ci\ ' IL PROCEDURE 5 ( 8th eel. 2003 ) .  
9� Stephen B .  Burban k  & Linda j .  S i lbe rman , Civil Pmredwe Rejimn in Compamlive 
Con!Pxl: The Un/tr.rl Stales of A merica, 45 Ai\1 .  J .  Cm1P.  L. 67!:'> ,  702 ( 1 997) . 
9 3  Sri' Burbank, sujJm note 39, at 232-33. 
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bly the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1 995 ( PSLRAr)-f 
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act of l 996Y' 
Since 1 996 the judiciary's system for tracking bills and legislation 
affec ting the Federal Rules indicates that although many bills intro­
duced 'Nould have directly amended specific Federal Rules ( albeit, 
again , far more often Criminal than Civil Rules ) or changed the re­
quirements of the Rules in specific substantive contexts ,  few such pro­
posals have been enacted. 
Here again, however, quantitative judgment is a m atter of per­
spectiveYr; As against the virtually statute-free environment described 
bv Judge Clark in 1 958,97 the recent l andscape is much more crovvded, 
and keeping the population of statutory procedural l aw in check re­
quires significant effort by the judiciary. 
Thus, for example ,  the Administrative Office identified forty-one 
bil ls and resolutions that -vvould have affected the Federal Rules in the 
1 05th Congress ( 1 996-1998 ) . Only three of those bills became lm.\'. 
The j udiciary did not oppose one of the three ; it secured an amend­
ment to another, and it took no position on the thirdYI-l 
The situation was similar in the l 06th Congress ( 1 998-2000 ) , 
when the Administrative Office identified thinv-three bills and resolu-' 
tions potentially affecting Federal Rules , which issued in four stat-
utesY9 The judiciary successfully opposed one statutory amendment 
94 Pub. L. No.  1 04-67, 1 09 Stat. 737 ( 1 995) ( codified in scattered sections  of 1 :'1  
U.S. C . ) .  " I f, h owever, the [ C J RA] was a wake-up cal l ,  the [ PSLRA.] was a fi re alarm . "  
Burbank & Si lberman , supra n o te l)2 ,  at 703. 
95 Pub. L No. 1 04- 1 34.  1 1 0 Stat. 1 32 1  ( 1 996) ( coditied at lR U . S . C:.  � :�60 1 
( 2000 ) ) .  SeP Burba nk,  sujJJa n o te ;)9, at 244; [V1argo Sch l an ger,  fnmrlie Litig,alion, 1 1 6 
H.\R\ ' .  L. RE\'. 1 557, 1 56 1 -62 ( 2003 ) .  
96 Sf'e supra text accompanying notes :'i4-5N.  
97 s·ee supm n o te 67 and accomp<mying text. 
9R SPe Memorandum from john K. Rabiej ,  Chief, Rules Comm. Support Office,  to 
the Stan ding Comm.  on Rules of Pr<KLice and P rocedure of the Judicial  Conference 
of th e United States (Dec. 3 ,  1 998) ( o n  f i le  with author) . The three s tatute� i n  ques­
tion were the "Taxpayer Confide n ti a l i ty Ac t (Pub. L. N o .  1 05-206) [ , whic h ]  co n ta i n s  a 
prmision . establ i sh ing an eviden tiary pri\·i lege fo r communications be tween a 
taxpayer and an authori1.ed tax practit ioner," irl. at 1 :  the ".A.. lternative Dispute Resol u­
tion <mel Se tt l eme n t E n c ourageme n t  Act ( Pub. L. No. 1 05-3 1 5 )  [ ,  wh ich]  req u i res 
each court to <Hithoril.e and provide by local rules . . . the option of volu:1 t<u-y A D R  
procedures ," ir/. at 2 ;  ancl the " Omni bus Appropriatio n s  Act [ ,  which]  contai ned a 
provision . . . subj ecting government attorneys to attorney conduct rules es tablished 
under state laws or rules . "  !d. 
99 .<ire .A.n � ' ll i': !STR.\TI\ 'L Orn c :E OF THE U . S .  CoL.' RTs, I xc i SL-\TtON Ar:FFCT I :\<. ;  T!  I E  
fEDE R \ l .  Ru.Es o r  P R.\C :Tit :E . \ N D  PRo< :EDl'RE,  1 06TH Co�.:cRr:ss ( 2000 ) ,  r;vrti!rtbl!' a t  
h t t p : /  /WIV'il· . uscouns.gUI/ rules/legislation .pdf. T he  fo \lr s u tu tes were t h e  Y2h Act. 
Pub. L. No. !Ub-:'\7, · 'fede raliz ing )'2K class acti o n s  :md [with j heigh ce ned plead i n g  
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of a Federal Rule ,  10 0  but i t  was unsuccessful in opposing the class ac­
tion and heightened pleading provisions of the Y2K Act. 1 0 1 
In the 1 07th Congress ( 2000-2002) , the Administrative Office 
identified forty-nine bills and resolutions potentially affecting the Fed­
eral Rules, from ·which six statutes resulted. 1 02 One of them includes a 
statutory amendment to Criminal Rule 1 6  that the judiciary requested 
because of the inadvertent omission of provisions in proposed amend­
ments previously transmitted by the Supreme Court. 1 03 Another ( the 
£-Government Act of 2002) requires the Supreme Court to promul­
gate rules. 1 04 Two others ( the USA PATRJOT Act 1 0" and the Home-
requirements ,"  id at 1 ;  the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, Pub. L.  No. 1 06- 1 85 ,  
containing a provision that "may conflict with . . .  Rule C (4) of the  SupjJlemental Rules 
for Cntain Admiral!)' a n d  AiaritimP Cases, " id. at 8;  the Federal Courts Improvements Act 
of 2000, Pub. L. No. 1 06-S l 8 , providing "for the sunset of provisions requiring a c ivil 
_j us tice expense and delay reduction plan , "  id.; and the Chi ldren 's Healtr_ Act of 2000, 
Pub. L No. 1 06-2 1 0 .  See Memorandum from John K. Rabiej ,  Chief, Rules Comm.  
Support Office, to  the  Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and P rocedure of the 
J udicial Conference of the Un i ted States 2 ( Nov. 27, 2000) (on fi le with author) . 
1 00 Sre Memorandum from John K. Rabiej ,  supra note 99, at 2 ( discussing pro­
posed amendment to FED. R. CRII\L P. 4 1  (d )  that would have " l imit [ed]  i ts reach ex­
pl ic i tlv to instances \Vhen tangible property on ly has been seized") . 
1 0 1  Y2K Act, Pub. L 1 06-:n,  1 1 3 Stat. 1 85 ( 1 999)  ( codified at 1 5  U.S .C .  
§§  660 1 -66 1 7  ( 2000) ) ;  AD M I N I STRATIVE OFFICE OF T H E  U .S. Co u RTS , supra note 99, a t  
l .  For  the pleading requirements ,  see  15  U.S .C .  § 6607; for the c lass action require­
ments ,  see 1 5  U .S .C .  § 66 1 4 . 
1 02 AoM I N ISTRATI\'E OFFICE oF T H E  U.S .  Cou RTS, LEGISLATION AFFECTING THE FEo­
ER \L RL'LES OF PR"..CTI C :E ,\ N D  PROCEDU RE , l 07n-I CoN CRESS ( 2002 ) ,  available at http :// 
v\�N\V. uscourts .gov I rul es/legislation 1 07 .  pdf The two statutes not discussed in the text 
are the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Re­
sponse to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, Pub.  L No. 1 07-206, and the Terror­
ism Risk Protection Act, Pub. L No. 1 07-297. See id. at 7; Memorandum from James 
N. Ish ida, Rules Comm. Support Office, to the Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice 
and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U n i ted States 3 (Dec. 4 ,  2002) (on 
f i le  with author) . 
1 03 Set> Memorandum from James N. Ishida, sujna note 1 02 ,  at l .  The vehicle ,  
i ronically, was an appropriations b i l l .  St>e 2 1 st Century Department  of J ustice Appro­
priations Auth orization Act, Pub.  L No.  1 07-273, § l 1  0 1 9 , 1 1 6  Stat. 1 758,  1 825 
( 2002 ) ;  inji a text accompanyi ng notes 283-84, 288. 
104 Sf'!< E-Gove mment Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-347,  § 205 (c )  ( 3 )  (A) , 1 1 6 Stat. 
2i:l99 , 29 1 4  (codified at 44 U .S .C. s 350 1 (2000) ) .  
(A) ( i )  The Supreme Court shall prescribe rules, i n  accordance with sections 
2072 and 2075 of title 28, Uni ted States Code, to protect privacy and secur i ty 
concerns relating to the electronic  fil ing of documents and the publ ic availa­
bi i i ty under this subsection of documents fi led electronically. 
( i i )  Such rules shall provide to the extent practicable for uniform treatment  
of privacy a n d  security issues throughout the  Federal courts. 
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land Security Act of 2002 HH> )  amend the Criminal Rules. 
In  the current ( 1 08th ) Congress , the Administrative Office identi­
fied " [ t] h irty-three bills . . .  that affect the Federal Rules of Practice 
and Procedure" as of December 2003. 1 07 To date, only one of those 
bills has been enacted, 1 08 but legislation in prospect could sign ifi­
cantly affect  the Federal Rules. 1 00 
The judiciary's monitoring effort requires substantial staff time 
and often results in letters stating concerns from either members of 
the judiciary or the Director of the Administrative Office to members 
( i i i )  Such rules shall take in to consideration best practices i n  Federal and 
State courts to protect private information or  othenvise main tain necessary 
information security. 
( iv) To the extent that such rules provide for the redaction of certain catego­
ries of i n formation i n  order to protect privacy and securi ty concerns,  such 
rules shall provide that a party that wishes to file an othenvise proper docu­
ment containing such i n formation may fi le an unredacted document under 
seal ,  which shall  be retained by the court as part of the record, and wh ich ,  at 
the discretion of the court and subjec t  to any applicable rules issued in ac­
cm·dance with chapter 1 3 1  of title 28, Uni ted States Code , shal l  be e i ther  in 
l ieu of, or i n  addition to ,  a redacted copy in the public fi le .  
!d. I n  the succeeding subsections, Congress authorized the Judicial Conference to 
issue i n terim rules, iri. § 205 (c ) (3 ) ( B ) , and required i t  to submit periodic repo rts on 
the adequacy of the Court ' s  rules " to protect privacy and securitv . "  !d. § 205 (c) ( 3 )  (C) . 
The federal judiciary has sought amending legislation .  See Memorandum o n  £-Gov­
ernment Act of 2002 (undated) (on file with author) . 
1 05 U n it ing and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required 
to I n tercept and Obstruct Terrorism ( USA PATRIOT) Act of 200 1 ,  Pub. L. No. 1 07-
56 ,  t i t .  I I , § 203, 1 1 5 Stat. 272,  279-8 1 (amending FED. R. CRi ivi . P. 6 (e ) ( 3 ) (C ) ) ;  id 
§ 2 1 9 ,  1 1 5 Stat. at 29 1 (amending Fw. R. CRI >vi . P .  4 1 (a) ) .  
l 06 Homeland Secur i t-y Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-296, tit .  VIII , § 895 , 1 1 6  Stat. 
2 1 35 ,  2256-57 (amending FED. R. CR I � I .  P 6 ( e ) ) .  
1 07 Memorandum from James N .  Ishida, Rules Comm. Support Offi ce , to the 
Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the J udicial Conference of 
the Uni ted States ( Dec. 1 2 , 2003) (on fi le with author) . 
1 08 See Aor, I INISTR.-\TI\'E OFFICE OF T H E  U.S .  CouRTs, Lr::ciSL\TION AFn:< TI�'<C T H E  
FEDER.\L Ru LES OF PR.·\C :TICE AND PROCEDURE ,  1 08TH CuNcRt:ss (2003 ) ,  (Wrlilable at  
http:/ /www. uscourts.gov/ rules/legislationl 08. pdf. As reported, SN' id. at 1 ,  the 
Prosecuto rial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Explo i tation of  Chiidren Today 
(PROTECT) Ac t of 2003 ,  Pub. L. No. 108-2 1 ,  tit. VI , § 6 l O ( b ) , 1 1 7  Stat. 650, 69'2 
"amends Criminal Rule 7 ( c )  ( 1 )  to permit the naming of an unkn own defendant in an 
indic tment so long as that defendant has a particular DNA profile as defi ned in 1 8  
u . s . c. § 3282 . "  
As of April 2 ,  2004, on ly one addit ional b i l l  or resolution had been added,  and 
the re were no additional s tatutes issuing from the group iden tifiecl . . See Legislation 
Affecting the Federal Rules of Practice ai1d Procedure , l 08th Congress (Apr. 2 ,  2004) 
(on file with author) . 
1 09 See, e.g. , Memorandum from James N. Ish ida, supra note J 07,  at 1 -3 (discussing 
pending class action l egislation ) .  
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of Congress.  1 w In addition,  vvh e n  Congress h as seriously considered 
b1lls that wo uld have substan tially altered existing p rocedural arrange­
ments ,  s uch as the CJRA and PSLRA, the j udiciary ' s  efforts h ave also 
included in-person negotiations. 1 1 1 
Fin ally i n  this aspect ,  as n o te d  above , at least one recently enacted 
statute requires the Supreme Co urt to p romulgate rules  under the 
Enabiing Act, 1 1 � and more congressional  mandates to e ngage in 
rulemakin g  are likely ( if, for instance,  H . R. 975,  the Bankruptcy Abuse 
Prevention and Consumer Prote c tion Act of 2003, vvhi c h  the House 
p assed in March 2003 , becomes la,,y·) . 1 1 '' 
As the forgoing makes clear, excl usive attention to the period be-'-' u 
tween 1 934 and 1 9 73 may encourage erroneous claims about the re-
spective lawmaking p owers of Congress, the federal c ourts, a n d  the 
federal judiciary. Such a blinkered view may also obsc ure the extent 
to which , over our entire h istory, Congress h as eschewed de fac to or 
de j u re delegati o ns 1 1 4 and i tself prescribed the procedure to be fol-
1mved in federal civil litigati on.  I t  is hardly sufficient, h owever, to sub­
sti tute for igno rance of h istory an approach that is c o n tent simply to 
count p rocedural statutes . 
Thus, at a tirne when mandatory c onfo rm i ty to state law in actions 
a t  law \Vas the preferred norm ,  Congress may h ave h ad good reason to 
p rescribe some aspects of federal procedure i n  areas whe re u niformity 
v,ras thought importan t.  Certai n ly, l egislation m ay h ave b e e n  th ought 
necessary given evidence of ( 1 )  the Supreme Court ' s  c rabbe d  ( an d  at 
ti mes overtly ideological)  in terpretations of Congress ' s  grants of local 
rulemaking power, as a resul t of wh ich the federal trial courts were 
1 1 0 Sef, f.g. , i\'Iemorc.ndum from J o h n  K. R<tbiej , supm n o te 98 ,  at l .  M o re re­
cently,  the Clni r of the S t�lncl ing Commi ttee w rote to th e Chairs of the House and 
Senate J Udic i�u)· c o m m i ttees op pos i ng provis ions i n  pending class action bills th<t t  
were in cons i .� te n t with Rule 23 (f) ( di�c retionat)· i n te rl ocutory appeal of class ce rtifict­
tion decisions) ;mel '.l·i th proposed requiremen ts for n otices to members of a class that 
the Supre m e  C o u rt t:-�msm itted w Congress (and that subsequ e n tly became effect ive 
in December 20\r'\ ) . Ser Letter from Hon .  An tho ny J .  Sci ri ca,  Chair, Standing Com m .  
o n  Rul e s  o f  Prac tice <mel Procedure o f  the Judicial Conference of the U n ited Srate� ,  to 
Rep .  F. james Sensenbre n ner, Jr. ( IVlay 1 2 , 2003)  ( o n  file with author) ; Letter from 
H ( ) n .  Anthony J. Scirica, Chair,  Corn m .  on Rules of Practi ce and Procedure of rhe 
J udicial  Conference of the U n i ted States , to Se n .  Orrin C .  H atc h  ( May 19 ,  2003)  ( o n  
f i l e  with author) . 
1 1 1  See, e. g. ,  M cArt h u r, supm n ote 2 : \  at 5 7 1 ; Burba n k ,  sujHa note 3SJ ,  <tt :2:)2. 
1 1 2 See i ujJra text accompanying n ote 1 04 .  
1 ' " L) Sec H . R. CJ75,  l 08th Cong.  §§ 22 1 ,  3 1 9 ,  4 1 9 ,  433-35 ,  7 1 6  ( 2003) ; ADi'> I I :'>i i STR.\-
TIH. OFFICE or T I ! E  U . S .  CoL RTS, suf)la n ote 1 08 .  a t  1 2- 1 3 .  Note,  hmvever, that n on e  
u f  these sect iuns would d i re c t  t h e  Su p reme Cuurt t o  prom ulgate rules .  
1 1 4 SPr Burba n k ,  \ ! lfna n u te 56,  at 1 05 .  
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stuck i n  the procedural  worlds of the past,  1 J :, and ( 2 )  the Court's dis­
inclination to exercise supervisory rulemaking power for actions at 
law, even when the delegation was reaffirmed and s trengthened. 1 1 ( i 
Similarly, although the ultimate success of the twenty year cam­
paign to restore to the Supreme Court supervisory rulemaking power 
for actions at law should not blind us to the real ities of lavvmaking 
power, i t  can hardly be questioned-the evidence from the period 
after 1 934 confirms-that the Court's bold approach to its recovered 
power signaled a new era in the regulation of federal procedure. For 
almost forty years , Congress was content to leave procedural lawmak­
ing to the federal courts and to the institutional judiciary whose inde­
pendence Congress i tself had fos tered, including in rulemaking. 1 1 7 
Congress is no longer content to accord to the federal j udiciary 
an effective monopoly in  the regu lation of procedure. Today, there is 
no guarantee that proposed amendments to Federal Rules originating 
with the federal j udiciary and promulgated under the Enabling Act 
will be permitted to go into effect; there is no guarantee that Congress 
will abstain from independently and directly amending the Federal 
Rules, and there is no guarantee that Congress will accept the proce­
dures prescribed in Federal Rules as appropriate for all types of cases 
or l i tigants. Today, moreover, Congress may be content (provision­
ally) to cede i ts power to make prospective procedural law to the judi­
ciary only if it is clear that the rulemakers will exercise delegated 
power on designated subjects and in designated ways. 1 1 :-� 
I I I .  WHAT HAs CHA.NGED AN D \1\!Hv? 
According to th is account, we are still l iving in a historical period 
that began decades ago , and understanding what has changed and 
why in the relationship betvveen Congress, the federal courts , and the 
federal judiciary as to the regulation of federal procedure is thus not 
merely of historical interest. To the extent that the arrangernents, re­
lationships, and accommodations characteristic of our current situa-
11 5  See Burbank, supra note 47, at  1 325-27;  Burbank, sujJrrt note 1 2 , at 1 038-39. 
l 1 6  See sujna text accompanving  notes 26, 48-49. Note also th e  Court's fai l ure to 
update i ts Equity Rules between 1 842 and 1 9 1 2 , see sujJut note 53 ,  ancl the need for 
regulation, by statute or co urt rule ,  of aspec ts of the intersection of  law and equity. 
See Clark & Moore, sufHa note :15 ,  at 4 1 5-35. 
1 1 7 On this importan t perspective, see Geyh, Con[.,'7essionaL Norms, supra note 3 ,  at 
195-208. 
1 1 8 SeP supra note 1 04 and accompanying text; see ({/so supra text accompanyi ng 
notes 1 1 2- 1 :1. 
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tion are deemed unsatisfactory, such understanding is essen tial to th e 
development of what Professor Geyh has termed a neV\' paradigm . 1 1 9 
In previous work I have sought to explain the dramatic changes 
in Congress ' s  attitudes towards procedural lawmaking as between the 
periods before and after 1 973 by reference to three primary develop­
ments .  First, key members of Congress ( led by Representative Kas­
tenmeier in the House) in the 1970s and 1 980s came to believe that 
the rulemakers were cavalier about the Enabling Act' s  l imitations on  
their power, promoting changes under the banner of  procedure that 
would have consequential effects on articulated congressional policy, 
including particularly policy concerning access to court. The most 
prominent examples of rulemaking proposals that elicited such con­
cerns were the 1 983 amendments to Rule 1 1 , which went into effect, 
although just barely, 1 20 and the various proposals to amend Rule 68,  
which the rulemakers abandoned when i t  became clear both that a 
switch in rationale (from fee-shifting to sanctions) was an inadequate 
response and that Congress was watching closely. 1 2 1 These members 
of Congress promoted the 1 988 amendments to the Enabling Acts, 
one purpose of which was to recall the judiciary to the proper l imits of 
the rulemaking enterprise. The hope was that self-discipline by the 
rulemakers, reinforced by changes making the process more inclusive 
and transparent, would enable Congress to disengage . 1 22 
Second, lawyers, members of an increasingly diverse and frag­
mented ( through specialization and competition )  profession, came to 
believe that the rulemakers (who had come to be dominated by 
judges) were not listening, and they turned to Congress for relief 
from proposals to which they objectecl . 1 2:\ From this perspective, the 
fact that the intense opposition to the 1 983 amendments to Rule 1 1  
did not succeed may have clone more harm to the rulemaking enter­
prise than would congressional nonacquiescence. For, those amend­
ments were perceived ( correctly or  incorrectly) to create all of the 
problems that had been predicted, including poisoning relationships 
between lawyers and their clients ,  lawyers and other lawyers, and lavv-
1 1 9 SPP Geyh , sujna note 42.  
1 20 See Stephen B .  Burbank ,  The Transformation of A merican Civil ProcedurP: ThP J:'x­
amjJle ofRu!r I I , 1 37 U .  PA. L. RE\'. 1 925 ,  1 948 n . 1 1 9  ( 1 989 ) ;  supm text accompaming 
note 75.  
1 2 1  Ser Burban k,  supra note 83.  
1 22 Sre sujJTa text accompanying notes 77-86. 
1 23 See Burbank,  supra note 39,  at 224-28; Stephen B .  Burbank, Procedure and 
Power, 4 6 ].  LEGAL Eouc :. 5 1 3 , 5 1 5- 1 6  ( 1 996) ; Burbank & Silbe rman , supra n o te 92, at 
70 1 -02;  Bryan t  Garth , From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice al War with the 
Profession and its Values, 59 BRooK. L. RE\·. 9 3 1  ( 1 993 ) .  
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yers and j udges . 1 24 Moreover, although opinions about Rule 1 1  
among lawyers differed,  few iawyers appeared to support the regime 
of mandatory disclosure ushered in-again ,  just barely-in 1 993 . 1 2' 
Indeed, the perception that an important community of interest had 
disin tegrated helps to explain ,  I believe , the efforts made by the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee under the leadership of Judge Patrick Hig­
ginbotham, to reach out to the bar ( among others ) , and to proceed 
more deliberately, in the mid- 1990s. 1 26 
Third, lobbying by lawyers and others led members of Congress 
to perceive that some issues of court practice and procedure either 
could be used to generate poli tical support among certain interest 
groups or in any event might require attention in order to preserve 
such support. 1 27 Thus, Senator Bielen apparently saw potential politi-
1 24 SeP STEPHEN B.  BuRBANK, RuLE 1 1  rN TRANSITroN: THE REPORT OF THE TH rRD 
C i RCL' fT T.-'.SK FoRcE ON FEDERAL RuLE or C rvr L PROCEDURE 1 1 , at 4 ( 1 98 9 ) . "Thus,  the 
Federal Rules of Evidence m ay have marked the begi n n i n g  of the e n d  of the j udici­
ary's monopoly of powe r to fashion the rules of the game.  But,  I bel i eve,  i t  was the 
poisonous envi ro n m e n t  fostered by the 1 98� amendme n ts . . .  particularly Rule 1 1 , 
that set the s tage for the m ore recen t ,  and m u c h  more serious, power struggles ."  
Burba n k .  sujJm n o te 39,  a t  2 2 8 .  
1 25 SPP Burbank,  supra n ote 2 4 ,  at 845-46. 
1 26 See Burbank & S i l berman, supra n ote 92,  at 702-03 .  As n o ted there,  
havi n g  woken up to the need to reach a tru c e  with the practic i n g  bar,  the 
rulemakers appear to be nodding off again .  The proposal to re turn to a 
norm of twelve-person c ivi l j u ries was scrapped by the Judicial Conference,  
and the p roposal to p e rm i t  greater partici pation of counsel in voi r  d i re did 
n o t  eve n get that far. 
!rl. a t  703 n . l 38 . .Judge H iggin botham was not reapp o i n ted to a seco n d  term. The 
1 995 self�study o f  rulemaking carried out as part of the j udici ary's l o n g  range p lan­
n i n g  recom m ended l on ger terms for chairs of advisory c o m m ittees. Si:'P SPl/Study, 
snjJI/1 no te 7 1 , at 68 1 ( "This was discussed with the Chief J ustice on December 1 3 , 
1 995" ) . 
1 2 7 " M embe rs of Congress were by then accustomed to lobby i n g  by in terests op­
posed to o r  favori n g  p roposed ame ndments and thus were e n couraged to view rules 
of procedure as a magnet ,  i f  not  for consti tuen t i n terests, then for special i n terests ."  
B urba n k ,  sujna note ;)9,  at 22i3.  Writ ing i n  1 989,  Professor Res n i k  observed : 
Over the last decade , a variety of powerfu l  "repeat players" h ave sought, 
some times openly,  to i n fluence "court reform" efforts. By a n d  large , that 
\vork has been clone not bv l e tters writte n to the Advisory Com m i ttee on 
Civil Rules,  but  rath e r  by lobbyi ng e fforts d i rected towards l egislatu res and 
the public,  by well-finan ced media campaigns, and bv support for confer­
e n ces and meetings to address and describe o u r  " l i tigation c risis . "  H owever 
appealing might be the notion that writ ing the Rules of Civil P rocedure . . . 
is a "ne utral" task with diverse consequences on anonymous and i n ter­
ch angeable civil  p lain tiffs and defendants, that description is no l o n ger avail­
able_  "Ton reform , "  among other events of the last decade, h as d e n ied us 
d 1 e  refuge of a comforting image . 
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cal gain in legislation designed to curb allegedly broad-scale and ex­
cessive expense and delay in federal civil l i tigation in the late 1 980s, 1 2� 
while Republicans in particular (but not exclusively) saw it  in legisla­
tion designed to curb allegedly frivolous securities fraud class actions 
in the mid-1990s. 1 29 
We know that Congress holds the cards-that it has virtually ple­
nary power over federal procedure . It remains better to understand 
the reasons why, having left the game for almost forty years, Congress 
has since chosen to exercise its power, both in matters initiated by the 
judiciary and independently. My hope is  that, by revisiting the subj ect 
informed by the recent work of other scholars and insights from other 
disciplines, a richer account will emerge that is useful for both histori­
cal understanding and, if and as appropriate, efforts to fashion a new 
order in federal procedural regulation.  
A .  The Rhetoric of Procedure a n d  the Reality of Power 
It  is astonishing how long lawyers, judges, and scholars were able 
(or continued to try) to hide the reality of the power of procedure 
beneath layers of adjectives that were designed to persuade the 
speaker's audience that procedure was unimportant ( "adj ective law" ) ,  
that it was technical (and thus for expert technicians ) ,  or that it was or 
could be neutral . l '�0 Even when such claims became untenable ,  it  was 
possible to obscure the reality of procedure ' s  power behind the re­
vealed truth that there is no bright l ine between procedure and sub­
stantive law, continuing to portray i t  as the "handmaid" of the 
substantive law. J '-1 1  
Judith Resnik,  The Domain of Courts, 1 37 U .  PA. L. REv. 22 1 9 , 22 1 9-20 ( 1 989 ) ;  see also 
id. at 2226. 
1 28 "Senator Biden is not a captive of the insurance industry any m ore than he is 
the son of a Welsh coal miner. He is a pol i ti cian who wanted a statute on civil j ustice 
reform ." Burbank, supm note 24, at 852 ( footnotes omitted) ;  sP.e also Burbank, supra 
note ?>9 ,  at 229.  
1 29 " [T] he 1 995 legislation was one of the few elements of legislative l egal reform 
successful ly enacted by a Republican Congress that had a far more ambitious agenda; 
it was enacted over the President's veto, and i ts final form was considerably less hosti le 
to privale securities l itigation than the ini tial bills on which it  was based." Stephen B.  
B urbank, The Class Action in Anwriwn Secun:ties Regulation, 4 ZZPi'H 321 ,  330 ( 1 999 ) .  
1 30 " Law reformers have long assured us that procedure is technical ,  details-in 
short, adjective la1.v." Stephen B. Burbank, Aftenuonls: A P..esjJonse to Professor Hazard 
and a Comment on Marrese , 70 CoRNELL L REv. 659, 662 ( 1 985) ; see Burbank, sujmt 
note 1 2 , at 1 052,  1 068; Clark, supra note 55 ,  at 457.  
1 3 1  See Charles E.  Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH.  U.  L.Q. 297 ( 1 938) ; 
Burbank, sujJm note 1 2 , at 1 1 36; Subrin ,  sujHa note 62 ,  at 962. "The reminder that 
there is no bright line between procedure and substantive law has been a refuge of' 
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Such strategies 1 "�� did not observe , any more than the desire to 
acquire and hold power observes ,  party lines, with the result that peo­
ple as different politically as William Howard Taft and Charles Clark 
pursued many of the same goals with respect to the Enabling Act and 
the rules i t  authorized ,  most prominently the merger of law into eq­
uity and of rules into discretionY�� 
procedural reformers for fifty years . "  Stephen B .  Burbank, TILe Costs of Complexity, 85 
M rcH . L. REv . 1 463, 1 473 ( 1 987) ( reviewing RicHARD L. MARcus & EDWARD F.  SHER­
MAN , CoMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED Cr\' IL PROCEDURE 
( 1 985 ) ) .  
1 32 See Burbank, supra note 1 3 1 , at 1 472 ( " I t  is true that procedural rul es are never 
n eutral in their  effects, if not the ir  purposes. I t  is also l ikely that there h as been more 
systematic misrepresentation about  the value-free nature of pt·ocedural rules than 
about any other  category in the tradi tional lexicon . " )  (footnote omitted ) .  Although 
the Chair of the original AdvisOiy Committee publicly stated in 1 938 that the Commit­
tee "found very· l ittle difficulty" in  distinguishing between procedure and substantive 
rights, see RuLES OF Crvr L PROCEDURE FOR THE D ISTRICT CouRTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
WITH NoTES AS PREPARED UNDER THE D IRECTION OF THE Am·rsoRY Cor-IMITrEF. AND 
PROCEEDINGS oF THE INSTITUTE oN FEDERAL RuLES, CLEVEL-\ND, OH 1 83 ( 1 938) (state­
ment of Will iam D. M i tchel l ) , he h ad ad mitted i n  a private letter i n  l ate 1 937 that h e  
was frequently dissatisfied with himself, "because after more than two years o f  strug­
gling with practice and procedure , when a question arises as to whether a matter is 
procedure or substance, my mind is murky on the subject  and I am unable to reach a 
conclusion i n  which I have confidence when ever the question is at all  debatable . '' 
Letter fi·om Wil l iam D. Mi tchel l ,  to Hon . George Wharton Pepper ( Dec.  1 9 , 1 93 7 ) ,  
quoted i n  B urbank,  supra note 1 2 , a t  1 1 34 n .530; SPe alw Burbank,  sujna note 65,  at 
1 0 1 2 . 
1 33 See Burbank, supra note 1 23,  at 5 1 3; B urbank,  supra note 24, at 854 ( " Remem­
ber that Charles Clark and William H oward Taft were dancing cheek-to-cheek. " ) . 
Taft was "dedicated to reforming the j udic ial system to make i t  more efficient and 
thus more powerful .  . . .  The conservative Taft, according to Maso n ,  saw an important 
l ink between judicial reform and the continued protection of property rights against 
popular reform . . . .  " Sue Davis, Alphe1ls Thomas Mason: Piercing the judicial Veil, in 
THE P IONEERS OF juDICIAL BEI- IA\'JOR 329 ( Nancy Maveety eel. , 2003 ) ; see also id. at 330 
(discussin g  Taft's ''dogged" lobbyi ng for the Enabling Act and attributing failure to 
fact that " i t  was invariably viewed by members of Congress as a measure that would 
furth er aggrandize the power of the judiciary" ) . 
Professor Bone h as asserted that the "distinction [between procedure and sub­
stance] made sense to early twentieth-centu ry reformers , "  and that "leading federal 
rule propone n ts assumed the integrity of aclversarial process ."  Robert G. Bone, The 
Pmress nf Making ProCPss: Court Ru.lnnaking, Demorralir Legitinuu)', and Procedu m1 Fjjiauy, 
87 CEo. LJ 887, 897 ( 1 999 ) .  Neither proposition seems to rne accurate as a descrip­
tion of the views of the two most important arch i tect� of the Federal Rules, Charles 
Clark and Edson Sunderland .  Both men were realists who favored greater con trol by 
judges precisely because they did "seriously question [ ] the basic features of adver­
sarial adjudication . "  !d. ; see Burbank ,  sujna note 1 3 1 ,  at 1 477;  Subrin ,  sujJm note fi2 ,  
at  978-79; Edson R.  Sunderland, A n  Apjnaisal of English Pmrrdure. 24 MICI-1 .  L R�Y 
1 09 .  11 6- 1 8  ( 1 925 ) .  
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The Congress that final ly passed the Enabling Act,  unlike i ts 
predecessors, did not give the bill much ( really, any) attention. I t  was 
enough (particularly in 1 934) that the administration supported it , 1 514 
and it cannot have hurt that the delegation and the rhetoric used to 
support it were consistent with the ethos of the emerging administra­
tive state . ns Thus, the judiciary was not alone in making claims to 
expertise; the political climate was receptive to such claims, l ::\6  and 
their tendency to yield monopoly power1 37 was predictably greater in 
a delegation to fashion law plausibly described as separate from sub­
stance (and also as both technical and neutral ) than to flesh out sub­
s tance itself. 
The Congress that allowed the original Federal Rules to become 
effective in 1 938 did attempt to give the proposed Rules serious con­
sideration, but in the absence of shared ( le t  alone coherent )  concep­
tions of the limits of the enterprise, and given the rulemakers ' 
decisions both to fashion trans-substantive rules and to l imit the policy 
choices made therein (as opposed to such choices made by judges 
applying them) , it  was difficult independently to assess the Court's fi­
delity, as Congress ' s  agent in fashioning prospective law,  to i ts man­
date . 1 3x Then, too ,  Congress was fed a heavy dose of the tradi tional 
rhetoric and was assured that the Court would be "zealous to correct 
its mistake , if any has been made . "  1 '�9 
1 34 s·a Burbank, supm note 1 2 , at 1 096 .  
1 35 That surely would not have sufficed h ad not Senator Walsh ,  the b i l l 's long-time 
Senate opponent  and President Roosevelt ' s  Attorney General designate , who recog­
n ized the rhetoric for what i t  was , "overtaxed his  heart in  the sleeping car from ·wash­
ington to Florida in 1 933."  Letter from Hon.  Henry J. Friendly, to Stephen B. 
Burbank ( Feb. 1 2 , 1 983) (on file  with author) ; see Burbank, supra note 1 2 , at 1 095 .  
1 36 See Elena Kagan , PrPsidm tial Administration, 1 1 4 H..\R\". L .  RE\·. 2245 ,  226 1 
(200 1 ) ; Laurens V\1al ker, "f 'h.e Fnd of !hP Ne-w Dml and The Fl:dr>ral Rules of Civil Procedure, 
82 !0\\ ,\  L. RE\ . 1 269, 1 272-75 ( 1 997) . 
1 37 " [T] he claim to expertise is also a c laim to monopoly power . "  McArthur, sujJra 
note 23 ,  at 605. 
1 38 Moreover, an etfort to secure more time to evaluate the proposed Rules foun­
de red on the difficulty of securing agreement from both bodies (and the Presiden t )  
within the short period prescribed i n  t he  original Enabling Act. See Burbank,  sujmt 
note 1 2 , at 1 1 78 .  For objections to Congress "about the amoun t  of judic ial power 
contained in the ne\v rules,"  see Subrin ,  supra note 62, at 999. 
1 39 Letter from Edgar B. Tolman,  to Hon.  J . C. O ' Mahoney, et al. (May 26, 1 938) , 
rejJri.nted in Hmrings on Rulrs of Ci11i[ Proredu.re for the United States District. Courts ( SJ. Res 
281) , 75th Cong. ,  3d Sess . ,  pt .  2 ,  App .  at 72 (May 1 9 , 1 938) [ hereinafter 1 938 Hem� 
ing]; ser Burban k,  sujmt note 1 2 ,  a t  1 1 78-79 . Tolman was "the secretary of and a major 
fo rce on the A.clvisorv Committee." !d. at 1 1 39 n. 55 1 .  
P R O C E D U R E ,  P O L I T I C S  A N D  P O W E R  
There were not many amendments to the Civil Rules bet\-veen 
1 938 and the 1 960s, at least by contemporary standards; l -w supporters 
represented that the Rules were the greatest thing since sliced 
bread, 1 4 1 and there was a substantial community of interests among 
the lawyers practicing in federal court and federal judges. Even 
before the inf1uence to that end of a common educational experi­
ence, "uniformity in training, conduct and ideas could not fai l  to pro­
duce a class with a highly developed group consciousness . " 1 4� 
Moreover, "community of interest stimulates association,"  and "bar as­
sociations [became] the recognized agencies for dealing with" 
problems in the administration of justice. 1 43 
Having led the fight to restore rulemaking power to the Supreme 
Court for so many years , the A.merican Bar Association used the occa­
sion of the imminent promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro­
cedure to launch " the most far-reaching and comprehensive 
program" 1 44 it undertook in the period between 1 936 and 1 950. This 
1 40 See Clark, supra note 67,  at 436 n.S .  Even so, in 1 955 there was criticism of the 
"al leged overamendment of the rules . "  !d. at 446 n .5 l .  
1 4 1  See id. a t  435 , 443. 
I t  may smack of hyperbole to say, as one commentator has, that the rules are 
"one of the greatest contributions to the free and un hampered adminis tra­
tion of law and j ustice ever struck  off by any group of men s ince the dawn of 
civil ized law." I t  is nevertheless true that the chorus of approval of the rules 
by j udges, la\vyers, an d commentators had been, until  very recently, unani­
mous. unsti nted, and spontaneous. 
WRICHT, supra note 69, at 429-30 ( footnotes omitted ) .  
1 42 Edson R. Sunderland ,  } 'he F;nglish Struggle for Procrduml Rrfurm, 3 9  HAR\'. L Rn. 
725 , 726 ( 1 926) . Professor Sunderland saw "a broadened and social ized legal educa­
tion"  as the best antidote to "conti n u [ i ng] to value conventional i ty over effic ienc;; ."  
and he noted with favor the campaign of the American Bar Association "for eievating 
legal education . "  !d. at 746. 
The courts and j udiciary have great influence on the bar eve n though the 
proportion of lawyers heavily engaged in  contested l i tigation is probably less 
now than ever before in this country. Many lawvers still are regularly before 
the courts on either con tested or uncontested matters, and the cou rts pro­
vide a common experience and common meeting ground for much of th e 
bar. 
Qu iNTIN Jo i-I "'STON E  & DAN HoPsoN, JR . ,  LA\VYERS AND THEIR WoRK: AN AN.\LYSis oF 
THE LEGAL PROFESS ION IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 56 ( 1 967) ;  seP alw Si\ I IT! ! ,  
sujJnl note 23,  a t  1 28 ( noting that the "policy communi ty" o f  those concerned about 
court procedure is small  and that lmvyers and judges "share a common socialization 
with i ts attendant impl ications for shared values and perspectives on the j udicial 
process" ) .  
1 43 Sunderland, supra note 1 42 ,  at 745 . 
1 44 EnsoN R. Su!\iDERL\ND, HISTORY oF THE AJ\I ERI< :.AN BAR Asson-\Tl c J c.: 2 1 3  
( 1 953) . 
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decade-long campaign "emphasize [d]  the importance of eliminating 
outworn technicalities in the practice of the state courts and re­
forming their procedure along the general lines followed by the fed­
eral rules . " 1 4 '" As a result, one elite group of lawyers was championing 
and seeking to extend the influence of the practices and procedures 
of another. 1 46 
\Vith the proliferation of civil rights and other legislation in and 
after the 1960s, the 1 966 amendments to Rule 23 on c lass actions, the 
1 970 amendments unleashing document discovery from the need for 
prior court approval , and the litigation that these developments elic­
ited or facilitated, the emptiness of the traditional rhetoric about pro­
cedure became hard to miss. In the ensuing culture of "adversarial 
legalism" so \vell described by Robert Kagan, 1 47 i t  also became increas­
ingly clear that federal courts wielded enormous power under the 
banner of procedure and that many choices they made under (or  
under the authority of) Federal Rules had consequential substantive 
impact. 1 4H 
Even in the absence of consensus about the Enabling Act ' s  l imita­
tions, it was impossible to m iss the substantive implications of some of 
the policy choices required by the proposed Federal Rules of Evi­
dence, and the early opposition, which was directed at the privilege 
provisions, put separation of powers, and hence Congress ' s  proper 
role ,  at center stage . 1 4" This was important, because i t  m ade clear that, 
1 45 fd. at  2 1 3- 1 4 . 
1 46 Sn· SMITH, sujJra note 23 ,  at 1 28 ( " [ M ] ainstream lawyers ' o rgan izations consist­
entlv clefer  to and support the preferences of judges on many court reform is­
sues [ . ] " ) .  For additional material on the ABA in this period, see Jm-INSTONE & 
H oPSO N ,  supm note 1 42 ,  at 35-42, 7 1 . 
1 47 Set' RoBERT A. KAGAN , AovERSARIAL LEGALISM 36-39, 44-50,  5 5-58 ( 2 00 1 ) ;  see 
also Paul Frymer, Acting Hhen Hlected Officials Won 't: Federal Courts and Civil Rights Fn­
formnntt in U.S. Labor Unions, 1 935-85, 97 AM . PoL. Sci . REY. 483 ,  484, 486-88, 490-9 1 
( 200:1 ) ; Ken I .  Kersch,  The Reconstruction of Constitutional Privacy Rights and thP New 
A. nu'riran Stale, 1 6  STUD.  A.ivl . PoL. DEv. 6 1 ,  84 ( 2002) ( "Every attorney h as assumed the 
authority of a progressive admi n istrator. " ) .  
[ I ]  t is precisely this decision making e n  masse , in  group cases o f  whatever 
gen re, that exposes so vividly what is always true but may h ave been less 
\ isible: that application of rules of law to given cases is law-generative and 
hence that courts are ( of course) lawmakers. 
Res n i k ,  supra note 1 27,  at 2229.  
1 48 " [T] his Court 's  rulemaking under the enabl ing Acts has been substan tive and 
poli tical in the sense that  the rules of procedure h ave important  effec ts on the sub­
stant i\·e rights of l i t igants." Mistretta v. U n i ted States, 488 U .S. 361 , 392 ( 1 989) . 
1 49 See H . R. REP. No. 93-650, at 27-29 ( 1 973)  (separate views of Rep. Holtzman ) ;  
irl. at 29 (stat ing that " [r] ules creating, abolishing or  l imiting p1·ivileges are legisla­
tive") : 1 20 CoN l ; .  Ru: .  1 420-2 1 ,  239 1 -92 ( 1 974) (statements of Rep. Hol tzman ) .  
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contrary to the consistent theme of the Court ' s  jurisprudence under 
the Enabling Act and of the academic literature, overreaching by the 
rulemakers threatened not only (and, in fact, not primarily) the law­
making prerogatives of the s tates, but those of Congress i tself. 1 00 
The messages that Congress was likely to derive from this evi­
dence of the changing role of the federal courts, of the power of pro­
cedure in aid of that enhanced role ,  and of the potential threat of 
supervisory court rulemaking to its lawmaking prerogatives, 1 "  1 were , 
moreover, consistent with messages received as a result of contempo­
rary developments in the cognate area of administrative regulation. 
By the mid- 1970s Congress had reason for "growing skepticism about 
the possibility of neutral or objective judgment" 1 '1� and reason to be­
l ieve " that much besides expertise necessarily permeated . 
choice . " 1 53 In time, Congress addressed the perceived problems in 
the two areas with simi lar strategies, ( 1 )  insisting upon greater public 
access to,  and greater transparency in, the processes of delegated law­
making, 1 54 and ( 2 )  relying on the interest group monitoring thereby 
facilitated to sound " fire alarms" 1 '5 vvhen such lawmaking strayed 
from the proper course. 
1 50 "Forty years of Supreme Court  decisions and academic commentary have re­
versed this plan, with the resul t  that federalism has loomed large, and allocation of 
powers between federal inst itutions h ardly at al l ,  i n  the discussion of  Federal Rules." 
Burbank, sujJra note 1 2 , at 1 1 87.  The fact  that most occasions of congressional nonac­
quiescence in proposed Federal Rules in the period immediately after 1 975 con­
cerned proposed Crimi nal Rules is suggestive in  this regard . SeP supm text 
accompanying note 74. 
1 5 1  See D.-\N IEL PATRICK MoYNIHr\N ,  Co UNTING OuR Bu:ss1 Ncs: REFLECTIONS ON T H E  
FuTU RE OF fuviERI C :A 1 23 ( 1 980 ) . 
!rl. 
But if the federal cour ts are going to make law (a  l e gislative funct ion)  and 
enforce law (an executive function ) -which is what Chayes's  term the jmblic 
law litigation model implies-they are i nevitably go ing to fin d  themseh·es in 
conflict with the legislative and executive branches. 
1 52 Kagan , supra note 1 36,  at 226 1 .  
1 53 Id. at 2262: see Walker, sujna note 1 36,  at 1 274-75 .  
By the  1 970s, however ,  concerns about  regulatory capture , a loss of faith in  
expertise, and a growing awareness that administrative regulation involved 
social pol icy choi ces had eroded public confide nce in administrative agen­
cies. These same fac tors undermined confidence in the efficacy and legiti­
macy of the tradi tional court rulemaking model as wel l .  
Bone, supra note 1 33 ,  a t  902 ( footnote omitted) . 
1 54 See Bone, supra note 1 33,  at 902-04; Kagan , sujna note 1 36,  at 226 1 -66; supm 
text accompanying notes 79-82 .  
1 55 Kagan , sujmz note 1 36,  at 2258-59. 
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As a result of all of these developments, although some of the 
rulemakers clung to traditional rhetoric, � :-, G interested observers , in­
cluding interested members of Congress , were more l ikely than they 
had been in the past to perceive overreaching, nontrivial substantive 
effects and lack of neutrality-encouraged to do so by attention to the 
Enabling Act in the scholarly literature and by calls for and the fruits 
of empirical research . "''7 The claim of procedural neutrali ty is put at 
risk whenever i t  is proposed to study the effects of a Federal Rule.  
This may help to explain why, however congenial the notion of expert 
procedural lawmaking may have been in the progressive period or for 
that matter in the modern administrative state , and even though the 
most prominent civil rulemaker of the twentieth century was a legal 
realist who himself had conducted substantial empirical work, I: "'>K very 
little such work informed the original Federal Rules or,  until recently, 
subsequent amendments . 1 :0° It also helps to explain the invocation of 
a "veil of ignorance" 1 60 as an appropriate normative posture for the 
rulemakers by the Reporter for the Civil Rules Committee in the late 
1 980s. 
An important part of the scholarly critique of the Federal Rules 
system challenged both the notion that the Enabling Act ' s  require­
ment of "general rules" required that the Federal Rules be trans-sub­
stantive, 1 6 1  and the notion that, normatively, such rules are always 
appropriate . This strand of the critique was , of course ,  an outgrowth 
of the perception that procedure may drive substance . 1 1 ;� In addition ,  
1 56 See, e.g. , Burbank, snjJia n o te R 3 ,  a t  426-27;  B u rban k, sujJm n o te 1 20 ,  a t  1 962. 
Of course, members of Con gress can p lay the rheto ric game too . ·witness Sen ato r 
Biele n 's 1 994 refe rence to "the s u bstantive pol icy goal of reducing delay and expense 
for civi l l i tigan ts . "  Joseph R. Bide n , J r. ,  Congress and the Courts: Our i\!Iutual Obligation, 
46 STAN. L. RE\·. 1 285, 1 290 ( 1 994) . 
1 57 See, e.g. , Burbank, supra n o te 24, at 844; B urbank,  sujJra n o te 1 20 ,  at 1 927-28, 
1 939-4 1 ,  1 963; Mullenix,  sujJia n ote 74, at 828-30. 
1 58 See Subri n ,  sujJm n o te 62, at  965-68. Thus ,  for example,  C lark led an early 
attem p t  to gai n empiri cal  info rmati o n  about l i tigation in the federa l  courts . SeP gmerc 
ally Ar. J ERlC\N LAw L ·sTITUTE, STuov OF THE Busi NEss OF THE FEDER·\L Cou RTS ( 1 934 ) .  
1 59 .)'pp B urbank, supra n o te 39, a t  242-43; Burbank, sujJra n o te 1 20 ,  a t  1 927-28; 
Richard L. Marcus,  OJ Babies and Bath.water: The Prospects for ProcPdwal Pmgn'ss, 59 
BROOk. L. REv.  76 1 , 782-83 ( 1 993 ) ;  Tho mas E.  Willging, Past and frpsenl Uses oJEmjJilc 
iwl Rf'search in Civil Rulernaking, 77 NoTRE DAr..J E L. RE\'. 1 1 2 1 ,  1 1 2 1 -22, 1 203 (2002 ) . 
1 60 Paul D. Carri n gton , J\!Iaking Rules to Di)jJose of 1\!Ianifestly Unfoundf'(l A.ssf'rtions: An 
f::xorrism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive RulPs of Civil Procedure, 1 37 U .  P.\ .  L. R.E\ , 
2067, 2079 ( 1 989) ;  Sf'e infra note 1 62 .  
1 6 1  SPe Burbank, supra n ote 1 20 ,  at 1 934-35. 
1 62 See id. at 1 940-4 1 . 
No one I know is suggesting a re turn to the forms of action or a wholesale 
rejection of trans-substantive procedure.  Some of us,  howe\·er ,  are sug-
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at leas t in some quarters , i t  was cen tral to a vision of political account­
ability in which,  on some matters, prospective and transparent policy 
choices by democratically accountable actors are preferable to buried 
policy choices by federal judges . I li� vVhether or not  this strand of the 
cri tique has been influential in Congress, 1 64 lawmakers and those who 
seek to influence them have learned the lesson that some matters of 
"procedure" are integrally related to substance and/ or useful to the 
effectuation of substantive goals . They have come to understand, 
therefore, that to fail to address those matters, whatever the label 
given to them, ·when seeking to change the substantive law is either to 
surrender a potentially potent technique or to commit the fate of 
those substantive goals to the preferences of judges.  1 (),.,., 
In sum, informed observers have for many years recognized that 
" ' real procedure ' is hard to find" 1 1'6 and they thus also should have 
recognized the strength of the normative argument for greater con­
gressional attention to the regulation of federal procedure, under the 
Enabling Act and more generally. Paying attention does not mean 
taking control ,  ho·wever, and particularly given the increased self-disci­
pline of the rulemakers during the past decade ( manifested in part 
gesting that i t  is time both w face fac ts ,  i n  particular the fac t  that uniformity 
and trans-substantivity rheto ric are a sham, and to find out  the facts, i n  par­
t icular the f�lcts about d iscretionary justice. A "ve i l  of ignorance" may be an 
apt metaphor to describe federal rulemaking to date . It is not ,  l contend,  an 
appropriate normative posture for the rulemakers of the future. 
!d. (foomotes omi tted ) ;  Sff Burbank,  su.jml note 24, at  846-47.  
1 fi;) Set, P.g. , Stephen B .  Burbank ,  ProcedurP, Politirs and Power, 52 J LECM. Enuc.  
;)42,  344 ( 2002) ( "For, when one knows that a rul e  has a statist ical ly signi ficant differ­
ential impact on a class of l i tigants or in  a particular type of case, the veil is l ifted, the 
myth of neutrali ty as to l it igant power is exploded, and the question of lawmaking 
power to address the s i tuation i s  unavoidable . " )  ( footnote omi tted) ; see also Burbank, 
sujm1 note 1 3 1 .  at 1 473-76. 
1 64 Ser 1 985 House 1-fNuing, sujJm note 78, at 9 (statement of Stephen B. Burban k)  
("Congress too rarely adYerts to the possible need for specia l ized procedure-as op­
posed to the trans-substantin· procedure of Federal Rules-when it enacts legisla­
tion " ) ;  id. at 2 1  n . 1 2  (adYocating · 'a Procedural Impact Statement ,  the purpose of 
which would be to ensure that existing federal p rocedure adequately wi l l  serve a b i l l ' s  
substantive pol ic ies" ) .  
1 65 Considerations of this sort seem to me more important determinan ts of recent  
d i rect congressional regulat ion of procedure ( as ,  for example ,  i n  the PSLRA) than 
the rejection of expertise s impl iciter, let alone "new-found [congressional] confi­
dence in  i ts own law-making abi l i tv . "  ·walker, supra note 1 36,  at 1 285.  
1 66 See, e.g. , Stephen B.  Burban k, Of Rules and Discrption: Th.P SttjHeme Court, Fednal 
RulPs and Common htw, 63 NoTRE D .. \� IE L. Rn . 693, 7 1 4  ( 1 988)  ( " In much of today ' s  
l i t igation landscape, procedure is acUectival to substantive law i n  the same way that, in  
negl igence law, reasonable is to  man . I n  other words, ' real p rocedure ' i s  hard to  
fi nd ." )  ( footno te omitted ) . 
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thro ugh interest m and attempts to secure empiricJ.l evidence ) ,  the 
demise of th e power of the procedure/substance dichotomy to order 
lavnnaking responsibil ities cannot by itself explain congressional 
behavior. 
B. The Rulemakers a nd the Rulemaking Process 
The original Advisory Committee consisted exclusively of practic­
ing lawyers and academics. Hi7 As late as the 1960s judges remained in 
the minority. Under Chief Justice \Varren Burger, h mvever ,  the Civil 
Rules Advisory Committee came to be heavily dominated by j udges 
selected by the ChiefJustice .  This imbalance h as continued, only par­
tially redressed under political pressure . 1 1'"' 
I do not know, but additional h istorical research may i l luminate , 
the reasons for the change. Likely candidates seem to be either, or 
some combination of, ( 1 )  the quest for greater agenda control , ( 2 )  
the realization that federal judges and/ or the federal j udiciary have 
J 67 For a l ist  a n d  desoiption of the original Ad\'i�ory Committee,  con sistin g  of five 
law professors and n i n e  lawyers, two of whom had been j udges, see Subri n ,  sulrm note 
62, at 97 1-72. 
1 68 For a description of the h istorical p rogressi o n  and a graph ,  see Stephen C. 
Yeazell , .fudging Rules, Ruling.fudges, 6 1  LAw & CoNTE M P .  PRoss . ,  Summer 1 99 8 ,  at 229,  
237-38. 
Lawyer parti c ipation h as decl ined as that of j udges i n c reased .  Today, !aw­
vers comprise j ust  a bit m ore than a third of the members of t h e  Advisory 
Com mi ttee on Civil Rules. Th e tide had begun to shift in this  dire c ti o n  
wi thin two decades after the o riginal Rules were e n acted. I n  1 9 6 1  , j u s t  ove r 
half of the Advisory Com m i tte e ' s  m e m bers we re pract ic ing lawye rs ; that pro­
portion held th rougho u t  the early 1 980s. By 1 985, the p roportion had 
dropped to about twe nty-five percent ;  ove r the l ast few years i t  h as h overed 
between thi rty-th ree and forty percent .  
frl. at  237.  Professor Yeazell n otes that  " [ t]  h e  proportion of lawyers o n  the S tanding 
Comm ittee, a body that  had n o  analogue i n  1 938, is s i m ilar ."  !d. For the p ressure, see 
Bone,  supra note J 33, at 903 n . 87;  Carri ngto n ,  supra note 1 60 ,  at 2076 n . 5 0 ;  Laura A. 
Kaster & Ken n e th A. Wittenberg, RulemaheL� Sh ould Be Liligalors, Nxr' L LJ, Aug. 1 7 , 
1 99 2 ,  at 1 5 . Professor Bone's  commen t that ·' these eiforts have fai led,"  B o n e ,  supra 
no te 1 33 .  at 903 n . 87,  is poten tially m isleading, s ince the number of l avvyers did in­
c rease somewhat. almost surely in response to proposed l egislati o n .  Sfe juDIClAL CoN­
FERENCE O F  THE U N ITED ST.\TES , LoNG R-\ M ;t -:  PLAI': ruR THE FEDERAL CoL• RTS 59 
( 1 995) ( "  [S] everal steps have been taken to e n hance outside participation by [among 
other steps listed] i n c reasi ng bar m e mbership on the rules com m i ttees . . . .  " ) ;  B ur­
ba n k ,  supm note 1 23,  at 5 1 6  (" [W] e may n ever see a vote on a Sen ate bi1 l to req uire 
m o re p ractic i n g  law-y·ers on the rules advisory com m i t tees,  because the c h ief j ustice 
has a l ready u n ilaterally i n c reased th e i r  n umbers . " ) .  For recent  c o m m e n tary arguin g  
t h a t  the S upre m e  Court " n eeds a j ust ice w h o  understands first hand w h a t  l aw practice 
in the trenches is l i ke today," see Luther T. I\:I u nfo rd , Rurnt Litigating Counts, NAT' t .  
LJ . ,  Feb.  1 6, 2004�, at 43,  4 3 .  
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discrete interests , or ( 3 )  suspicion of lawyers ' ability to put aside their 
(or their clients ' )  interests .  The latter two phenomena are related 
and would naturally enhance the perceived importance of controlling 
the rulemaking agenda. 1 69 
To say that "federal judges and/ or the federal judiciary have dis­
cre te interests" is not to say that, when engaged in rulemaking, either 
is an interest group in the sense of "an organized body of individuals 
who share some goals and who try to influence public policy. " 1 70 That 
would be an odd way to describe a group engaged in lawmaking, al­
though it does prompt inquiry concerning the influence if any of the 
existence of the federal judiciary as an interest group in i ts relations 
with Congress and the Executive 1 7 1 on the effectuation of individual 
or insti tutional judicial interests in rulemaking. Moreover, although it  
i s  d ifficult to dispute the notion that both federal j udges and the fed­
eral judiciary as an institution have interests, many would doubtless 
disagree that such interests are , or that they may properly be,  influen­
tial in supervisory court rulemaking, at least if they are juxtaposed 
with the "public interest. " 1 n  The latter question takes us into a de­
bate spurred by public choice theory. The former may suggest that, in 
a world where supervisory court rulemaking is provisional (or  defeasi­
ble ) and no longer holds monopoly power, the need of the judiciary 
qua interest group to defend institutional interests may have 
prompted the heavy til t  towards judges on the rulemaking bodies. 
1 69 See S. Sidney Ulmer, PLI'searching the SujJre-rne Court in a Dnnonalic Pluralist System, 
l LAw & Pm.'v Q. 53,  67 ( 1 979) ( " [ I ] f  the social balance of power among competing 
groups is relevant to the way in which government responds to articulated needs, one 
must take in to consideration the relative success of these groups in getting on the 
formal agenda of appropriate decis ion making  bodies. " ) ; see also supra note 1 26 ( not­
ing that Judge Patrick H igginbotham, who spear-headed outreach efforts as Chair of  
the Advisory Committee, was not  reappo in ted) . 
1 70 jEFFREY tvl . BERRY, THE INTEREST GRouP SociETY 5 ( 1 984) ( emphasis omitted ) ,  
quoted i n  SM ITJ I , sujJ'I{t note 23,  at 4 .  See DAVID B .  TRUi\ JAN , THE Go\.ERNMENT.\l. P KO­
LESs: PouTJ C :AL INTERESTS AND P u n uc OPINION 33 ( 1 95 1 )  ( " ' [ I ] n terest group'  refers 
ro any group that, on the basis of one or more shared atti tudes, makes certain claims 
upon other groups in the society for the establishment, mai n tenance ,  or e nhance­
ment of forms of behavior that are implied by the shared attitudes . '' ) .  
1 7 1  See, P.g. , S ,vi iTH, s ujJra n ote 23, at 3-4; M cArthur ,  supra note 23 ,  at 569 n .55 ,  
:17 1 .  
1 72 See Burbank, suj;ra note 1 23 ,  a t  5 1 5 . 
!d. 
A recen t  attempt by jonathan R. Macey to bring public choice analysis to the 
service of procedure, although not  without flaws, at least gives theoretical 
imprimatur to a view long held by some sch olars , to wit, that in making and 
applying procedural law j udges attend to  their own professional i n terests as 
well as to the interests of practic ing lawyers , litigan ts ,  and society. 
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Public choice theory has not  fared well as applied to court 
rulemaking. An early effort by Professor Macey 1 7" encountered cri ti­
cism by Professor Alexander, 1 74 and more recently, by Professor Geyh . 
I n  other words, Professor Macey ' s  formulation of j udicial self-inter­
est can explain almost every conceivable rule c h ange .  To the exte n t  
that desires for power, p restige, and l eisure work i n  opposition to 
each other, a rule favorin g  one such i n te rest will  disfavor another­
every hour a rule requires the j udge to wield h e r  power is an hour 
she will n o t  be tanning h e rself by the pool .  Thus,  every rule change 
can be explained i n  terms of whi c h ever i n te rest is favored-never 
m i n d  the i n terest that is disfavored.  Likewise , i nsofar as o n e  facet  of 
a given i n te rest comes at the expense of another facet of that same 
i n terest, every rule can be explained in terms of whichever facet is 
maximized. Therefore, a rule requiring the j udge to exercise power 
that she did not have befo re is  explicable because it i n c reases h e r  
absolute power (as i t  decreases h e r  discretionary powe r ) , w h i l e  a 
repeal of that rule is explicable because it i n c reases h e r  discretion­
ary power ( as it decreases her  absolute power) . 
At the same tim e  as it explains too m u c h ,  the premise that 
j udges are motivated solely by appetites fo r leisure time, prestige, 
and power explains too l i ttle ,  because it fai ls to account adequately 
for the complexity of human motivation . . . .  In short, self-i n te rest 
explains j udicial conduct only if  self-interest is defi ned broadly to 
accoun t for other-orie n ted behavior. With such a defi n i ti o n ,  h ow­
ever, the public choice model becomes tautological and explains 
nothing. 1 7" 
1 73 See Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Proce­
dure, 23 j .  LEGAL STU D .  627 ( 1 994) ; supra note 1 72 .  
1 74 Seejanet Cooper Alexander, judges ' Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Cmmnent on 
iVJacey, 23 j .  LEGAL STUD. 647 ( 1 994 ) .  
But the interests Macey examines not only are broad and vague but also 
seem relatively weak as possible motivations for procedural rule-making .  I 
find it difficult to believe that the cluster of "reducing work-load" in terests 
affect judicial decision making more than do judges' ph ilosophical ,  ideologi­
cal, or moral views-that is  to say, the i r  ideas about what is right and j ust. 
!d. at 665. 
1 75 Geyh, supra note 42,  at 1 2 1 5- 1 6 . Professor Geyh acknowledges that "the judici­
ary [may] weigh [ ] i ts narrow i n terests in power, prestige, and l eisure against i ts 
broader i n terest in  promoting the public good and take [ ] a position that furthers the 
former at the expense of the latter . . . . " !d. at 1 2 1 6; cj DAN IEL A. FARBER & PH I LI P P .  
FRICKEY, L\\N AND P u BLIC C H O I C E :  A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21 ( 1 99 1 ) ( "Surely closer 
to reali ty-although not as i n tel lectually elegant-is Richard Fenno's  suggestion that 
the behavior of members of Congress is  dictated by three basic goals: ach ieving reelec­
t ion,  gain ing inf1uence within the House, and making good publ ic  pol icy. " ) .  
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Another problem with Professor Macey's and similar work, as ap­
plied to rulemaking, is the failure to account for, and make adjust­
ments that may be required by, group decisionmaking-group 
decisionmaking, moreover, by a mix of trial and appellate judges and 
of j udges, lmvyers and academics, on behalf of institutions ( courts) to 
which not all group members belong-rather than decisions by and 
on behalf of the same individual . l 76 Moreover, Geyh 's  additional 
point that " the judiciary [may] take [ ] a position intended to promote 
the public good that is perceived by Congress or i ts constituents as 
promoting the judiciary's narrow self-in terest at the expense of the 
public good," 1 77 reminds us that the room (and need) for strategic 
behavior in rulemaking results not only from group decisionmaking, 
but also from the influence of actors other than the rulemakers. Or, 
as put by Professor Bone, "a public choice analysis should treat court 
rulemaking as a strategic game among the [rulemakers ] , Congress, 
and the various interest groups. " 1 78 
Since one of the banners in the long campaign for the Enabling 
Act was expertise, there is apparent i rony in the fact  that the group 
responsible for drafting the original Federal Rules did not include a 
single sitting judge .  1 79 Even though the Supreme Court could not 
fairly be described as a mere rubber stamp when reviewing the pack-
1 76 CJ Lewis A. Kornhauser, i\!Iodeling Collegial Courts I: Path-Dependenr:e, 1 2  lNT'L. 
REv. L. & Eco N. 1 69,  1 80-84 ( 1 992)  ( arguing that collegial i ty among appellate j udges 
determines the path of the law) . Professor Macey avoids these complexi ties by assum­
ing a monolit ihic j udic ial ut i li ty function ,  and by p roceeding from the premise that 
" rules are not only construed by j udges, they are also promulgated under the direc­
tion of judges ."  Macey, supra note 1 73, at 627; see id. at 628 ( stating that the Civil 
Rules Committee "is composed primarily of j udges , with a spri nkl ing of practic ing 
lawyers and academics" ) .  As Macey recognizes, on ly the Supreme Court makes the 
decision to promulgate a Federal Rule, but in doing so, it ( usually) merely ensures 
procedural regularity and acts as a vetogate on p roposals that are l i kely to be contro­
versial and/or el ic i t  plausible claims of overreaching. See id. ("To date, however, the 
Supreme Court has served as a mere conduit for the work of the advisory committee ,  
approving the  vast majority of  changes recommended to  i t  by  the  committee . " ) . 
1 77 Geyh,  supra note 42,  at 1 2 1 6 . 
1 78 Bone,  supm note 1 33 , at 924 . I have substi tuted "rulemakers" for "Advisory 
Committee" because supervisory court rulemaking involves multiple layers of advisory 
groups, differently composed, and formal promulgation by the Supreme Court, 
before a proposal reaches the Congress. See also id. at 906 ( " [T] he  Advisory Commit­
tee has become keenly sensi tive to the risk of congressional i n terference in  the 
rulemaking process. " ) .  Professor Bone fai led, h owever, to recognize some strategic 
behavior by the j udiciary. See sujJm note 1 68 ( discussing addit ional appointments of 
lawyers to the Advisory Committee in response to proposed legislation ) ; infra note 
206 and accompanying text (discussing changes i n  the rulemakin g  process under po­
l i t ical pressure ) . 
1 79 See sujJia note 1 67 and accompanying text. 
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age of proposed Rules presented to i t  in 1 937, J Ho presumably no senti­
ent observer equated i ts role with authorship . Indeed, one of the 
original rulemakers praised advisory committee and similar systems 
both because of his normative preferences against courts preparing 
rules and for rulemaking by groups that included substantial lavvyer 
representation, and also because they provided cover to the courts in 
the event of controversy. 1 8 1  
To the extent that there was a perceived community of interests 
among elite lawyers, academics and federal j udges, and given the ex­
tensive efforts made by the original Advisory Committee to secure 
comments on their drafts , 1 8:! the compositi on of that committee may 
not have caused any discomfort to the purveyors of the expertise story, 
and their concern may in any event  have been comparative lack of 
expertise in the legislature . 1 8� Moreover, to the extent that the law­
yers and academics appointed were familiar with , or represented, a 
broad variety of (plaintiffs ' and defendants ' )  interests involved in fed­
eral l itigation, as seems plausible in the comparatively unspecialized 
legal world of the 1 930s-ancl in the absence of empirical investiga­
tion-they could plausibly be deemed to have made recommenda­
tions of "general rules" behind a veil of ignorance. 1 R4 Finally, with the 
1 80 SPe Clark, supm note 67, at  442 (discussing proposed Federal Rules that the 
Court rejected) . 
1 8 1 See Edson R. Sunderland, Rules of Court Governing Pmctice and Procedure, 9 Mo. 
BAR J. 1 98 ( 1 938) [ hereinafter Sunderland, Rules of Court] . Sunderland there ob­
served that "bench-drawn rules would sti l l  be colored by special i nterests of the 
branch , modified by special interests of the bar," id. at 200,  and that " [ l ] a>vyers . . . are 
i n  a better position than judges to understand the public attitude toward the adminis­
tration of j ustice ."  !d. at 202;  see alm Edson R.  Sunderland, Trends in Procedural fJlw, 1 
L\ . L. Rr.v. 477, 488 ( 1 939) . For similar views more recently expressed, see Yeazel ! ,  
supra note 1 68 .  
1 82 See 1 938 Hearing, sujJra n ote 1 39 ,  at 3-4; Burbank,  sujntl n ote 24, at 848 n .5 1 . 
1 83 See Clark, supra note 67, at 443; Sunderland, Rules of Court, sup ra n ote 1 8 1 ,  at 
1 99-200. 
1 84 See Burbank,  sufna note 24, at  847-48. 
Professor Marcus is correct that the original Federal Rules were drafted "by a 
group of e l i te lawyers and law professors who acted with l i ttle empirical evi­
dence." They were, however, people of substantial p ractical experience con­
cern ed about  rules that would work for lawyers and their  c l ients whi le 
serving what Professor Garth calls " the universal principles of the 
profession . "  
!d. ( footn otes omitted) ; rf Resnik ,  supra note 1 27,  at 2225 (anonymity and in ter­
changeabi l i ty) . Note, however, P rofessor Subrin 's view that " there was n o  one on the 
Committee who was a spokesperson for the small firm , the small case,  or  the small 
c l ient ."  Subri n ,  sujJ m  note 62, at 972 ( footnote omitted) . 
I t  is not clear that the same can be said of la\\ryer members today, because of the 
h igh ly special i zed nature of contemporary legal practi ce and the perspectives, i ncen· 
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Executive Branch enthusiastically supporting the effort i n  a period of 
unified government, there was little reason to anticipate major 
controversy. 1 :-;,; 
Writing m 1 926 ,  P rofessor Sunderland remarked that  
" [a] lthough there can be no competition among individual lavvyers , 
vve have a very effective competition among systems and rules of prac­
tice . " 1 86 Describing the country as "a laboratory in which experiments 
are being actively conducted,"  Sunderland expressed hope that the 
movement for uniform state l egislation ·would "not extend into the 
procedural field," lest it  "destroy the most promising possibil ity for the 
general improvement of American procedure ." 1R7 
tives and c l i e n t  pressures that such special ized p ractice may engen der, a n d  because 
eve ryone i' n ow aware of the potential  for diffe rential  im pact in the Federal Rules.  
See Garth , supra note 1 23 ,  at 953-56, 959.  Compare Yeazel ! ,  sufmt note HiS ,  at 239 
( " [T] o h ave the rules themselves eme rge from a grou p  of once and future c o n tes­
tants . . .  provides a splen didly Rawlsian ici ng on the cake . . . .  " ) , with id. at �44 
( "Ame rican l aw'Yers tend to represen t, if not  the same cl ients ,  t h e n  t h e  same kind of 
c l ie n t  th rough out their  careers. " ) .  
Of course , rn v  view o f  t h e  original  rul e m akers may ref1ect "the p revalent  notio:1 
that the l egal p rofess ion has fal l e n  from an earlier condition of grace into an abject  
and debased condition . "  1\'Iarc Gala n ter, Lawyers in the JHisL: The Golden AgP of f_rgal 
Nostalgia, 1 00 D ick. L REv. 549 , 550 ( 1 996) . Professor Gala n ter observes that " i t  
wou l d  be surprising if  there were n o t  many more vVarren Christoph ers and Lloyd 
Cutl ers engaged in  public  se rvi ce today than there were E l i h u  Roots and H e n ry Stim­
sons t h e n . "  !d. at  559.  Yes .  b u t  consider the m e m bers h i p  of t h e  Civil Rules Comm it­
tee in  1 96;): Dean Acheson ( C h ai r) , George C. Doub, Shelden D. El l iott ,  John P. 
Fran k, Arth ur  J. Freund,  Aibert E. Jenner, J r . ,  C harles W. Joiner,  Benj a m i n  Kaplan 
( Reporte r) , David v\'. Louise l l ,  .Jolm M. Mcilvaine,  W. Brown Morto n ,  J r . ,  A.rchibalcl 
J\IL M u l l ,  Jr. , Roszel C. Th omsen , C harles Alan Wright,  Charles E .  Wyzanski , .J r. See 
H . R .  Doc. No.  67 ( 1 963) . 
1 85 Cf. Fiori n a ,  supra note 1 3, at "16 ( "During the New Deal p e r i od con gressional 
Democrats could c n n te m piate  con trol ove r the aclministrative p rocess for t h e  fo resee­
able fu ture. " ) .  
1 R6 Sun derlan d .  suj;m note 1 42 ,  a t  744. 
1 87 !d. The re�tcl e r  m ay have n o ted the s i m i l arity between the reasoning, and i n­
deed the language. used by Sunderland in 1 926 ,  and that used by J us tice Brandeis i n  
h i s  fam o us 1 932 d isse n t  i n  Ntul Slrtle Iu Co. v .  Liebmann, 285 U . S .  262 ,  3 1 1 ( 1 932) 
( Bran deis . ] . ,  disse n ti ng) ("'t is  one of the happy incidents of the fed eral system th<tt  a 
s ingle co urageous State m ay . if i t s  citizens c h oose ,  serve as a laboratory; and trv n ovei 
soc i al and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the c o u n t ry. " ) . Th e i r  
common p h i l osophv helps to expla i n  ( 1 )  Sunderlan d ' s  revisionist  approach t o  the 
E nabl i n g  Act after i t was passed ,  sre B urbank,  svjJra n o te 1 2 , at  1 1 35 ("Sun derl:u ; cl ' s  
purpose in  distort i n g  the record p robably was l i nked w i t h  his  view t h a t  nation <1 l  u ;1 i­
form ity in the p rocedural fi eld was undesirabl ::: because it  would foreclose s tate e x per­
i m e n tation . " )  ( footnote omi tted ) ;  injm n ote 1 8R, and ( 2 )  both B ran deis 's  opposition 
to the bi l l  i n  1 926 and his d isse nt from the p rom ulgation of the Feder<1i lZu l es i n  1 9 3t\.  
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Sunderland did not foresee that, in part through his efforts ,  and 
with the active support of the elite bar, the local experimentation  he 
celebrated would be put at risk. 1 �8 He also did not foresee other  de­
velopments that were at war with procedural "conventionality, " 1 89 in­
cluding the social revolutions worked by the civil rights and equal 
rights movements and the demise of ( some of) the anticompeti tive 
practices of the organized bar. 
All of these developments unleashed forces that contributed to 
legal ( including procedural ) innovation and hence to pressure on 
supposedly uniform rules . As a result of the changing opportunities 
and circumstances of practice,  inviting to the reformer and entrepre­
neur alike ( for each of whom amended Rule 23, as an example,  of­
fered a golden harvest) , the legal profession became less 
homogeneous, more competitive , and more specialized ,  I �lo and the 
communities of interest among lavvyers and between lawyers and 
judges shrank. 
With the diversification of, and increasing specialization and 
competition within ,  the legal profession has come a greater risk that 
la\·vyers ' and j udges ' views about desirable procedural regulation 
would diverge ( as well, of course , as of divergent viev;s among la\"'­
yers ) . 1 9 1 That may have been reason enough for Chiefjustice Burger 
See Letter from Stephen B. Burbank,  to Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld (Mar. 6, 1 985 ) 
(on  fi le with auth or) . 
1 88 See sujJm text accompanying note 1 45 .  There is i rony in the fact that Sunder­
land went on to become one of the ch ief arc h i tecl'i of the Federal Rules ,  as there is in 
the fact  that his enduri ng cloubl'i about uniform federal procedure a lmost  kept  him 
from being invited to jo in the Advisory Comm ittee (and, with Clark 's  he lp , d id keep 
h im from being selected as reporter) . See Burban k,  supm note 12 ,  at 1 1 35-36. 
1 89 Sunderland, supm note 1 42,  at 746; see sujm1 note 1 4 2 .  
1 90 SeP Garth , supra note 1 23 ,  at 932 ,  938-45 . Compare the demographic descrip­
t i o n  of the bar in JoHNSTONE & HorsoN , s upm note 1 42 .  at 1 9  ! reporting that blacks 
constitu ted "s l ightly over 1 perce nt" and women " less than 3 percent" of American 
lawvers in the early 1 960s ) . 
1 9 1  See Bur bank, sujJTa note 24, at 854 ( " D ivisions among lawyer entrepreneurs on 
q uestions relati ng to open access bode ill for the abi l i ty of the 'organized bar'  to have 
consequential impact on c ivi l j ustice reform . . . .  " ) (foo tnote omitted ) . Such diver­
gence of views is ever presen t and has mean t that "the legal profession h as difficulty in 
using power for i ts own collective ends."  joHNSTO:-.iE & Horso :.: ,  sujHu note 1 4 2 ,  at 70 .  
As a group, lawyers are too independent,  the i r  work uni ts too small and too 
fragmented and their  perspectives too diverse to readi lv act roge ther i n  the i r  
own occupational self-i n terest. T o  b e  sure .  the organized har fulfi l ls tradi­
t ional occupational association functions of group in tegration and advo­
cacy-al though less effec tive ly than many trade unions and trade 
assoc iations-and la>vyers on the bench and e lsewhere in gm·ernment  com­
m only favor the profession when they have a chance to do s o .  But by and 
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to change the balance  of lawyers and judges on the Advisory Commit­
te e .  There were o ther likely contributing factors,  however. 
The increasingly contentious nature of the reception accorded 
proposed Federal Rules by Congress was a threat to the prestige and 
influence of the Court i tself, 1 9'2 reinforcing perhaps the tendency to 
equate individual with institutional judicial interests ,  to equate both 
with the public interest, and in any event  to try to protect insti tutional 
interests from the start. Moreover, as the policy community con­
cerned about procedure expanded and fragmented, the latter equa­
tion was ever more l ikely i tself to prove controversial, and changes in 
the process and culture of federal court rulemaking that contributed 
to the expanding policy community may also have contributed to con­
tinuing controversy. 1 9" 
An attempt to remove the Court from the supervisory court 
rulemaking process in the 1 980s almost succeeded and had the bless­
ing of Chief Justice Burger and, for a year, of a majority of the 
large, the legai profession is  not particularly effective in using group pres­
sure for i ts own benefi t. Within the profession ,  on matters of general profes­
sional concern .  power is widely d ispersed. 
!d. at 70-7 1 ;  sr'e id. at 35. The nature of "work uni ts" has changed s ince this descrip­
tion was written ,  as more and more lawyers have come to practice in  larger and larger 
firms. AJthough certain groups of lmvyers have become powed.u l  i n terests to be reck­
oned with , SPI:' injia text accompanying note 1 99,  their  conflicting i nterests qua lawyers 
sti l l  make it difficult  to secure legislation ( inc luding legislation overriding a proposed 
Federal Rule) on matters i mplicating those in terests . SeP infra text accompanying 230. 
1 92 See v,· INI FR.ED R. BR0\•\'1, , FEDERAL RU LEiYIAKI NG: PROBL . B ·I S  r\N D  Poss i B I UTIF:S 
1 -4, 75 , 1 38 ( 1 98 1 ) ;  Burbank ,  supra note 1 2 , at 1 020-2 1 . In  a descript ion of Brown's 
studv, which was undertaken by the Federal Judicial  Center at his  request, Chiefjus­
tice B urger noted that i t  "pro,:ide [ d ]  pol icy makers with , among other th ings ,  a co­
gent analysis of the sal ient arguments for and against reducing the level of Supreme 
Court invoh·ement in  the rulemaking process ."  Hon .  Warren E. Burger, Year-End 
Report on the j udiciary 18 (Dec.  :28, 1 98 1 ) ,  quoted in Burbank, supra note 1 2, at 1 02 J 
n . l 5. 
Con troversy generated bv Federal Rules formally promulgated by the Supreme 
Court at the end of a process that has increasingly come to resemble the legis lative 
(or administrative) process recalls Robert McCloskey's comment on the Court ' s  
"shrewd insight" in refusing . .  to ped·orm 'nonj udicial '  functions ,"  to  wit, "that th e 
Court ' s  position would ultimately depend on presen,ing i ts differe nce from the other 
branches of govern mt:nt."  Rost::RT G .  l'vl c : C LOSKEY, TI-I I:: A!VI ERIC-\ · SL;PRE!\IE Cou RT 20 
(3d rev. eel .  �2000 ) . 
1 93 CJ J-\c:K L. W.--\LKER ,  J R . ,  !Vl OBI UZl ;'\;(; INTEREST GROUPS l "l AiviERIC :.-\ 40 ( 1 99 1 )  
("As a result of the expansion of the interest-group system and the change i n  i ts com­
positi on ,  the processes of pass ing legislation and evaluating publ ic  pol icies have be­
come much more compl icated, and policy formulation h as become much more 
conf1ictual than ever before . " ) . 
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Sunderland did not foresee that, in part through his efforts ,  and 
with the active support of the elite bar, the local experimentation he 
celebrated would be put at risk. 1 H�' He also did not foresee other de­
velopments that were at war with procedural "conventionality ," 1 H9 in­
cluding the social revolutions worked by the civil rights and equal 
rights movements and the demise of (some of) the anticompetitive 
practi ces of the organized bar. 
All of these developments unleashed forces that contributed to 
legal ( including procedural ) innovation and hence to pressure on 
supposedly uniform rules . As a result of the changing opportunities 
and circumstances of practice,  inviting to the reformer and entrepre­
neur alike (for each of whom amended Rule 23 ,  as an example ,  of­
fered a golden harvest ) , the legal profession became less 
homogeneous, more competitive , and more specialized, 1 90 and the 
communities of interest among lawyers and between lawyers and 
judges shrank. 
With the diversification of, and increasing specialization and 
competition within, the legal profession has come a greater risk that 
la1·vyers ' and judges ' views about desirable procedural regulation 
would diverge (as well ,  of course , as of divergent views amon g  law­
yers ) . 1 9 1 That may have been reason enough for ChiefJustice Burger 
See Letter from Stephen B.  Burbank ,  to Prof. Andreas F. Lowenfeld (Mar. 6, 1 985) 
(on  file  with author) . 
1 88 See supTa text accompanyin g  note 1 45 .  There is i rony in the fact that Su nder­
land went  on to become one of the chief arch i tects of the Federal Rules ,  as there is in 
the fact that h is  enduring doubL� about uniform federal procedure almost kept him 
from being invited to join the Advisory Committee (and, with Clark ' s  he lp ,  d i cl keep 
him from being selected as reporter) . See Bur ban k, s ujJm note 1 2 , at 1 1 35-36. 
1 89 Sunderland, sujna note 1 42 ,  at 746; see sujJm n ote 1 42 .  
1 90 See Garth , sujJm. note 1 23,  at 932 ,  93R-45. Com pare the demograph ic  descri p­
ti on of the bar in JoH NSTONE & HorsoN, sztjmt note 1 42 ,  at 1 9  ( reporti ng that blacks 
constituted "sl igh tly over l percent" and women " less than 3 percent" of American 
l awvers in the earlv 1 960s ) . 
1 9 1  See Burbank ,  su.p·ra note 24, at 854 ("Divisions among lawyer entrepreneurs on 
questions relating to open access bode i l l  for the abi l i ty of the 'organized bar' to have 
consequential impact on civil j ustice reform . . . .  " )  ( footnote omi tted) . Such diver­
gence of views is ever present  and h as meant that " the legal profession h as ditficu l ty in 
using power for its own collective ends."  JoH NSTONE  & H o Pso:-.: ,  s u.jJra note 1 42 ,  at 70. 
As a group, l awyers are too i ndependent, their work units too small and too 
fragmented and their perspectives too di\·erse to readilv act together in the i r  
own occupational self-in terest. To be sure .  the  organized bar  ful fil ls tradi­
tional occupational association functions of group integration and advo­
cacy-although less effectively than man; trade unions and trade 
associations-and lawyers on the bench and elsewhere in  government  com­
monly favor the profession when they have a chance to do so. But by and 
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to change the balance of la-vvyers and judges on the Advisory Commit­
tee .  There were o ther likely contributing factors,  however. 
The increasingly contentious nature of the reception accorded 
proposed Federal Rules by Congress was a threat to the prestige and 
influence of the Court i tself, 1 �2 reinforcing perhaps the tendency to 
equate individual with institutional judicial interests, to equate both 
with the public interest, and in any event  to try to protect institutional 
interests from the start. Moreover, as the policy community con­
cerned about procedure expanded and fragmented, the latter equa­
tion was ever more likely i tself to prove controversial, and changes in 
the process and culture of federal court rulemaking that contributed 
to the expanding policy community may also have contributed to con­
tinuing controversy. 1 9:� 
An attempt to remove the Court from the supervisory court 
rulemaking process in the 1 980s almost succeeded and had the b less­
ing of Chief Justice Burger and, for a year, of a maj ority of the 
l arge , the l egai profession is uot  particularly effective in using group pres­
sure for i ts own benefi t. With in the profession ,  on matters of genera l  profes­
s ional concern, power is widely dispersed. 
!d. at  70-7 1 ;  sel' id. at �S. The nature of "work un i ts"  has changed s ince this descrip­
tion was wri tten ,  as more and more lawyers have cornF. to practice i n  larger and larger 
f irms. A.Jthough certain groups of l awyers have become power-ti.d i nterests to be reck­
oned with, see injia text accompanying note 1 99,  the ir  confl ict ing i nterests qua lawyers 
st i l l  m ake i t  difficult  to secure legislation ( including legislation overriding a proposed 
Federal Rule) on matters i mplicating those i n terests .  See infra text accompanying 2�0. 
l Y2 Srw \'\'t N J FRED R.  BRO'vVL" , Ft::DER..-\L Ru LEi'vL-\KJ NG: PROBLEMS AND Poss t B J LITJEs 
1 -4 ,  75, 1 38 ( 1 98 1 ) ;  Burbank, sujna note 1 2 , a t  1 020-2 1 .  In  a descri ption of Brown's  
studv, which was undertaken by the Federal Judicial Center at h is request, Chiefjus­
tice Burger noted that i t  "provicle [d]  pol icy makers with, among other th ings, a co­
gent analysis of the sal ient arguments for and against reducing the leve l of Supreme 
Court involvement  in  the rulemaking process . "  Hon. Warren E. Burge r, Year-End 
Report on the judiciary 1 8  (Dec.  28,  1 98 1 ) , quoted in Burbank ,  sujJm note 1 2 , at  1 02 1  
n . 1 6. 
Con troversy generated bv Federal Rules formal ly promulgated by the Supreme 
Court at the end of a process that has increasingly come to resemble the l egislative 
(or  administrative) process recalls Robert McCloskey's comment on the Court ' s  
"shrewd insight" in  refus ing ''to perform 'nonjudic ia l '  functions , "  to  wi t ,  "that the 
Court ' s  position would ultimately depend on preserving i ts difference from the other 
branches of government ."  RouERT G .  i'vlc:CLOSKEY, THE A!VI ER.JC-\N Su PRE�IE Co u RT 20 
(3d rev. eel .  2000 ) .  
1 93 Cf jAcK L. vV.-\LJ.:.E R,  JR . ,  JVI O BILI ZI:'-IC I NTEREST GROL! PS I N  Avi ERI C.-\ 40 ( 1 99 1 ) 
( "A.s a result  of the expansion of the i n terest-group system and the change in  i ts com­
posi tion , the processes of pass ing legislation and evaluating publ i c  po licies have be­
come much m ore compl icated, and policy formulation has become much m ore 
conflictual than ever before . " ) . 
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Court. I ' l l  I t  appears to h ave fai led because of lobbying o n  behalf of 
rulem akers in state systems modeled o n  tb �� federal , who ·were c o n­
cerned about their mvn p rerogatives and the p ossible harm to 
rulemaking if the Court n o  longer formally sponsored the rules . 1 �l'> 
Conti nuing controversy doubtl ess h elps  to explain vvhy members of 
the Court have gone to such l engths to distance th e insti tu ti o n  fro m  
proposed Rules t h a t  it  formally promulgates,  and it  can o n ly cause 
one to wonder vvhy other members have been so enth usias tic i n  airing 
the dirty l inen.  1 96 
The risk of a rupture b e tween federal j udges and the bar was real­
ized when, in response to a p erceived crisis of expense and delay, 
_j l' dges pursued rulemaking s trategies that e i ther e mpowered them at 
th e expense of lawyers and their cl ients (sanctions a n d  a ctive case 
management) or that simply disempcnvered lavvyers ( discovery re­
fo rm ) . 197 In so doing, rulemakers and the j udges they empowered 
directly confro n ted th e culture of "adve rsarial legalism" "1" and in vi ted 
trouble from la-vvyers who , as Professor K:tgan has put it, " can be an 
extraord in arily potent  political force whe n  their i n terests and ideol-
1 94 CumjJMe Letter from H em .  vVarre n E. Burger,  w Rep . Robert \N. Kastenmeier 
(ivlay 1 2 .  1 983) , rtjHin trrf in 1 983- 1 984 Ho usP HNir! 'l,l!), supm note 78,  at 1 9:'> ( "Th e 
\'vl ernbe rs of the Court see no reason to o ppose legisl at ion to e l i m in ate this Court 
from the rule m aki n g  process . " ) ,  u>ilh Letter from H o n .  'v\'arren E. B urger, to Rep. 
Robert W .  Kaste n me i e r  (June :25,  1 984) , rPjJrin tPd in 1 98 '3- 1 984 House Hmn ngs. sujJra 
n o te 78, at  .I qEJ ( " O n  fu nhe r  refl e c t i o n ,  t h e  Justices conclude tha t i t  wo u l d be better 
to keep the u l timate authori ty uf pass ing o n  rulem aking wit h i n  the Coun as it is 
n ow . 
j L):'J 
''\ 
J -
SI'f i 985 Huuse Hwrri:ng, sujna n o te 7g, a t  9 0  ( statemem of Step h e n  B .  Burbank) 
( n o t i n g  t h a t  "the Conference of Ch i ef J ustices h as g(J n e  on record ve r-y s trongly in  
[tvor < Jf keeping the rule makin g powe r in the h a n cl s  of the Suprem e  Court" ) .  
l 9ti Sre Burba n k, s11jJia n ote 24, at 842.  
l t  is difficult ,  h owever, n ot to sense a crisi s i n  federal p rocedu ral re form 
\\ h e n  the C h i e f  Jus tice ' s  letter transm i tting t h e  1 993 amen d m e n ts to the 
Fccier<tl Rules discla imed an; i m p l ication ' 'that the Coun i tse l f  ivoulcl have 
pro posed these amendments in the form subm i tte d , "  and wheil  four o t h e r  
J ust ices indicated the ir  agnosticism a b o u t ,  lack o f  competence w evaluate o r  
disagre e m e n t  with , one o r  more of the a m e n d m e n ts .  \Vh e n  a m<0ority of 
the Supreme Court has washed i ts h ands ()f proposed Fede ral Rules,  and 
when some of the J ustices h ave aired the d i rty l i ne n , what is  i t  th at s h o u l d  
restrJ. i n  Congress fro m respo n d i n g  to those who wish to do the sam e )  
!ri. ( footrwtes omitted) ; sPe inji·a text accompanying note 202. 
1 9? SeP Burbank, mpra note ] 23 .  a t  '1 J l- l :'i ;  R<tlph K. W i n ter, In Dtjim.\P of Disrovny 
RP(orm, 58 BROOF .. L. REv. 263, '277  ( 1 992 ) . 
1 98 K--\CAN. supra note 1 47 .  at 233 .  "Sh arp reductions in adversariai  legal ism , i t  
fo l luws , w o u l d  requ i re concen trati n g gm e rn mental a u t h ori ty and s h i fting powe r from 
parties a n d  ]a,,�,·ers to gm·ern m e n ta l  utli c i ais a n d  programs-and in  the l i tigative p ro­
cess.  lo judges . "  !d. 
P R O C E D U R E ,  P O LI T I C S  A N D  P O W E R  
ogy are challenged." 1 99 Their work also raised the question whether 
the rulernakers were serving the interests of federal judges, those of 
the federal judiciary, or the public interest. �wo I t  cannot have helped 
that the rulemakers ' decision to proceed with the 1 993  proposed 
amendments on required disclosures, in the face of overwhelming op­
position from the bar and only months after having apparently aban­
doned the plan, was predicated in part on an insti tutional desire to 
regain " leadership" from Congress ( in light of the CJRA) . 20 1 
Thus, the dissolution of the ties that bound lawyers and federal 
judges in rule making has meant that the federal judiciary is not guar­
anteed broad support when, functioning as an interest group, it has 
sought to avert congressional overrides of proposed Rules, direct con­
gressional amendment of existing Rules, or the enactment of proce­
dural law apart from the Federal Rules. In addition,  when, as in 1 983 
and again in 1 993 ,  lawyers qua lawyers believe that the rulemakers are 
not listening to their obj ections-and particularly when they believe 
the rule makers have confused the interests of judges or of the judici­
ary with the Dublic interest-some of them will activelv seek relief in • 1 ' 
Congress . �0� They can only be encouraged to do so on occasions of 
recorded disagreement about proposed Federal Rules by members of 
the Supreme Court. :zov. 
Lawyers also represent the members of other interest groups, and 
in that capacity as well some of them have found irresistible the op­
portunities for seeking to exercise inf1uence ( and/ or to earn fees ) ,  
which were created by the opening up of the rulemaking process , par­
tic ularly in a world in which the myth of the neutral i ty of procedure 
has been exploded. 204 
199 !rl. at 24:) .  Hut see sujmt note 1 9 1 ;  infra text accompanying no te 230 .  
200 '·Does neutral i ty include the wil l ingness to subordinate the i n te rests of the judi­
ciary narruwlv viewed when they are in confl ict  wi th other in terests tradi t ional ly val­
ued, inc l uding by the organized bar? Is that the lesson of Rule l l , of san c tions in 
gener<tl , of court-an nexed arbi tration or of managerial judging�" Burbank ,  supm 
note 24, at 848 (footnotes omitted ) .  
�0 1 !d. at 845 (ci tation omitted) . 
202 Sre B urbank, sujna note 39, at 228;  Burbank, supra note 1 23 ,  at :) 1 5- 1 6 . 
20?> Sfe sujmr text accompanying note 1 Sl6 .  I n  this respect recorded d isagreement 
wi th the promulgation of a p roposed Federal Rule may func tion l ike a dissen t  to a 
decis ion in terpreting a federal s tatttte . See infm text  accompanying  note 224. 
204 Consider in  that regard a September 1 999 memorandum from the chair of the 
Federal Civil Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers tu his 
comm ittee colleagues, reporting the "extremely good news" that the Judicial Confer­
ence had approved the proposal to narrow the scope of discovery under Rule 
26 (b) ( l ) ,  Memorandum from Robert S. Campbel l ,  Jr., Chair, Federal Civil Procedure 
Com mittee of the American College of Trial Lawyers, to Members of the Federal Civii 
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From this perspective , the changes in the rulemaking process in 
the 1 980s that were designed to open it  up to more and more diverse 
points of view, make it more transparent, and diminish the need for 
congressional involvement, may in fact have facilitated a process of 
redundancy wherein participants treat rulemaking that is at all contro­
versial as merely the first act.205 If so, and to the extent that those 
process changes, although required by statute as of 1 988 ,  o riginated 
with the judiciary,206 that would be ironic.  For to that extent they 
would consti tute an example of the late Daniel Patrick Moynihan 's  
" Iron Law of Emulation"207 or ,  more precisely, the "more subtle pro­
cess" he described, "involv [ ing] the emulation by one branch of an­
other in order to eliminate any appearance of disparate levels of 
legitimacy. ":ws 
Procedure Committee of the American College of Trial Lawyers 1 ( Sept.  1 6 , 1 999) 
(on fi le with author) , c laiming that i t  was "the College proposal ( substantially adopted 
by the Advisory Committee) , " id. , and observing  that American College committee 
member "Fran Fox p layed a major  role as a member of the Advisory Committee, i tself, 
in  advocating the proposed amendment." !d. at 3 .  
205 See Burbank,  supm note 39,  a t  242. " I n  addition ,  far from he lp ing  to  disengage 
Congress from the process of procedural rulemaking, the changes made in the 1 980s, 
which ass imilated i t  to the legislative process, may encourage Congress ' to second­
guess the product of that process or to preemp t  i t. ' "  !d. ( footnote omitted) ; see irl. at 
244. 
206 It  is probably more accurate to say that they resulted from the j udic iary's reali­
zation that c hanges were necessary in  l ight of the controversy in the 1 970s, with the 
interest of the organized bar and congressional oversight nudging  the judiciary in the 
early 1 980s, and 1 988 legislation formally requiring a set of changes, most of  which 
( but notably not the requirement of open meetings)  h ad already been put  in place . 
See 1 985 House Hearing, supra note 78,  at 92-93 (statement of Stephen B .  Burbank) ; 
Burbank,  supra note 34, at 998 n . 2 ;  Burbank,  supra note 1 2 , at 1 020-2 1 ;  sufJra note 
1 92 .  Note, moreover, that in  1 976 Congress h ad requ i red the meetings of certain 
adminis trative agencies to be "open to public observation . "  Pub. L. N o .  94-409, §3 (a)  
( 1 976) ( codified at 5 U.S .  C. §552b ( 2000) ) .  In  any even t, Professor Geyh is correct 
that the 1 988 legislation "did l i ttle more than codify existing pract ice ,"  Geyh,  sujna 
note 42,  at 1 1 89 n . 1 24 ,  and that "the trend toward pol i tic ization of the rulemaking 
process was in  ful l  swing  by the t ime that the amendments were adopted . "  Jd. Rut S!'f 
Bone,  supra note 1 33 ,  at 903 (stating that 1 988 amendments "opened the rulemaking 
process" and n oting Geyh's con trary view) . 
207 MoYNIHAN, supra note 1 5 1 ,  at. 1 1 8 .  "Whenever any branch of the government  
acquires a new tech nique which  en hances i ts power in  relation to the  other  branches,  
that technique wil l  soon be adopted by those other branches as well . "  Id. 
208 !d. at 1 2 1 .  There can be l i ttle question that other actions taken bv the insti tu­
tional federal judiciary i l lustrate Moynihan's  Law. Thus, at the same t ime as Congress 
was better equipping i tself to monitm· ntlemaking ( court and admin istrative ) by enlarg­
ing staff, see infra text accompanying note 228,  i n  1 976 Chief Justice Burger estab­
l ished and placed in the Adm inistrative Office of the Uni ted States Courts a 
Legislative Affairs Office. See Robert W. Kastenmeier & Michael ] .  Remington ,  A judi-
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Perhaps ,  however, describing the phenomenon as one of redun­
dancy is tendentious. In  the absence of effective judi cial review of 
court rules, ( the potential for)  congressional review becomes the only 
feasible alternative . Writing about the administrative process, Profes­
sor Fiorina has observed:  
But as the courts came t o  accept  i n terest-group i n terpretations o f  
American politics i n  general , and of regulati o n  i n  p articular, j udi­
cial deferral to agen cy expertise began to decli n e .  Analogous devel­
opments occurred i n  Congress. Much of the legislatio n  establishing 
the "new social regulation "  was filled wit h  detailed procedural re­
quirements going far beyond the APA. Congressional m aj o ri ties en­
co uraged an accessible rulemakin g  p rocess, sometimes goi n g  so far 
as to subsidize i n te rvenors. And these same maj o ri ties p rovided 
every opportunity for disgru n tled i n terests to shift the c o nfli c t  from 
the administrative arena to the judicial .  Though such develop­
m e n ts admi t  to various i n te rp re tations, they are consiste n t  with leg­
islators trying to counter evident biases i n  admi n i strative p rocess . 209 
More recently, in the wake of the Supreme Court's invalidation of the 
one-house veto , � 1 ° Congress implemented a system of review of ad­
ministrative rules very much like that which has been in place for su­
pervisory court rules since 1 934. 2 1 1 I have previously remarked the 
relevance to court rulemaking of some of the concerns about this sys­
tem raised by Professor Strauss. 2 1 2 For present purposes i t  is notewor-
cious Legislator's Lexicon to the Federal judiciary, in juDGES AND LEGISLATORS: TowARD 
lNSTITLTIONAL Corvi iTI' 63 ( Robert A. Katzmann ed. , 1 988) . In recent  years the efforts 
of that office to mon itor lrgislalion affecting the j udiciary, inc ludin g  legislation affect­
ing the Federal Rules, sre sujJra text accompanying notes 96- 1 1 3 , have been supple­
mented by the work of an expanding Rules Committee Support Office ,  the staffing of, 
and l evel of support provided by, which has doubled since it was created in 1 99 1 .  See 
E-mai l  from Peter McCabe, Esq . ,  to Stephen B .  Burbank (Dec.  3 ,  2003) (on  file with 
author) . 
After noting the creation of the Office of Judic ial  I mpact A�sessment in the Ad­
ministrative Office ,  Robert Katzmann observed that " [ i ]  t would n o t  be surprising if  
Con gress, fol lowing Moynihan's  Law of Emulation [ , ]  . . .  were to create i ts own capac­
itv to produce such statements." RoBERT A. KnnrANN , CouRTS AND CoNCRESS 1 02 
( 1 997) . 
209 Fiorina, sujna note 1 3 , at 49 ( footnote omi tted) .  
2 1 0  SeP INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S .  9 1 9  ( 1 983) . 
2 1 1 See Congressional Review Act, Pub. L. No. 1 04- 1 2 1 ,  tit. I I ,  subtit. E, 1 1 0 Stat. 
857, 868-74 (codified at 5 U.S .C. §§ 80 1 -808 (2000) ) .  
2 1 2  Ser B urbank ,  supra note 39, at 245; Peter L .  Strauss, From Expntise lo Politics: Thr 
Transformation of A maiw n Rulemaking, 3 1  WAKE FOREST L. RE\·. 745 ( 1 996) . Thus, 
noti n g  Professor Strauss ' s  worry that agencies might "look for alternative means of 
accomplishing their business," Strauss, supra, at 772,  I pointed out that " [ t] he use of 
case-by-case adjudication to c ircumvent  or  preempt court rulemaking obstacles posed 
by the Enabling Act process is not unknown." Burbank ,  supra note 39, at 245. Recent 
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thy that, although Congress has only once formally invoked its power 
to block a rule ,  the power to do so has nonetheless cast a substantial 
shaduw.2 1 �  
C. Congress and the Legislative Process 
The specific experience of the proposed Evidence Rules and a 
new jurisprudential climate combined to make members of Congress 
and their s taffs aware of the potential of rulemaking choices to sub­
merge substantive in favor of procedural policies, of supervisory court 
rulemaking to impinge on Congress ' s  lawmaking prerogatives,  and of 
procedure consequentially to affect  substantive rights . Less sanguine 
than Professor Bone about the power of ideas to shape congressional 
behavior, at least on a continuing basis ,2 1 4  I believe that neither devel­
opment suffices to explain the changed pattern and pace of congres­
sional hold-ups and overrides of Federal Rules in the 1 970s and 1 980s,  
let alone Congress ' s  recent willingness to act outside of the Enabling 
Act process. 
In  1 99 1  Professor Eskridge published a pathbreaking study of 
congressional overrides of Supreme Court s tatutory interpretations,'2 t: o  
the influence of which has far transcended the specific topic and has 
extended as much to political science as to legal scholarship .  '2 t  n He 
found that, although there were on average six overrides in the four 
Congresses from 1 967 to 1 9 7  4, the average increased to twelve in the 
evidence of that p henomenon comes in  an opinion of the U.S. Court of  Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit ,  holding that the district court erred i n  refusing  to er�join state 
court cases that were brought as national class actions after the Court of Appeals had 
held that n o  such class could be certified under Rule 23.  See In re B ri dgestone/Fire­
stone ,  Inc . ,  Tires Prod.  Liab. Litig. , 333 F .3d 763, 765-69 ( 2003) . The Seventh Circu i t  
thus required a n  in junction to  implement  common law rules of  preclusion that  the 
rulemakers had concluded was beyond the rulemaking power to authorize . SeP snjnu 
note 8.5.  The decision 's  treatment of  preclusion law and of the An ti-I nj unction Act,  
28 U .S.C.  § 2283 ( 2000 ) , is adven turous, to say the least. 
2 1 3  SeP Julie A. Parks, Note, LPssons in Politics: Initial Use of thP Congressional Review 
A cl, 55 AD M I N .  L. RE\'. 1 87 ( 2003) .  
2 1 4  Sn' Bon e ,  supm note 1 33 ,  at 9 1 9  ( " Ideas have power i n  the pol i tical process 
notwithstanding the force of raw i nterest.. Armed with a persuasive j ustification of 
the ir  role,  court rulemakers can make it more difficult for Congress to justify 
interve ntio n . " ) . 
2 1 :) Sec Wil l iam N .  Eskridge, Jr. , Overriding Supreme Court Statu/my ln tnprPtation Deu­
s ions, 1 0 1 Y\!X L J .  33 1 ( 1 99 1 ) .  
2 1 6  St'P Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, l.Valtn F ivlwjJhy: The Intemctlve Xat u 1P of Judicia! 
DPrision !\!laking, in Tm: ProNEERS o r  JL'D ICIAL BEI L-\\'IOR, sujJra n ote 1 33 ,  at 2 1  1 - 1 � .  
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eight Congresses from 1 975 to 1 990, and that the 94th Congress 
( 1 975-76) represented the turning point. 2 1 7 
Professor Eskridge explored the characteristics of decisions l ikely 
to be overridden and of the groups likely to persuade Congress to take 
that action,  noting as to the former that decisions attracting scrutiny 
'\vere much more l ikely to have a dissenting opinion"2 1 s and that deci­
sions "overridden were much more l ikely to have had an ideolog:cally 
identifiable split on the Court . " � 1 '\ Moreover, analyzing the reasons 
for the change in the rate of congressional override, Professor Es-u u 
kridge iden tified , among others,  th e proliferation of in terest groups , 
"producing more monitoring, "��( \ and he observed that between 1 970 
and 1 975 the s ize of the staf-Is of standing committees in the House 
and Senate doubled,�� 1 a factor that he found to have more explana­
tory pmver than the exis tence of divided government.2�2 
Because of these and other contributions, Professor Eskrid!!e ' s  u 
s tudy is extremely useful  in considering the relationship between the 
federal courts, the federal judiciary, and Congress in the regulation of 
procedure. Thus , the time period he identifies as the turning point 
for s tatutory overrides of Supreme Court decisions, 1 975-1 976, is 
equally salient for the greater incidence of overrides (and of close 
calls ) in the rulemaking area. 22" 
Similarly, Eskridge ' s  finding concerning the effect  of dissents 
and/ or an ideologically identifiable split on the l ikelihood of a deci­
sional override suggests that what I have called the Court "a iring the 
dirty l inen"224 may have contributed to congressional activity ( and, in­
deed may have been intended to do so ) .  �T' In any event, the greater 
transparency of the rulemaking process as a whole has facil itated m o n-
2 1 7  See Es kridge . su;Jia n ote 2 1 :\ at 338. 
� 1 8  !d. a t  350.  
2 1 9  Iri. 
2�0 !d. at :ns. 
22 1 lrl. at 339. 
222 See id.  a r  ?.40-4 1 ( "The evidence from r.h e  l 9S O ' s  corre lates vei-:- well  l\ i t h  t h e  
suggesti o n  that �taff si1.e h as exercised a n  i ndepe n d e n t  i n fl ue n c e  o n  t h e  leve l o f  u m ­
gression;tl overrides . " ) . 
223 SPe sujHa r.ext accom panying notes 73-74. 
224 Sf'e .m.pm text accompanying note 1 96. 
225 Cf Eskri dge, sujmt n ote 2 1 5 , at 388-R9 (cliscu�s ing " i nsti nnionai sign:,l i i : : g" 
when , fo r  ex;unplt'. " the Court wil l  som eti m es refuse to in terpret a stawte b ro�u:ilv ,  
especia!lv when s u c h  <111 i n te rp retation wo uld represent < l  m<� O r  policy dec i s i o n  ch,lt  
the Co 1 1 rt vmu l d  be m ore comfo rtctble allowi ng Congress t.o make '' ) 
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itoring and hence identification of ideological and/ or interest group 
flash points .;?;?fi 
More important (because bearing directly on the change in Con­
gress ' s  attitude or behavior with respect to proposed Federal Rules 
and federal procedural regulation in general ) are Eskridge ' s  findings 
concerning congressional staff and his analysis and discussion of inter­
est group dynamics. 
The vast increase in s taff between 1 970 and 1975 equipped Con­
gress to monitor supervisory court rulemaking,227 and its experience 
with the proposed Evidence Rules during that very period indicated 
that there might be reason to do so. Thereafter, even before the j udi­
ciary changed its rulemaking procedures ( a  process completed and 
formalized in 1 988) , the proliferation of interest groups discussed by 
Eskridge , and the monitoring they provided for a Congress better 
equipped to respond, surely contributed to the pace and rate of over­
rides and close calls in the 1 970s and early 1980s. Moreover, as sug­
gested above, it is likely that both increased staff and the capacity i t  
gave to Congress stimulated emulation in the judiciary, commencing 
with the creation of the AO's  Legislative Affairs Office in 1 9 76 .�;?K 
Although review of the occasions of friction between the 
rulemakers and Congress as to Civil Rules proposals in the 1 970s and 
1 980s�29 suggests the possibil ity of a partisan (or ideological ) explana­
tion,  many of them are difficult to square with public choice and simi­
lar theories of legislative behavior. The 1983 sanctions/ case 
management ( as also the 1 993 discovery) proposals may cons ti tute an 
exception to both propositions, although both sets of proposals were 
recognized as having implications for access to court (which is often a 
partisan issue) .  Moreover, because lawyers do not constitute a unified 
interest group ( and also speak for others who may consti tute such 
groups) , it may be that proposals designed to affect attorney behavior  
2 2 6  The Supreme Court has also been concerned about i ts a b i li ty to monitor 
rulemaki ng. "The Advi sory Com m ittee was i nform e d  in February l 992 ' th at the 
Court would in the future l ike a m e m orandum explaining Lhe contentious i s sues re­
solved . '  .. . Appendix H to the Judicial Confere nce Rules materi als for Se ptember, 
1 992 i�  a document en titled ' Proposed Rules Amendments Gen c rating S u bstantial 
Controversv."' Burbank, sujna note 56,  at 1 24 n.l 77. 
'2 '2 7  The same p he nomenon may have affe cted congressional onc rsight o f  aclm ini s­
n·ative agenci es. SPP Kagan, sujJra note 1 36 ,  at 2 2 5 7  (citing JoEL  D .  AB FRB,\CI- 1 , KEE P I N C  
.-\ V\'.\ ! C H F U l .  EYE l 4 ,  34-37 ( 1 990 ) , for a " large increase i n  fo rmal m etho ds of legisla­
tive onTsight, such as committee hearings and investigations, i n  th e 1 970s and 
1 980s" ) . 
228 SN' supra note 207 and accompanving text. 
229 s·Pe supra text accompanying notes 73-76. 
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will usually produce a conflictual demand pattern, diminishing the 
likelihood of success in Congress. �?>o 
V\rben one moves from congressional review of proposed Federal 
Rules to procedural legislation initiated in Congress, whether in the 
form of direct legislative amendments to Federal Rules or of discrete , 
substance- (or l itigant-) specific  provisions, additional considerations 
bear on the analysis. Just as the rulemakers have mistakenly treated 
the Executive Branch as a monolith in the past,23 1 it is probably a 
mistake to treat Congress as a monolith for these purposes. Different 
congressional committees have different cultures and patterns of 
membership, including percentage of lawyer members, as well as dif­
ferent attitudes toward the federal judiciary. 2'�� 
Invocation of "The Enabling Act Process" may mean something 
to the members of the House and Senate j udiciary committees, most 
of whom will be lawyers,�3-' and whose staffs often work closely with 
representatives of the judiciary. Indeed, it may function as something 
l ike a rule of law value to restrain legislative behavior reasonably per­
ceived as a breach of that treaty. 234 The same may not be true of other 
committees , and it  is interesting that some of the legislation contain­
ing provisions to which the federal judiciary has objected in recent 
years has come from such other committees. 2'�"' Moreover, of course ,  
there may be no point in invoking-or, worse, no occasion to in­
voke-rule of law values when legislation is passed in violati on of Con­
gress 's own rules . 236 
The question, however, is whether the judiciary is differently situ­
ated from any other interest group in this respect. In one of the clear­
est examples of the "Iron Law of Emulation,"2'�7 Congress developed 
the committee sys tem beginning in the 1 790s so as to "counter the 
expertise and experience that unti l  that time had been monopolized 
230 SeP Eskridge, sujna note 2 1 5 , at 365 . 
2 3 1  See Bur bank,  supra note 5 6 ,  at  1 4 7-48. 
232 SPe, e.g. , Mark C. [\..l i l l er, CrmgrPssional Committees ond the FedPml Courls: ;\ i\'eo­
fnsliiu.lional Pl'l speclive, 45 'vV. PoL. Q. 949 jmssim ( 1 992) [hereinafter Mil ler ,  Conwes­
sinnal Committees] ; Mark C. M i ller,  Lawyers in Congress: V\17wt Diffnence Does it f'vioke ?, 20 
CoNGREss & THE PRESI DE'-iC Y 1 ( 1 993) . 
233 St>r iVl i l l er, CongrPssinnol  Co m mittees, s upra note 232, at 962. 
234 Cf Eskridge, sujJm note 2 1 5 , at 367-72 ( noting the "critical role"  of commit­
tees i n  screening out override proposals ) .  
235 Thus, the PSLRA was consi dered by the Banking Committee in  the Senate and 
the Commerce Committee in the House; the Y2K Act was considered by the Com­
m erce Comm i ttee in  the Senate; and the £-Government Act was considered by the 
Committee on Government Reform i n  the House. 
236 See Edward R .  Becker, Of Laws and Sausages, 87 jLID !C\TURE 7, 7-1 0  ( 200�) -
2:�7 SPe sujJI'a text accompanying note 207. 
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by the executive branch . "2'�8 Eventually, however, the power of con­
gressional committees eroded v.rith the adoption of reforms that 
brought sunshine to their meetings,  "strengthened the Speaker and 
made him accountable to the caucus"239 and proliferated subcommit­
tees. 240 More recently, the power of the committee system as a whole 
has eroded, as more and more legislation is the product of activity on 
the floors of Congress, often taking the form of enormous multipur­
pose bills, including appropriations bills.24 1 The Prison Litigation Re­
form Act was part of one such bil l ,  for example.242 
In any event, "The Enabling Act Process" has nothing properly to 
do (or at least not what the judiciary thinks it has to do ) with most of 
the substance- (or l i tigant-) specific  legislative procedure to which the 
j udiciary has objected. The judiciary appears to be missing the points 
that ( 1 )  Congress has a strong claim to exclusive power to make pro­
spective law for such matters , which it has not delegated ,  and ( 2 )  both 
ideological and interest group politics are l ikely to be at their apex 
(within the domain of procedure) when the question is the content of 
a substance-specific rule of procedure , contributing to, but by no 
238 Kenneth A.  Shepsle, Representation and Governance: The Great Legislative Tmrie-
Ojj; 1 03 PoL. Su . Q. 461 ,  465 ( 1 988) . 
239 Id. at 478. 
240 See id. at 479-80. 
24 1 See id. at 480. 
Subcommittees get rolled by full committees, and ful l  committees get rolled 
on the floor.  Final legislati on today i s  less the resul t  of specialized considera­
tion by experts than i t  is the product of whomever [sic] is ski l led at assem­
bling tloor majori ties . . . .  The Congress becomes vul nerable  to penetration 
from outs ide . . . .  
!d. ; see id. (" [ ivl ]  ore and more legislative business is conducted o n  the f1oor wi th sub­
committee product� gett ing amended, often beyond recogni tion . " ) ; see also WALKER, 
sujn·a note 1 93 ,  at 1 36 ( noting dramatic decl ine in i ntroduced and enacted bil ls after 
micl- 1 970s and enactment  of major  programs in  the 1 980s as part of " the ritualisti c ,  
mam moth , omnibus budget reco nci l iation bil ls compiled at the end of  each  session of  
Congress" ) .  "But the  prime example of  Congress at i ts worst is i ts s tewardsh ip  on  
appro priation bi l ls ."  Becker, sup-ra note 236 ,  at 8 .  
242  See Christopher E .  Smith & Christopher E .  Nelson, Perceptions of the Conse­
quences of the Pri.so·n Litigation REform Act: A Comjmrison of State Attorneys General anrl 
Frderal Distrirt judges, 23 JusT. Svs. J .  295, 3 1 0  ( 2002 ) .  
Before the enactment of the PLRA, the repeated and susta ined legislative 
in i tiatives to curtail prisoner l i tigation and related judicial authori ty to inter­
vene i n to correctional operations were delayed and deflected by influential  
Democratic senators, who were concerned about the protect ion of constitu­
tio nal rights in correctional insti tu tions.  However,  the statute eventually 
gai ned the opportun i ty for enactment  without full examination in commit­
tee hearings because it was included in  the 1 996 Appropriations Act . . .  
/d. ( c i tatien omitted) ; sef' Schlanger,  sujna note 95,  at 1 559. 
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means exclusively determining, the need for circumspection i n  the 
formulation and communication of the judiciary's views. 
It is quite remarkable  that the federal judiciary continues to ob­
ject to procedural provisions in statutes like the PSLRA and the Y2K 
Act on the basis of "The Enabling Act Process . "24" For although the 
Enabling Act does allocate power with respect to prospective , legisla­
tion-like procedural law,  i t  is restricted to "general rules , "  language 
that the rulemakers have consistently interpreted to require Federal 
Rules that both apply in all federal district courts and that apply in all 
types of civil cases ( i . e . ,  are trans-substantive ) .  244 Whether or not that 
interpretation is correct,24" it prevents promulgation of Federal Rules 
that are substance-specific ,  and behind the judiciary's  objections there 
may, therefore, lie either a claim that the Federal Rules represent the 
best accommodation of procedural values, and the best vehicle for the 
effectuation of substantive values, for every type of case in federal 
court, or a claim that the costs to such values are oul:lveighed by the 
benefits of formally uniform procedure. In addition or alternatively, 
an objection that invokes "The Enabling Act Process" may simply ( al­
beit fecklessly) signal the judiciary's concern that, given the circum­
stances in which so much contemporary legislation is enacted, 
described above , statutory procedure is unlikely to be well made, 
viewed either discretely or as part of the larger procedural landscape 
in which i t  will repose. 246 
Yet, the numerous instances when federal courts themselves have 
sought to vary choices made in the Federal Rules to accommodate the 
perceived needs of particular types of cases is evidence, were it 
needed, of the implausibil ity of such claims about the Federal 
Rules .2-l-7 Moreover, as already suggested ,  for those many matters 
where the Federal Rules make no choices, leaving the procedure/sub-
243 SeP Christopher M. Fairman , Heightened Pleading, 81 TE:-<. L. RE\ . 55 1 ,  6 1 4  
( 2002) ( opposition t o  heightened pleading in  Y2K Act) . 
244 See Carr ington,  sujJm note 1 60 ,  at 2080 (special p leading rules for RICO cases 
"would have violated the principle of generalism and might therefore exceed the au­
thority of the court under the Rules Enabling Act" ) . 
24.5 SPe Burbank, supra note 1 20 ,  at 1 934-35; sujna text accompanying note 1 6 1 .  
Note that, in my view, most Federal Rules are only formally Lrans-substan tive . 
246 Professor Geyh suggests that the judiciary's opposition to substance-specific 
procedure ,  which reflects concern about the Jack of "in terest, aptitude, [and] experi­
ence" of the responsible legislators, may be motivated in part by a desire " to  alert the 
judiciary committees that someone out there is  on [their] turf ( thereby prompting 
the judiciary committee to request a jo int  referral and k i l l  the bil l ) . "  Memorandum 
from Charles G .  Geyh, to Stephen B. Burbank (n .d . )  (on file with the author) . 
247 S'ee, P.g , Fairman, sujJra note 243, at 6 1 7-24 ; Ch ristopher M .  Fai rman,  Thr 
i\!Iyth of NoticP Pleading, 45 ARIZ.  L. RE\·. 987 ( 2003 ) . 
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stance accommodation to discretionary decisionmaking, the claim 
must be that Congress ' s  substantive agenda is always better served by 
trusting to the discretion of federal j udges and thus abj uring the po­
tentially potent technique of using procedure to drive , or to mask, 
substance. 24� From the latter perspective , indeed, the claim seeks to 
deny to Congress a politi cally valuable instrument of ambiguity. 249 
Neither the history of the past thirty years , recounted above , nor the 
theory of the legislative interpretation game,250 suggests that Congress 
would, or that i t  should ,  honor such a claim across the board.25 1  
248 See Fairman,  supra n ote 243, at 6 1 7- 1 9 .  Professor Fairman i s  c ri ti cal o f  the 
pleading provisions in  the Y2K Act, as of those in the PSLRA, on ·whi c h  they were 
modeled, defending trans-substantive procedure on the ground of u nifo rmity and 
because it  fosters "greater social j ustice ."  Id. at 622-23.  But surely this is an ideologi­
cal judgment that presupposes the current content of Rule 8. Moreover, the Court's 
statements that " [a ]  requirement  of greater specificity for particular claims is a result  
that ' must be obtained by the p rocess of amending the federal rules ,  and not  by j udi­
cial interpretation , "' Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N .A. , 534 U .S .  506, 5 1 5  (2002)  ( quoting 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics I n telligence & Coordination Unit ,  507 U .S .  
1 63,  1 68 ( 1 993) ) ,  should be  approached with care. A Federal Rule requir ing height­
ened pleadi ng i n  "all averments of fraud or mistake" is one thing. See fED . R. Crv. P .  
9 (b) ; Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 1 64 ( 2d Cir .  2004) ( Rule 9 (b )  applicable to fraud 
allegations even though fraud not a necessary e lement of statutory claim ) .  A pro­
posed Federal Rule attempting to impose heightened pleading requirements as to a 
particular substan tive c laim would be quite another, something h ard if not impossible 
to square with the ru!emakers '  tradi tional in terpretation of "general rules" and-per­
haps this is the point-not something that they would conceivably attempt  in  the post-
1 988 rulemaking world. 
249 My defense of  statutory substance-specific procedure, occasional and tailored 
to meet an identified m isfit between Congress's substantive goals and the trans-sub­
stan tive Federal Rules, is predicated in part on a normative preference for transparent  
policy choices on matters of substantive i mport by democratically selected lawmakers 
over buried policy choices by j udges. See s ujna text accompanying note 1 63 .  Even if, 
as i n  the PSLRA. and the Y2K Act, heightened pleading  was an avoidance techn ique. 
enabling Congress to navigate substantive controversy or an empirical vacuum, ser 
Fairman , suj)l"a note 243, at 607, 6 1 7; id. at 6 1 8  ( " reach [ ing] out to procedural alter­
natives as salves for the substantive tension'· ) , I do not see that "con gressional height­
ened pieacling escapes scrutiny by the bench, bar, and public in  the same way as the 
judiciaily imposed standards do."  !d. at 624. Although modern legislation may es­
cape just <1.bout e\'eryone ' s  scrutiny before enacted, that was not true of the pleading 
proYisiom of the PSLRA or the Y2K Ac t. Moreover,  transparency is only part of the 
n orm ative preference.  :\ccountability for prospective choices having predictable and 
identifiable effects o n  the substantive law is the other ,  and the Federal Rules process is 
not the proper veh icle for such choices. 
2:'ill SPP Grundfest & Pritchard, s upra note 7 ,  at 637-50 .  
�25 1  Even Professor Carrington bas acknowledged that there "may be times when 
Congress should respond to cries for substance-specific procedural advantage . "  Car­
r ington ,  svjJm note 1 60,  at 2086; see id. ( " I f  necessary to effect enforcement of a sub-
slan ti\ e right . . " ) .  
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From an interest group perspective , the judiciary's invocation o f  
"The Enabling Act Process" as  an objection to statutory substance-spe­
cific procedure may reinforce the view that the judiciary cares more 
for i ts power and supposed prerogatives than it does for the public 
interest.2:o2 \Norse, inconsistency in the invocation of that objection 
may reinforce suspicion that the objection is not really based on the 
interests of the judiciary qua judiciary-or on concern for the quality 
and integrity of federal procedure-but rather on ideological consid­
erations, depending therefore on the proposed legislation in ques­
tion. 2:o3 If so,  the judiciary will be regarded as taking sides in an 
inevitably policy preference-laden debate and incur the same costs as 
if it were actually participating on the merits of such debate. Those 
costs may be substantial. 2',4 
252 See supra text accompanying note 200. 
253 Although the PLRA "chan ged the operation of numerous civil rules ,"  
Schlanger, supm note 95,  at 1 562, the j udiciary appears to have objected specificallv 
only to those affecting the operation of Rule 53 ( special masters ) . . ')ee E-mai l from 
John K. Rabiej ,  Chief, Rules Support Office, Administrative Office of the U . S  Courts, 
to Stephen B. Burbank (May 25, 2004) (on file with author) . 
254 As so well discussed by P rofessor Resnik, such suspicion has attended efforts hv 
the institutional federal judiciary to persuade Congress not to enact legislation creat­
ing new federal righ ts on the ground that, in a time of crowded dockets, and in l ight 
of federalism concerns, the resultin g  cases would represent a misallocation of federal 
resources. See Judith Resnik ,  Const?icting RPmedies: The Relmr;uistJudicimy, Congress, aml 
Federal Pown, 78 h!o.  L.J. 223 passim (2003 ) . 
On matters as to which one would expect the judiciary to try to maximize the 
institution ' s  col lective preferences, such as salary, terms, and con cl it ions of em ploy­
ment, eve l)'One recognizes that judges are self-interested and can discount what they 
say without closing off an obvious and important source of relevant  in formation .  This 
is  also true of workload/docket concerns, although, as Professor Resn ik points out, 
there are reasons to doubt the judiciary's abi l i ty to forecast the work that new statu­
tory righ ts would create. See irl. at 286, 289, 296. Opposition to the c reation of new 
federal rights by the institutional j udiciary on docket grounds, whether or not backed 
up with an explicit statement of the "proper" role of the federal courts ,  may carry 
undue weight or  in any event be invoked by congressional opponents. Th e costs are 
not  just  the perception that the j udiciary has a unified policy preference but that the 
preference.  once expressed, may skew individual judicial decisionmaking by those so­
c ialized not to express the ir  views ex ante and affected perhaps by the insti tutionally 
expressed view ex post. See id. at 308-09. In an intenriew in 2003 , the Chair of the 
National Conference of Federal Trial Judges. Judicial D ivision ,  American Bar Associa­
tion,  stated: 
One of the things that you wi l l  not  find wi thin our Conference, however, is 
any official position or opinion contrary to the policies of the Judicial Con­
ference.  So, while we target issues that would certainlv be of in terest to the 
Judicial Conference, such as legislation affecting independence or compen­
sation ,  and we discuss these fran kly and vigorously, our publ i c  position never 
conflicts with any official pol icy adopted by the Judicial Conference .  \Ne 
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The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1 990 appears to confound the 
transactional model of legislation , which posits that Congress will have 
l ittle interest in statutes that distribute benefits broadly (a  theory 
under which the Enabling Act makes eminent sense so long as proce­
dure is thought to be neutral )  . 255 I t  is not necessary to endorse that 
theory in order to believe that we shall not see the CJRP .. 's like soon 
again .  Legislation containing substance-spec ific procedure is ,  for rea­
sons already adumbrated, quite a different matter. The climate for 
ideological and interest group politics with respect to procedure today 
recalls the mid- 1990s. That is not good news.25fi 
IV. THE FuTuRE 
In the current political climate-perhaps the most poisonous in 
forty years for the relationship between Congress and the federal judi­
c iary-there is reason for concern about adherence to l ong-standing 
customs or norms and hence about resort to blunt instruments of in­
fluence or control by members of Congress determined to work their 
wil l  on the federal courts and "to take no prisoners" in the p rocess . 207 
bel ieve the federal Judiciary needs to speak with one voice o n  such policy 
issues. 
Conference Represents Federal Trial Judges, T H I RD BRANCH, June 2003, at 1 0  ( interview 
with Chief Judge I rene M .  Keeley, N . D .  W. Va. ) .  
More fundamentally, i t  is not, I bel ieve, appropriate for the federal j udiciary to 
have an institutional view about the "proper" role CJf the federal courts , or at least one 
that p urports to drive official positions on proposed legislation creating new federal 
righL� .  That is a matter for Congress. The j udiciary should be expected to provide 
data to Congress, and there is no harm in  a repeated plea that Congress consider 
case load implications (and adequately fund the courts ) . Anythi n g  beyond that is 
l ike ly to be seen ,  perhaps with good reason,  as " taking sides in  an inevitably policy 
preference-laden debate . "  
255 See WrLLfAtvi N .  EsKRI D G E ,  JR . ,  E T  A L . , C:\SES r\N D  lVlATERIA.LS () N L.ECISLATI O N :  
STATUTES A N D  THE CREATION oF P u s u c :  Pouc: v  59 ( 3d eel .  2001 ) .  
256 The polarization of procedure is but part of the larger po l i ti cal e nvironment, 
to which I turn i n  the next Part. 
257 See Letter from Rep .  Max Sandl in ,  to Stephen B. Burbank (Oct. 3 ,  2003) (on 
file with author) : 
[T] hirteen members of the U .S .  House of Representatives recen tly formed 
the "House Working Group on Judicial Accountabil ity." The working  group 
is  chaired by Representative Lamar Smith ( R-Texas) and Representative 
Steve Chabot ( R-Ohio) . The working  group's stated goals include educating 
Members and the public about so-called 'j udicial abuse ," preven ting 'judi­
cial abuse,"  and supporti ng the nomination of judges "who wi l l  not substi­
tute their own pol icy vie>vs for the law." 
Representative Tom DeLay ( R-Texas) , House M�ority Leader and a 
member of the working group, praised the group for i ts in tention "to take 
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The proper response is not-i t  cann ot be-assertions of power that 
does not exist. The federal judiciary not only lacks a purse and a 
sword; i ts shield is very narrow. Wiser heads must prevail , and, if nec­
essary, informed public opinion must be brought to bear on those 
who are ignorant of, or choose not to heed, the lessons of our consti­
tutional history. :!SH 
Power has a shadow, j ust as law doesY'-'9 Yet, although one may 
have to yield to naked power, as also abide by a foo lish law, neither 
means that one must accept irrationality or irresponsibility "wi thout 
question,  or for that matter, without insistence that legislative foolish­
ness be clear for all to see. "2c;o Rather than waging a losing battle 
about power, far better to seek to forestall irrational i ty and irresponsi-
no prisoners" when it comes to exposing and p reventing 'j udicial abuse." 
Among other measures, the working group has committed to i ncreasing di­
rect oversight of the federal courts and to calling federal judges to account 
when they "exceed the authority given them under Artic le  I I I . "  
!d. ; 1j inji"a text accompanying note 286 (noting the Chief Justice 's  concerns about 
PROTECT Act) . 
258 See E-mai l from Stephen B. Burbank, to Todd Metcalf, Legislative Assistant 
(Oct .  23 ,  2003) (on file with author) : 
Representative Sandlin would know better than I whether a self-appointed 
group of members of the House from one side of the aisle has any standing 
or power w do anything, other than further pol lute discourse that is already 
debased. I would have thought not. The risk, however, is precisely that, by 
adding to a legislative corpus of misinformation and inter-branch hosti l i ty 
that is already too large , the House Working Group will  influence those >vho 
do have power. In that regard, the quoted characterization of the group's  
" take no prisoners" approach, however praiseworthy in the pursuit of ter­
mites, manifests a woefully ignorant and inappropriate atti tude towards an 
institution for the establishment of which our ancestors fought and died and 
which has been a cornerstone of our freedoms. 
If in fact the House Working Group is serious, i t  appears that the mem­
bers of that group want to turn back the clock and to use the recognized 
power of oversight, among other legislative powers, to coerce the judiciary, 
the " least dangerous branch" in part because it lacks the power adequately to 
defend i tself. Fortunately, Representative Sandlin  is alert to the dangers, 
and if the effort subsists, he will have the support of all thoughtful citizens, 
who, even when they do not l ike a federal court decision , know that an inde­
pendent (and accountable)  judici<uy has been cri tical to our development as 
a functioning democracy. 
!d. ( responding to Letter from Rep. Max Sandlin,  S1lpm note 257) . 
259 See, e.g , Burbank,  supra note 1 ,  at 32 1 -22 (noting that the acquittal of Justice 
Samuel Chase on articles of impeachment  nonetheless curbed partisan behavior on 
the bench) ; Robert H .  Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of I he 
],aw: ThP Case of Divorce, 88 YALE LJ 950, 990-97 ( l 979) . 
260 Stephen B .  Burbank, The Courtroom as Classroom: Independence, Imagination and 
Ideolog,y in tlu Work of jar.k WPinstein, 97 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 97 1 , 2009 ( 1 997 ) . 
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bility th rough genuine dialogue, informed and nourished bv the re-­
spect that is due to all branches of government and that is required if 
we are to honor the genius of those who fought and died for our 
liberty. 
The challenge is especial ly daunting, however, because the break­
clown in norms of institutional respect and accommodation is not con­
fined to the judiciary and Congress. It is rather  a defining 
characteristic of contemporary politics and should be a source of the 
most serious concern for all thoughtful citizens . As recently put by 
Professor Shane,  although " [ w] e have a national system of govern­
ment whose orderly and effective operation depends to an excep­
tional degree upon certain norms of cooperation among i ts 
competing branches,"26 1 today "there is reason to worry that new hab­
its of unalloyed combat . . .  have replaced old habits of mutually re­
spectful competition, to the long-term detriment of democratic vitali ty 
m the United States ."262 
Over the last decade the rulemakers have, by and large , taken 
seriously the ChiefJustice 's  assurance to Congress that they would ob­
serve the Enabling Act's l imitations. 263 They have also taken seriously 
a number of calls, including in a 1 995 self-study of rulemaking, that 
rulemaking attend far more in the future than it has in the past to the 
:? 6 1  Peter M .  Shane, \-Vhen Inte1�branch Norms Break Down:  OJ Arms-fm�Hnstagr.s, ··o,� 
derly Sh utdowns, " Presidential Impeachments, and Judicial "Coups, " 1 2  CoRNELL J .L. & P u B .  
P o L ' v  503,  :105 (2003 ) .  I have suggested that  the so-called House Worki ng Group on 
Judicial Accountabi l i ty is pursui ng a "partisan ,  if  not  strongly ideological,  effort to use 
the supposed excesses of the federal j udiciary for pol i ti cal advan tage in future elec­
tions . "  E-mail from Stephen B .  Burbank,  supra note 258.  lf so ,  it  is an example o f  
" inter-branch aggression for pol i tical  goals . "  Shane ,  s up ra, at  5 2 1 . 
Informed c i ti ze ns know that a Republ ican-i n i tiated broads ide founded in al­
l egations of judic ial abuse and j udicial  overreaching against a federal j udici­
ary dominated by judges nominated by Republican p reside n ts is un l ikely to 
be sincerely motivated. The problem, of course, is that most c i tizens are not 
wel l  informed and that they trust their  elected representative:'> for accurate 
information and sincere legislative action when a genuine p roblem affecting 
the common weal arises. 
E-mail from Stephen B .  Burbank, supra n ote 2:)8.  Whether or not the group's activi­
ties will pose "a special threat to democratic legitimacy," Shane, suf'm, at 5 2 1 , depends 
upon i ts abil ity to generate popular support.  Of course, that is why the group seeks to 
"educate" the publ ic .  .See Letter from Rep .  Max Sandl in ,  supra note 257. 
262 Shane, suj;m note 26 1 ,  at 542. "I am crit iquing the substitut ion of norms that 
support i nter-branch consensus bui lding and democratic deliberation with norms 
that fayor winner-take-all pol itics and unproductive in ter-branch tens ion . "  ld. at 504 
n .S .  
263 See sujna text accompanying note 85. 
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need for and the fruits of empirical study.:264 Both developments have 
helped the rulemakers keep their ambition under control , for evi­
dence of which one need only consider the recently shelved proposals 
to address in Federal Rules problems stemming from duplicative or 
overlapping class actions.2 (;,; 
The result of the j udiciary' s  self-restraint is l ikely to be few occa­
sions of friction when the Court promulgates, and few overrides of, 
proposed Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the future. 266 But that 
same self-restraint, coupled with the discovery of the power of proce­
dure by interest groups and Congress alike, seems destined to yield 
more proposals for "procedural" legislation and hence the need for 
closer and more frequent cooperation with Congress. 
vVhen such proposals take the form of direct statutory amend­
ments of the Federal Rules , the judiciary has a legitimate interest in 
focusing attention on "The Enabling Act Process , "  and Congress 
should ensure that there is a compelling reason to depart from that 
process, be it a genuine need for speedy adoption,267 inadvertent 
omission from proposed Rules that are about to become effective,:26H 
or the desire to place law properly made by Congress as opposed to 
the rulemakers in i ts proper context. The last of these reasons re­
quires no disruption in the normal process prior to congressional ac­
tion.2(>!J Moreover, when considering action for any of these reasons 
264 See Se!fSturly, sujJra note 7 1 ,  at 699; supra text accompanying  note 1 57 .  
265 Si'e sujJm note 85; Resn ik,  sujJra note 254, at 296-305. 
266 "Friction,  to some extent, is a sign of the system at work. But l ife cannot be all 
friction . "  Shane ,  supra note 26 1 ,  at 508. For a s imi lar view as to the relations between 
judges and politicians in England, see Diana Woodhouse, The English judges, Politics 
and the Balance of Pown, 66 Moo. L. REv. 920, 923 ( 2003) (book review) ( "A degree of 
friction between the courts and the executive is healthy. However, when i t  manifests 
i tself in open conflict, as it did in 1 995-96 ,  it can undermine public confidence . " ) . 
267 ,1iee Selj�S.I u.dy, supra note 7 1 ,  at 687. 
Rulemaking today is more accessible to in terested parties than ever before . 
It is also slower, and the exchange is not an unmixed blessing. I n  the wake 
of the 1 988 changes, only Congress can change rules with dispatch .  This 
means that any group with a perce ived press ing need seeks i ts forum in the 
legislature rather  than the j udiciary·, and today Congress readi ly demon­
strates i ts in terest in federal rules matters by holding committee hearings 
and amending the rules themselves .  
!d. Hut see supra note 2 0 6  ( noting that the 1 988 changes largely confirmed existing 
practices) . 
268 SPe supm text accompanying note 1 03 .  
269 SPP Burbank ,  sujna note 56, at  1 45-46. 
'Nhen p rudence counsels (or  the Enabl ing Act requires) that federal law be 
made through legislation rather than court rules, the desire to take advan­
tage of the rulemakers ' expertise, to faci l i tate comprehensive procedural re-
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(or  any other) , the form proposed-namely, s tatutory amendment of 
Federal Rules-should remind Congress that following the normal 
process, if possible ,  is important not just to improve the quality of the 
product ( including the coherence of the Federal Rules as a whole ) , 
and not just to show respect for the federal judiciary as an institution. 
"If interdependence is as critical to the Framers ' system as autonomy, 
then it follows that no branch should seek to eliminate longstanding 
forms of interdependency between the branches."270 
Those unmoved by such considerations may wish to recall that 
although Congress holds the ultimate power to make most procedural 
law, federal judges are not without power to frustrate i ts effective im­
plementation.27 1  Forbearance in one realm of power m ay induce sim­
ilar forbearance in the other.272 More generally, a "system of 
separated powers . . .  works only if every branch is committed to effec­
tive governance and is willing to forbear from the deployment of i ts 
powers to their extreme theoretical iimi ts. "27g 
'vVhen, however, Congress proposes to enact substance-specific 
procedural law, appeals to "The Enabling Act Process" risk the percep­
tion that the insti tution is advancing i ts own interests over the public 
interest or that the appeal is a cover for substantive disagreement.274 
In such cases, the judiciary's  legitimate interests lie rather in timely 
and sincere consul tation on the questions whether the existing trans­
substantive rules are in fact  not appropriate and, if so ,  what alterna­
tives would be best. In addition,  one need not embrace the tradi­
tional expertise story to believe that the rulemakers would have much 
form, to honor a sense of shared institutional authori ty, or to overcome 
traditional congressional inertia, may nonetheless suggest the wisdom of a 
two-tier process. The weak version of such a process would require only that 
the rulemakers bring questionable exercises of authori ty to Congress 's  atten­
tion. The strong version woul d  require legislation to implement the 
rulemakers ' recommen dations on such matters. Both versions would leave the 
in itiative to frmnulate new or amended Federal Rules with the m.lemakers. 
Td. (c i tations omitted) .  If positive l egislative action were thought required or desira­
ble ,  i t  wendel be appropriate for Congress to signal i ts interest in  receiving a proposed 
Federal Rule from the j udiciary, as it woul d  be to proceed directly to legislation if the 
signal were i gnored (which is h ighly unl ikely) . 
270 Shane, sujJra note 2 6 1 , at 5 1 2 ; see id. at 5 1 3 . 
2 7 1  Sre, r• g. , S:vi iTl ! ,  supm note 2 3 ,  a t  1 27,  1 30 .  
272 Sre Shane ,  supra note 26 1 ,  at  506 ( "For the  most part, each branch needs the 
forbearance, if not actually the agreement  of, the other two branches in  order to work 
i ts 'viii . " ) . 
273 ld.. at 508;  if MoYNI HAN, sujJra note 1 5 1 ,  at 1 37 ( " the tendency to introduce 
n ew confl ict  techniq ues can be restrained hy the knowledge that th ey will almost cer­
tainly be matched . " ) . 
274 Sre sujJm text accompanying notes 252-54. 
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to offer Congress when it considered the content of a proposed sub­
stance-specific procedural rule, and how such a rule would fit within 
and affect  other parts of the broader landscape. Like a certain four 
letter word , "The Enabling Act Process" loses its power when invoked 
too often .  
The Federal Rules include more than the Federal Rules of  Civil 
Procedure , and, as has been noted, most congressional hold-ups or 
overrides of Federal Rules, and most direct statutory amendments ,  ac­
tual and proposed, have concerned the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro­
cedure. 27"' Although some of my normative prescriptions-perhaps all 
of them-apply equally to criminal as to civil procedure-it is evident 
that,  for instance, the perceived need for speedy lawmaking will  be 
more pressing and more frequent in the criminal realm,  particularly 
now that the war on crime ( and criminals) includes the war on terror­
ism (and terrorists ) . I t  is also evident that the forces of partisan polit­
ics and ideology are more l ikely to be irresistible in that realm,  
rendering the reestablishment of something approaching the pre-
1 973 equilibrium impossible ,  at least in the short term. Indeed, fric­
tion in one area of the criminal process-sentencing-bids fair  to do 
serious harm to every aspect of interbranch relations. 27(' 
I have noted, but devoted insufficient attention to , the phenome­
non of Congress eschewing both "The Enabling Act Process" and sub­
stance-specific procedure in favor of ( 1 )  statutory directions to the 
rulemakers either requiring or encouraging rulemaking on particular 
subj ects ,  coupled with ( 2 )  standards to be reflected in any such 
rules. 277 Although personal conversations have suggested that some 
members of the federal judiciary bristle at such directions, particularly 
when given to the Supreme Court, and at such s tandards, at least 
when they are inconsistent with the preferred policy of the institu­
tional judiciary or appear to preempt a suitably deliberative process 
for the development of policy,27H such statutory directions may be 
preferable to some of the alternatives. Indeed, the technique deserves 
careful study as a lawmaking via media with the promise to meet the 
legitimate process , insti tutional , and political needs of both the judici­
ary and Congress. Since Congress would retain power to proceed by 
legislation if the judiciary failed to accept an invitation to fashion rules 
(which, again, seems h ighly unlikely) , and since commands to the Su-
275 See supra text accompanying notes 74, 96.  
276 See infia text accompanying n otes 285-87. 
277 SPP sujJra text accompanying notes 104 ,  1 1 2- 1 3, 1 1 8 .  
2 7 8  Concerns o f  th is sort appear t o  l ie  behind the _judiciary 's  attempt to secure 
amendmen ts ro the E-Government  Act .  SPe supra note 1 04. 
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preme Court at least may raise consti tutional questions,  l ittle if any­
thing is to be gained by requiring rather than encouraging 
rulemaking. 
There is no necessary connection between an individual ' s  ability 
as a federal j udge (or rulemaker) and his or her personal political 
skills. For many years the federal j udiciary was poorly served by some 
of the judges ( and other rulemakers, including academics ) who inter­
acted with the public and with Congress on proposed Federal Rules. 
:\rrogance, particularly when conjoined with ignorance (of the facts ) ,  
is well calculated to yield calls for help to h igher authority. The same 
reasoning that has shaped the constitution of the Judicial Confer­
ence's Budget Committee279 is appl icable to all committee leadership 
positions that predictably require substantial interaction with Con­
gress, the bar, or the public .  
Moreover, with the traditional rhetoric about procedure revealed 
as empty, when cynicism about law and those who make it is rampant, 
and given more than thirty years of appointments to the rules commit­
tees by chief justices appointed by Republ ican presidents ,  i t  has not 
been helpful that a few of those appointed to positions of rulemaking 
responsibility have worn their ideological preferences on their sleeves .  
In  any event, a game theoretic or institutionalist perspective confirms 
the importance of having people in leadership positions who are 
aware of congressional preferences. ::Bo 
Given the concerns that almost brought about the Supreme 
Court 's removal from "The Enabling Act Process" in the 1 980s,  i t  is 
ironic that today the Court may be a source, rather than a victim,  of 
the current distress of federal procedural lawmaking. For, however 
disingenuous claims of 'judicial abuse" or 'judicial activism" may ap­
pear as applied to the lower federal courts ,2B 1 there is no  blinking the 
fact  that the Supreme Court has declared federal statutes unconsti tu­
tional at an unprecedented rate in recent years , and it is not  unrea­
sonable to believe " that the Court is not approaching i ts review 
functions modestly, but instead actually is inventing new reasons for 
invalidating legislation . "2s2 It is doubtful that members of Congress 
vvho so believe will distinguish the Court from the institutional federal 
'27Y Sre s�r iTH,  sujJJ(l note 23, at 20 ( referring to j udges " h aving abil i tv, legislative 
experience . and congressional associations" ) .  
280 See Bone, supra n o te 1 33 ,  at 906;  supm note 1 78. 
2 8 1  Str supra note 26 1 .  
282 Shan e .  supra note 2 6 1 , at  :S J O . ' 'Of the 1 5 1  federal statutes deciared unconsti­
tu'ion:tl i n  whoie or part by the Court between 1 789 an d June 2000,  40-over 26 
percen t-were declared unconsti tutional since 1 9 8 1 . "  Irl. (foo tnote o m i tted ) ; see also 
id. at 5 ?>6.  
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judiciary o r  that they will quickly embrace arguments grounded i n  the 
need for forbearance and mutual respect. 
In any event, creating a system or culture in which timely and 
sincere consultation is accepted practice will not be easy with respect 
to some congressional committees, and i t  would not foreclose last­
minute or stealth legislation, nongermane provisions smuggled into 
appropriation bills, and other excrescences of the contemporary legis­
lative landscape.  From one perspective , the judiciary suffers no differ­
ently than other interest groups, although its institutional experience 
doubtless causes special regret that there appears to be so l ittle legal 
space in which to require due process in lawmaking. �w� From an­
other, although the breakdown in the congressional committee sys­
tem and the other forces that have led to the dominance of party 
inf1uence and party discipline in  legislative politics help to explain 
why members of Congress might in fact regard the j udiciary as just 
another interest group, we all suffer when it  is so regarded. 
I t  is reasonable, but in the current political climate perhaps not 
realistic ,  to expect more responsible behavior from the Department of 
Justice, which at least twice in recent years proposed last-minute addi­
tions to bills that affected Federal Rules or responsibilities under the 
Enabling Act without previously consulting the judiciary.�x-+ But that 
is a small point at which to stick if, as is widely believed,  the Justice 
Department was the primary moving force behind the so-called Fee­
ney Amendment, where the absence of consultation has been the sub­
ject  of much adverse comment?x'> including from the C h iefjustice ,::!t'
6 
and some of thP provisions of which have recently been declared an 
283 SPe Becker, sujJm note 236, at 7. 
'284 SPI: Memorandum from john K. Rabiej ,  Chief Rules Comm.  Support Office,  to 
the Standing Comm.  on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the J udic ial Conference 
of the U ni ted States 3 (Dec. 4,  1 996) (describing provision concern ing effective date 
of ne1v Evidence Rules 4 1 3-4 1 5  " inciuclecl as part of the enacted general Appropria­
tions Law" and submitted by the U .S. Department of Justice (DOJ )  to Congress "the 
night before the vote was taken on the legislation" ) ; Memorandum from James N. 
I shida, supra note l 02,  at 3 ( reporting that p rovision requiring Supreme Court 
rulemaking in the £-Government Act resulted from "a last-minute move [ inserting) 
language proposed by [ the  DOJ] " ) .  
'285 See Becker, · upra note 236,  a t  7.  
Excrescences indeed. l have seen too many of them,  especial lv in recent 
months.  Firs t  and foremost is the Feeney Amendment t:o the Amber Alert  
Bi l l ,  which resulted in  a drastic cutback o n  the abi l i tv of federal sentencing 
j udges to make downward departures from the Sentencing Guidel ines in 
certain kinds of  cases, and which also l imited the number ofjuclges who can 
se rve on the U.S .  Sen tencing Comm ission .  The Feeney /unendment was 
tacked onto an unrelated and popular bi l l ,  making i t  difficult for legislato rs 
to vote against it ,  and then rammed through the Congress in violation of 
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unconsti tutional abridgment of separation of powers . 287 Moreover, if 
the federal judiciary' s  appeals for regularity and consultation are to be 
credible, i ts leaders must ensure that their house is in order, which 
means resisting in the future temptations to game the l egislative sys­
tem in the very ways the judiciary has recently decried.  288 
The "current political climate" and the pessimism i t  naturally en­
genders about the future of inter-branch relations in general put the 
problems of federal procedural lawmaking in humbling and depress­
ing perspective . They may also suggest that past proposals about fed­
eral rulemaking or federal procedural lawmaking as a whole, 
including my own, are hopelessly academic and/ or hopelessly naive . 
\Ale have seen where the power lies,  and we know that the answers to 
our il ls do not lie either in i ts unilateral deployment or  in undis­
criminating resistance. History did not s tart in 1 934, but a h istory of 
mutual respect and forbearance did start in that year, and although 
subsequent events have revealed the need for some adj ustments ,  the 
reasons therefor are not also reasons to abj ure norms of 
interdependence. 
The reestablishment of such norms will not, I am confident, issue 
fro m  elegant models or finely reasoned metrics , and experience sug­
gests that commissions are also not the solution. We need to redis­
cover, in relations between the federal judiciary and Congress, a form 
of politics that seems almost a lost art in today's  landscape . 289 The 
notion that the judiciary might take the lead in reestablishing such a 
House and Senate rules without any public hearings and virtually no  debate 
regarding i ts effect on sentencing law, policy, or  practice. 
!d. ; see also id. at 7-8 . 
286 See Hon.  William H .  Rehnquist, 2003 YearcEnrl Report on the Federal Judiciary, 
T H I RD B RANC H , Jan.  2004, at l ,  l -2 .  
287 See U nited States v. Mendoza, No. CR03-730DT, 2004 U.S .  D ist. LEXIS  1 449, at  
q g  (C .D .  Cal. Jan.  1 2 , 2004) . 
288 See Becker, s ujna note 236,  at 8 ( noting that j udiciary secured " last minute 
riders creating new district court j udgeships" and "that too was wrong" ) ;  Kasten meier 
& Remington, supra note 208, at 84 ( noting the " tendency of the courts to seek autho­
rizations for experimental programs directly through the appropriations p rocess'' and 
the "eJ:fort by the legislative represen tatives of the _judicial branch to play off the ap­
propriations and authorizing committees i n  order to obtain maxim um leverage" ) . 
289 As a start, the federal judiciary should at last come to grips with questions 
about communications wi th members of  Congress that have been asked (and an­
sv.;ered) by Robert Katzmann and Charles Geyh.  See �\TZMt\NN ,  supm note 208 jHl.\­
sim; Geyh, supra note 42 passim; see alw Resnik ,  s upra note 254 passi·m. 
Perhaps the Brookings I nstitution could again sponsor a conference,  as i t  
d i d  i n  1 986, among t h e  three branches a t  which they could discuss these 
issues ["the matter  of congressional process across the board" ]  at the h ighest 
level. . . .  Although the impact of the perverse Congressional p ractices that I 
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politics-of "custom, dialogue, compromise, and statesmanship"2�Jo_ 
will come as a shock only to those who believe that poli tics and law, 
l ike judicial independence and j udicial accountability,29 1  are i rrecon­
cilable, or those whose exposure to politically feckless j udges has 
caused them to forget those who are adepts. �9� The times require 
Learned Hand's ( and David Shapiro ' s )  "spirit of moderation."  
What is  t h e  spirit o f  moderati o n ?  It  is the temper w h i c h  does n o t  
press a partisan advantage t o  the bitter e n d ,  whi c h  can understan d 
and will  respect the other side, which feels a u n i ty between all c i ti­
zens-real and not the fortui tous p roduct of propaganda-which 
recognizes their  common fate and their common aspirations-in a 
word, which has faith i n  th e sacredness of the i n divi d ual .29"' 
have described affects al l  kinds of legislation ,  perhaps the j udiciary can fur­
nish the template that can persuade the Congress to clean up its act. 
Becker, supra note 236, at 1 0. Note in that regard that " U J udges and members of 
Congress engaged in a rare exchange of perspectives during  a recent  Supreme Court 
Fel lows Program panel d iscussion on the relationship between Congress and the fed­
eral courts . "  A Calljor Alore Communication, T H I RD BRANCH , Feb. 2004, at 9, 9. A.s also 
reported there, J ustice Breyer "suggested reviving programs that once provided op­
portuni tites for members of Congress and federal judges to talk to each other." !d. 
290 See sujJUl text accompanying note 4 1 .  
29 1 See Burbank, sujna note 2 ,  at �25. 
The ins trumental view of judicial independence taken here,  on  the other 
hand, requires no dichotomy and sees no  paradox, since i t  p roceeds from 
the premise that j udicial independence and judicial accou n tabil i ty " are differ­
ent sides of the same rain. " An accountable judiciary wi thout any in depen­
dence is weak and feeble. An independent judiciary without any 
accoun tabi l i ty is dangerous. 
!d. (footnotes omi ttecl ) .  
292 See Burbank, supra note 4 1 , at 1 234-35 .  
29� LEARNED HAND,  T H E  S P I RIT OF LIBERTY 1 25 ( 1 959 ) .  
